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Film-Philosophy International
Salon-Journal (ISSN 1466-4615) Vol. 9 No. 38, July 2005 |
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Reni Celeste Love and Catastrophe: Filming the Sublime in _Hiroshima Mon Amour_ [1] This essay studies two scenes from Alain Resnais's film
_Hirsoshima Mon Amour_ (1959) alongside the concept of the sublime in order
to take film from a discussion of desire to one of love. Love is understood,
according to philosopher Emmanuel Levinas's description, as an infinite
alterity, rather than as totality or unity. Though Levinas insists on a
separation between love and tragedy, and argues that the work of art cannot
achieve the ethical, I argue that Resnais's film expresses a sublime
achievement by staging, or representing, the infinite tragically through
failure and betrayal. Introduction *Desire* is no small word in narrative film theory.
Besides being the engine of the popular film plot, it has been modern film
theory's deepest obsession. Is it possible to move from a discourse of
*desire* to one of *love*? A discourse of desire understands the film screen
as corresponding to deep psychoanalytic structures of the desiring spectator.
Desire in psychoanalysis locates a fundamental lack established in infantile
experience (Freud) and language (Lacan), and posits the film screen as a
potential site of resolution. Love, as I will define it, corresponds to the
quest towards an infinite difference. To understand the cinema according to
love is to attempt to enframe the infinite. Can the film screen make this
transition from desire to love -- is the infinite something that can
*appear*? The question of the sublime posed by Kant bears a similarity: can
reason surpass the limits of the human faculties when one encounters what is
beyond representation? I will employ Kant's concept of the sublime alongside
two scenes of loss and retrieval in Alain Resnais's _Hiroshima Mon Amour_
(1959), to argue that film can present the unpresentable and achieve love. The Platonic version of love traditionally has been
understood as a quest for the universal, the same, or the one. Love is
classically depicted in terms of identity-desire strives to transform
difference into unity. Emmanuel Levinas proposes a challenge to this regime
that also represents a challenge to the traditional understanding of
philosophy or metaphysics. As he writes in _Time and the Other_, 'I have
precisely wanted to contest the idea that the relationship with the other is
fusion. The relationship with the Other is the absence of the other; not
absence pure and simple, not the absence of pure nothingness, but absence in
a horizon of the future, an absence that is time'. [2] For Levinas love is
infinity rather than totality. Levinas opposes to this ethical infinity of
the Other, the realm of representation, or art. In order to undermine the
equivalence in deconstruction between being and image that ultimately destabilized
all ethical and truth claims, Levinas insisted in his early writings on a
strict division between art and ethics. Art is incapable of the infinite
because it is ultimately without time, and can deliver no future. In his
essay 'Reality and its Shadow', he described art in terms of tragedy a frozen
nightmare of repetition that he referred to as *l'entre temps*, or the
meanwhile. 'Every art work is in the end, a statue-a stoppage of time'. [3]
He includes cinema, theater, music and the so-called time-based arts. To
achieve love is to break out of the province of tragedy and the work of art.
This description of both art and love implies a critical separation between
two concepts that have been historically intertwined: tragedy and love. I will write in accordance with Levinas's understanding
of philosophy and love as well as his conviction that love exceeds the frame
of representation, desire and exchange. I also understand love to be the
single most important achievement for Being and agree that the ethical is
deeply bound to love as difference. What distinguishes my position from
Levinas's is that I insist on the classic inseparability of love and tragedy.
I will argue that, despite his refusal, representation is capable of love as
he has defined it. In order to do this I will make recourse to the sublime, a
concept that emerged in Enlightenment aesthetics and has since revealed
itself to indicate the ultimate challenge to reason -- a challenge that
despite Kant's insistence on nature, was ultimately waged in the work of art.
I will make my case for film in two steps. First I will give an explanation
of the sublime and consider why it has become such an important concept for
postmodern philosophy. Next I will argue through an analysis of _Hiroshima
Mon Amour_ that tragic film achieves the sublime by enframing the experience
of the infinite -- in this case love and catastrophe. The Return of the Sublime The sublime, alongside tragedy, is one of the most
important concepts pertaining to the relation of art and thought. The
significance of the concept of the sublime for philosophy can be traced to
Kant's third _Critique_, where along with beauty it served the role of
bridging theoretical and practical reason. Kant describes the sublime as an
experience of astonishment, first noted by Edmund Burke, whereby pleasure and
pain are experienced simultaneously when confronted with grand and excessive
displays of nature. Though Kant did not speak of tragedy, this structure in
which success and nobility is asserted through failure is analogous to the
structure of tragedy. Not only is the sublime a tragic structure, but also
tragedy is a sublime experience. Tragedy has been described by Friedrich
Schelling as the drama, or the staging, of the sublime experience. [4] The sublime however is not a mere psychological
experience. Though Kant considered his discovery secondary to the concept of
beauty because it described an experience rather than something that could be
said of the object itself, Kant noted that we can attribute two kinds of
agitation generated by the sublime to the object itself, and 'hence present
the object as sublime in these two ways'. [5] These two forms of agitation
are the *mathematical* and *dynamical*. This extends the sublime from being a
merely subjectivist phenomenon to being *transcendental* in the Kantian
sense. The first component of the sublime, the mathematical, is
concerned with size, or as Kant describes it, that which is absolutely large,
where *absolute* refers to what is large beyond comparison. Thus Kant
concludes, 'Nothing that can be called an object of the senses is to be
called sublime'. [6] Imagination is our power to estimate the magnitude of
things in the world of sense, yet when it strives to embrace this absolute
largeness it comes upon its limitations and fails because absolute largeness
is not a magnitude but a boundlessness. This failure causes the sensation of
displeasure, but the situation also simultaneously ushers in reason, in the
form of the awareness that our ability to think this infinite as a whole
points to our possession of a supersensible power, and this superiority of
reason is experienced as pleasure. Paradoxically this ability of the mind to
apprehend the unlimited as totality is only brought to awareness aesthetically
as the experience of an inability. The pleasure of the sublime is only
possible by means of displeasure and failure. The second component of the sublime is the *dynamical*,
or what Kant sometimes refers to simply as *might*. An object of nature generates
the experience of the dynamically sublime when it reveals a might that has no
dominance over us. [7] The deep gorges, raging streams and massive mountains
instill a terror and amazement in us, but if we judge from a safe place we
are not actually afraid or cowering before a dominant power. Once again Kant
argues that our fear in the face of unbounded nature actually provokes our
sense of superiority and independence to nature, and thus our strength before
it. The might of nature in comparison to our fragile being makes us recognize
our physical impotence and vulnerability, but at the same time it reveals an
ability we possess to judge ourselves apart from nature. To take the
astonishing immensity and force of nature as an object of our mind is to reveal
our minds as larger and greater. As Kant says, 'Hence nature is here called
sublime merely because it elevates our imagination, [making] it exhibit those
cases where the mind can come to feel its own sublimity, which lies in its
vocation and elevates it even above nature'. [8] Kant's isolation of the sublime to *nature* is essential
to the larger goals at stake for him in this concept. His insistence on the
superiority of the mind over nature, and of the superiority of reason over
imagination, cannot be fully understood without reference to the relation of
the sublime to moral feelings. For Kant the mind has a purpose that
transcends nature, and that purpose is the apprehension of the supersensible
as the grounds for moral judgments. This discussion is taken up in 'S29 On
the Modality of a Judgment about the Sublime in Nature'. [9] Insofar as the
analytic of the sublime concerns itself with the relationship between reason
and sensibility, it stands at the junction between metaphysics and skepticism
and calls forth the question not only of the possibility of knowledge but
also the limits of reason. Recent interest in the sublime indicates that in
the midst of postmodern skepticism and the death sentence waged on
metaphysics by almost all major philosophies in the past century, that the
question of surpassing ultimate limits has once again become critical. [10] The most influential rereading of the sublime may be
Lyotard's, because he understands it to exemplify the postmodern problematic.
Lyotard discussed the sublime in his earlier work _The Postmodern Condition:
A Report on Knowledge_, where he argued that modern art found its impetus 'in
the aesthetic of the sublime'. [11] He distinguished in this text modern art
from postmodern art in terms of their various responses to the possibility of
presentation. Modern aesthetics 'allows the unpresentable to be put forward
only as the missing contents', whereas the postmodern aesthetic 'puts forward
the unpresentable in presentation itself'. [12] Both modern and postmodern
art revolve around the problem posed by the sublime -- how can art present
the unpresentable? Lyotard and others have found in the Kantian conception of
the sublime the fissure of modern thought, uncovering the very condition of
20th century thought -- an obsession with the limits of knowledge. Though
postmodern interpretations of the sublime see it as the very limit of reason,
rather than as victory, in the notion of the sublime Kant did not uncover, as
be believed, a mere appendix to beauty but the most rigorous and astonishing
feature of philosophy itself -- the aporia, a point of infinite
possibilities, to which we can return repeatedly without resolution. In both the sublime and the tragic, contradiction and
negative presentation are invoked as an aesthetic form of truth that stands
superior to logic and inseparable from the ethical. Human dignity and
nobility only reaches its full height in the failure of the system, because
through the realization (reason) of this failure a larger victory is asserted
negatively, that of the hegemony of reason. When Friedrich Schelling asks how
the Greeks were able to bear the contradictions of their tragedy, he finds
his answer in the idea of tragedy as supreme justice. The Greek hero is
condemned to play out the struggle between the opposing equalities of freedom
and necessity, and to assert the hegemony of freedom through its very loss.
For Schelling drama is the highest art because of its sublime achievement.
[13] _Hiroshima Mon Amour presents_ a modern case. _Hiroshima Mon Amour_ _Hiroshima Mon Amour_ is a film that proclaims that
history will not be possessed, and then proceeds to reflect the shadow of
historical truth through the confession of this limitation in narrative
cinema. Commissioned to do a documentary film on Hiroshima, Alain Resnais
instead made a feature-length drama that questions the very possibility of
documenting history. If classical aesthetics in the German idealist tradition
situates the question of art within a philosophy of identity, here the same
paradoxes are marked within a philosophy of difference. Can the frame
*present* what lies beyond the realm of the sensible: love, catastrophe, and
historical truth. Can a film image be considered a *presentation*? How film
presents absence is the broader question of _Hiroshima Mon Amour_. In his biography of Alain Resnais, James Monaco
describes the film this way: '_Hiroshima Mon Amour_ is two films, often
working against each other'. [14] It is this point of strife that gives the
film its metaphysical and erotic tension. The film takes as its center the
question of love and catastrophe, contact and disruption, the play of
opposites touching and recoiling, but it does so in a manner in which
opposing forces are not conflated upon one another in equivalence, or
reconciled and unified. For example, it consists of a dialogue between two
nameless lovers, one French and one Japanese; it is set between two cities in
two nations; it involves two sets of lovers existing in two different moments
of time; it questions the distinction and commingling of fact and fiction;
and it brings into friction the image and the word, the horrible and the
beautiful. In this film love and catastrophe are shown to coexist, but in a
relation of perpetual strife that refuses totality. The plot of this film is fairly simple. A French actress
has an adulterous affair with a Japanese man while filming a peace
documentary on Hiroshima on location. The affair regenerates a memory of a
lost German lover from her youth in an occupied France. The film thematizes
the problem of *telling* or presentation across all levels of articulation,
image, music and text, through the figure of betrayal. The first manner in
which these themes become cinematic is in the structure of the film's
temporality. The temporality of this film is both brief and vast. On the one
hand the film transpires within the claustrophobic confines of an adulterous
love affair that lasts less than two days; and on the other it takes up the
vast territory of history and memory as it struggles to revive lost episodes
of trauma and loss from the war thirteen years before. That the latter is
filtered through the confines of the former sets the stage of recollection as
a prison. The adulterous affair exists as a space without space. Its
illegitimacy relegates it to the realm of secrecy and transgression. From
this position, a desire that refuses fulfillment, it stands in for love. And
from this void ironically emerges the portal through which the past (truth)
may be reanimated as fiction (lies) within the limited confines of a screen. Despite remaining nameless the French actress and the
Japanese architect will be both distinctly developed characters and
universals. He tells her she reminds him of every woman, and she asks if he
is entirely Japanese. She confides that adultery is nothing new for her, that
she has a weakness for men. She is comfortable with lies, but has no reason
to lie to him. She can be at both times completely honest and dishonest. She
feeds on reinvention, recreation, fiction, and yet is tormented by a desire
for truth. Foremost she seeks freedom, and finds it only through secrets. No
one has all the pieces to her and so she is not possessed. This is her
greatest loneliness and her greatest freedom. This stranger will be the only
one to whom she has ever spoken the story of her dead German lover. The
architect on the other hand is a realist, a man who builds and occupies
structures. Just as the film focuses during the prelude on the architectonic
in its portrayal of urban construction and reconstruction, he too will open
up the dichotomy between structure and history, position and its absence. Through its manipulation of time and space this film
seeks to create a space of disclosure. This requires that the ineffable be
given a position. This position that denies position must in some sense
always come as a betrayal. This film acknowledges itself as this betrayal and
in so doing redeems itself. I would like to reveal this betrayal by focusing
on two scenes of radical loss -- the 15-minute prelude, which tries to
reanimate the catastrophe of Hiroshima, and the flashback of the German
soldier, in which the French actress tries to reanimate her lost love. The Prelude From the first shot the image is marked by an unsettling
ambiguity. A piano plays, the screen is dark, and slowly light emerges,
revealing glistening flesh, body parts moving in time with melancholic piano
notes. The image provokes the viewer to draw closer, to struggle against
confusion, to make out in the darkness what is too dim and unclear to
understand. Is the flesh loving or is it dying? Are these the limbs of lovers
entwined, and the sweat of sex, or is it the final movements of a dying,
damaged body? The film's title asserts the only evidence one has to
comprehend the image -- the words *Hiroshima* and *Mon Amour* -- each
seemingly signifying in different directions. These bodies are not given
faces until 15 minutes into the film, but even when they will be clearly
identified as lovers, they will go unnamed throughout the film, and despite
the film's probing into their histories, she will simply be the French
actress, and he the Japanese architect. Overlaying this opening image is the commencement of the
dialogue between the lovers that bears resemblance to an incantation or
musical exchange. The voices loom over the images; the male asserting total
negation, the female total affirmation. The sense of the entire dialogue is
already encapsulated in their opening lines: 'HE. You saw nothing in Hiroshima.' 'SHE. I saw *everything*. Everything'. [15] Her claim to total presence is negated not only by his
repeated denial of everything she affirms, but also by the shots that
accompany her claims -- public spaces, architecture, the hospital, the
museum, artifacts, photographs, and newsreels. What we see are images of a
city reconstructed and obsessed with its lost history: children gazing at
miniature reproductions of the city, artifacts behind glass in museum boxes
(twisted iron, bicycle wheel, hair from the heads of anonymous women), and
dramatized newsreels of the trauma following the explosion. While she seeks
and speaks of actuality, the visuals show only mediation and loss. Gradually
a relation other than strict opposition is brought to bear upon *everything*
and *nothing*. The sensible trace is everything, all there is, and yet it
indicates a lack, a nothing. Thus the lovers speak the same thing from
opposing positions. As singular assertions the claims bear no truth, becoming
merely opposing metaphysical poles. It is the toccata and fugue of their
dialogue that gives them their weight as aesthetic truth claims. The woman repeatedly relies upon official history to
bolster her case. Beyond the museum reconstructions there is the memory of
the media documentation in process, of being witness to the making of history
through newsreels. She insists, if not upon the credibility of the newsreel,
at least upon the phenomenology of having seen the newsreels. Her voice
becomes more urgent, and the images move frantically as well. The image track
shows actual newsreels taken after August 6, 1945, crosscut with shots of the
lovers in shadow. 'SHE. I saw the newsreels. On the second day, History
tells, I'm not making it up, on the second day certain species of animals
rose again from the depths of the earth and from the ashes. Dogs were photographed for all eternity. I saw them. I *saw* the newsreels. I *saw* them. On the first day. On the second day. On the third day.' [16] The progression of days passing, each documented and
archived for its developments and departure from the previous images, attests
to a history, a linear mode of narrative captured for all eternity. But he
interrupts: 'HE. You saw nothing. Nothing.' [17] Next we have the beginnings of the theme that brings the
oppositions of the horrible and the beautiful into an uneasy alliance. As she
speaks of beautiful flowers we see images of children, of gaping wounds being
probed with instruments, burns, fingers missing, an eye being extracted. 'SHE. . . . on the fifteenth day too. Hiroshima was blanketed with flowers. There were
cornflowers and gladiolas everywhere, and morning glories and day lilies that
rose again from the ashes with an extraordinary vigor, quite unheard of for
flowers till then. I didn't make anything up.' 'HE. You made it *all* up.' 'SHE. *Nothing*. Just as in love this illusion exists, this illusion of
being able never to forget, so I was under the illusion that I would never
forget Hiroshima. Just as in love.' [18] The play in the texts between *all* and *nothing* leads
into the first reference to love, which is presented through analogy. Love
begins to be linked to catastrophe, and memory to illusion. It is here that
the case she has made thus far to the preservation and possession of events
begins to open onto its opposite and expose the wound opened by love and
catastrophe. The film now expands from the private sufferings of
individuals to the city as social phenomenon. Individuals will be destroyed, lives
will be radically transformed, but *it* goes on. The city is shown now as an
angry force and these larger public structures exhibit all the same torments
as the private sphere. Newsreels show demonstrations, mass burials of food,
conflict, and public speeches, but these visuals exist without narration,
orchestrated only by the film music, as if to contest the classic documentary
belief in the narrator's omniscience and ability to control the meaning of
images. Unity and dispersement are shown to transpire on a variety of scales,
connecting the private and the public, personal history and global history,
the life of the person and the metropolis. These oppositions are not
represented in an effort to assert a hierarchy, wherein one is diminished and
the other heralded as the greater value, but to show their inseparability,
and mutual entanglement. This entire prelude can be seen as an overlaying of
desire and death upon the outline of the urban landscape, but the final
moments conclude and highlight this project. The dialogue dissolves into a
monologue of desire by the French actress accompanied by a monotonous,
hypnotic tracking shot where the camera flows steadily down the city streets,
across bridges, along train tracks. Her utterances and the visual movement
resemble the moments of deep passion moving toward sexual climax, but we see
no lovers, just streets, onlookers, details, bicyclists, things being passed
as if seen from handlebars of a bicycle. These images are haunted, appearing
as if they had already been lost, or as if they were being remembered from
deep within a dream. As we see these lost images passing rhythmically by, we
hear her disembodied monologue addressing the lover. 'SHE. . . . I meet you. I remember you. Who are you? You're so good for me. How could I have known that this city was made to the
size of love? How could I have known that you were made to size of my
body? You're great. How wonderful. You're great. How slow all of a sudden. And how sweet. More than you can know. You destroy me. You're so good for me. Plenty of time. Please. Take me. Deform me, make me ugly. Why not you? Why not you in this city and in this night so like the
others you can't tell the difference? Please . . .'. [19] It is here that the impulses of desire are most
explicitly linked to fatality and destruction. The Other is a phantasm that
both redeems and destroys. It is the otherness of the lover that is coveted,
but the goal of desire would be to appropriate that otherness, make it
sameness, and absolve the radical threat to individuation. Ecstasy is shown
to be the process of resisting, succumbing, and being deformed and
transfigured in the embrace of the Other. To achieve love is in some way to
interrupt the ambition of desire and embrace the ecstatic. The Betrayal of Love There has been much discussion regarding the
transference that takes place in this film between the recounted love affair
with the German soldier during the war and the love affair in the present
with the Japanese architect. But rather than consider the complex
psychological dynamics revealed in this act of recovery, I would like to look
at how these two adulterous lovers come to signify the larger betrayal that
functions in the filmic presentation of history. Firstly, the situation that commences the attempt at
historical retrieval is adultery. The encounter between the French actress
and the Japanese architect is secretive and discontinuous. It is a closed
intimacy that does not extend outside their dialogue and this brief moment in
time. It is as if they speak to themselves, into a closed box, or to the
already dead. This setting highlights something essential about the community
of two more universally. The language of lovers bears a certain exclusivity.
The adulterous love is born within an even stricter secrecy, it was not
intended to travel or be passed on. Each will carry its memory as a kind of
loneliness and longing, just as she has carried her dead German lover as her
deepest loneliness up to this point of confession, where she turns him into
story and in doing so betrays him. To tell their secret, even within another
secret, is to reduce it to language and representation. The affair with the German soldier during the German
occupation of France was also by circumstance a deep social transgression
held quiet between the lovers. Their encounters were hidden. We see them
riding bicycles through desolate countryside. 'SHE. At first we met in barns. Then among the ruins.
And then in rooms. Like anywhere else.' [20] Love is described as a secret place; one that opens up
within solitude. It is the attempt to share a place that really permits of no
communion, and the promise implicit in this effort is that this secret
community not be turned into public rhetoric or universalized. Whether one
loves alone or one's love is returned amounts to the same torment, the same
loneliness, and the same impossibility. After her confession/betrayal we see
the French actress battling with her solitude, entering her hotel,
uncomfortable, at first unable to face herself and exiting the room,
retracing her steps, then re-entering and finally coming to terms with the
room. She goes to the sink to wash her face, as if seeking absolution, and
looks into the mirror. What follows is a combination of speech and interior
monologue. 'SHE. You think you know. And then, no. You don't. In Nevers she had a German love when she was young . . .
We'll go to Bavaria, my love, and there we'll marry. She never went to Bavaria. (*Looking at herself in the
mirror*.) I dare those who have never gone to Bavaria to speak to
her of love. You were not yet quite dead. I told our story. I betrayed you tonight with this stranger. I told our story. It was, you see, a story that could be told. For fourteen years I hadn't found . . . the taste of an
impossible love again. Since Nevers. Look how I'm forgetting you . . . Look how I've forgotten you. Look at me.' [21] This is a disturbing and complicated shot. She takes
herself as an object in the third person while looking at her reflection in a
mirror, and she addresses her deceased lover directly from an interior voice.
There is in this monologue an *I*, a *her*, a *you*, and a *we*. She asks the
dead to take her as an object, to look at her, and to see on her exterior the
signs of the betrayal. As if oblivion, forgetfulness could be seen, as if the
dead were capable of redeeming. Here she is neither herself nor another. Even
solitude is divided and she herself cannot be one. She has found another
impossible love, not because her love for the Japanese architect will go
unfulfilled due to circumstances, but because the ambition of desire (to
share one's solitude, to possess the other, to overcome individuation) is an
impossible one. Love itself has thwarted desire. The object of love is
destined to slip away and be lost to her. The only way she can remember him,
or retain him, is by displacing him with others. When she recounts the public recrimination following the
death of her soldier she is unmoved by shame, by her family's dishonor, by
her shaved head. She can think of only one thing -- his absence, his eternal
absence, that her life continues, and his death continues, and that this
border will never be breached. This otherness, this slipping away of the
Other, is love itself. She waits and counts time in her cellar while he lays
timeless in the grave. The encroaching oblivion of their encounter is hers
alone to resist. In the cellar she screams out to her dead lover, but she
knows she is already losing him because she now possesses only a name. 'SHE. Your German name. Only your name. I only have one
memory left, your name.' [22] The proper name here is divested of all its weight. It
is just a name. A word. A signifier. Like the anonymity of the *she* and the
*he*, and the movement of the film away from being simply a public discourse
on Hiroshima (like the peace film and the demonstration within the film),
there is here an attempt to get beyond language and traces. She follows this
ambition for a real, viable memory through pain and blood, scratching her
hands and fingernails against the rock walls of the cellar until they bleed,
then licking off the blood. Pain holds you riveted to a spot and may even
mark the body with a visible scar. It contests forgetfulness. The Japanese architect understands that his task is to
stand in for the German lover, to revive him, and thus to ensure his own
survival. He pries from the French actress her lost memories and she gives
her secrets. He will be the only one who knows her story and this shared
secret will be their bond. The retrieval of this fading story of love
resembles the film itself in its ability to represent at both times a
betrayal and redemption. In forgetting, one remembers. For example, he says
to her in one of their final meetings, 'HE. In a few years, when I'll have forgotten you, and
when other such adventures, from sheer habit, will happen to me, I'll
remember you as the symbol of love's forgetfulness. I'll think of this
adventure as the horror of oblivion. I already know it'. [23] So, to have made the lost German lover into a story is
to have betrayed him, to have made him into discourse and turned intimacy
into mere narrative, but in so far as one presents the narrative as failure,
just as in the sublime, there is a gain through the realization of loss. She
will become nameless and forgotten a few years from now, but she will be
remembered as 'the symbol of love's forgetfulness'. Likewise, Resnais's work,
_Hiroshima Mon Amour_, serves as the symbol of loves forgetfulness, an in
doing so indirectly achieves love. Kant argues that reason remains victorious through its
ability to recognize its limits in the sublime. Postmodern accounts have
found in the sublime the fissure of reason that deems its exercise a failure
and renders it tragic. If we understand Love as Levinas does, it is this very
inability to possess the other that makes love the ultimate achievement of
Being. He says in _Time and the Other_, 'Can this relationship with the other through Eros be
considered as a failure? Once again the answer is yes, if one adopts the
terminology of current descriptions, if one wants to characterize the erotic
with 'grasping', 'possessing', or 'knowing'. But there is nothing of all
this, or the failure of all this, in eros'. [24] Both Nietzsche and Levinas strove to rewrite philosophy.
One through tragedy and one through love. Levinas's thoughts on love reveal
an opposition to a philosophy that defines itself through desire's quest for
totality, authority, and power. Instead he describes philosophy as the
pursuit of Love, a transcendence that is 'otherwise than being' and can be
described best in terms of the future, the mystery to come. Though Levinas
excluded tragedy from this future, I have argued for its inclusion. To bring
together tragedy and love is to grant the work of art a sublime capability --
the achievement of love. Yale University New
Haven, Connecticut, USA Reni Celeste (1964-2004) completed her first
book _The Tragic Screen: Cinema At The Limits Of Philosophy_ in 2003. Her
second book, _Action-Speed-Metropolis_, explores the origins and limits of
the field through the figure of action cinema and industrial modernism. It
looks at cinema both at its origin and its contemporary convergences, in
order to understand how new forms of communication had inspired a global
revision of culture experience and the study of film. Notes 1. This article first appeared in _Studies in French
Cinema_, vol. 3 no. 3, 2003 <http://www.ncl.ac.uk/crif/sfc/journal.htm>.
It is reproduced here with the permission of the editors. 2. Levinas, _Time and the Other_, p. 90. 3. Levinas, 'Reality and its Shadow', p. 137. 4. See Schelling, _The Philosophy of Art_. 5. Kant, _The Critique of Judgment_, p. 100. 6. Ibid., p. 106. 7. Ibid., p. 119. 8. Ibid., p. 121. 9. Ibid., pp. 124-140. 10. The sublime is the subject of no less than thee
recent titles: Crowther's _The Kantian Sublime_ (1989), Makkreel's
_Imagination and Interpretation in Kant_ (1990), and Lyotard's _Lessons on the
Analytic of the Sublime_ (1991). 11. Lyotard, _The Postmodern Condition_, p. 77. 12. Ibid., p. 81. 13. Schelling, _The Philosophy of Art_, pp. 247 and 253. 14. Monaco, _Alain Resnais_, p. 49. 15. Duras, _Hiroshima Mon Amour_, p. 15 16. Ibid., p. 18. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid., p. 19. 19. Ibid., p. 25 20. Ibid., p. 48. 21. Ibid., p. 73. 22. Ibid., p. 57. 23. Ibid., p. 68. 24. Levinas, _Time and the Other_, p. 90. Bibliography Paul Crowther, _The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to
Art_ (Oxford University Press, 1989). Marguerite Duras, _Hiroshima Mon Amour_ (New York: Grove
Press, 1961). Immanuel Kant, _The Critique of Judgment_, trans. Werner
Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1987). Emmanuel Levinas, _Time and the Other_, trans. Richard
A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987). --- 'Reality and its Shadow', in Sean Hand, ed., _The
Levinas Reader_ (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1989). Jean-Francois Lyotard, _The Postmodern Condition: A
Report on Knowledge_, trans. Geoff Bennington (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1984). --- _Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime_, trans.
Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). Rudolf A. Makkreel, _Imagination and Interpretation in
Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment_ (Chicago,
Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1990). James Monaco, _Alain Resnais_ (New York: Oxford Press,
1979). Jean-Luc Nancy, _Of the Sublime: Presence in Question_,
ed. Jeffery Librett (Albany: Suny Press, 1993). Friedrich Nietzsche, _The Birth of Tragedy_, trans.
Ronald Spiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, _The Philosophy of
Art_, ed. and trans. Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: Minnesota University
Press, 1989). Copyright © Intellect Ltd 2003 Reni Celeste, 'Love and Catastrophe: Filming the Sublime
in _Hiroshima Mon Amour_', _Film-Philosophy_, vol. 9 no. 38, July 2005
<http://www.film-philosophy.com/vol9-2005/n38celeste>. |
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