Film-Philosophy
Journal | Salon | Portal (ISSN 1466-4615)
Vol. 5 No. 25, August 2001
Richard Allen
Looking at Motion Pictures (Revised) [1]
I What is it we see when we look at a
motion picture? This is a fundamental question addressed by
all film theory. It derives from a much older question: what
is it we see when we look at a picture? But the answer to
this question depends in turn upon how we understand the
activity of seeing itself. The philosophical understanding
of what seeing is has been dominated by the causal theory of
perception. The concept of a causal connection is central to
understanding the natural world and it serves to
characterize the physical connection between our sensory
organs and what it is that we perceive. We can only see
objects of a certain colour, shape, or size because these
objects impinge causally on our senses. However, the causal
theory of perception makes two further claims: first, that
by acting causally upon our senses, objects cause us to have
a visual experience; second, that the asserted causal
connection does not simply describe our knowledge of the
physical world but it is part of our 'ordinary notion of
perceiving'. [2] The first claim assumes a sharp
divide between 'the mental' and 'the physical' worlds in
order to assert the existence of a causal connection between
the two. The second claim, wishing to deny this sharp
divide, asserts that the idea of a causal connection is
built into the concepts we use to describe our interaction
with the world, in this case of the concept of perception.
It is the burden of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to
contest both these claims. First, he argues there are not
two worlds, 'mental' and 'physical', that are causally
connected to each other, but one physical world that
consists of causal connections. Secondly, he argues that a
philosophical understanding of the mind consists in
attaining a perspicuous overview of the concepts we use to
characterize it and the way these concepts are grounded in
human behaviour, not in the investigation of the causal
preconditions for the application of those concepts. In
other words, there is a sharp distinction between conceptual
and empirical inquiry: grammar, in particular the grammar of
our mental concepts like 'perception', is autonomous. The
causal theory of perception provides a signal instance of
the failure to observe this distinction. I shall begin this essay by sketching
some Wittgenstein-influenced arguments as to why the causal
theory of perception is inadequate. However my main concern
is to explore the ramifications for pictorial perception of
understanding perception in terms of the causal theory. When
'our ordinary notion of perceiving' is characterized in
terms of the existence of a causal connection between an
object perceived and our sensory experience of that object
the case of pictorial perception generates a paradox. For
when we look at a representational painting, a photograph,
or a film, arrayed before us is the two-dimensional
disposition of pigment upon a canvas or light registered
upon photographic paper or projected on a film screen
organized into the shapes of recognizable objects. According
to the causal theory, my 'visual experience' of a picture is
caused by my two dimensional object array. Yet when we look
at a painting, photograph, or film, and report upon our
'visual experience' we commonly report that we see not
simply the disposition of pigment or array of light but what
is depicted in the representation. This is especially true
when we report on what we see in photographs, on television,
and in the cinema. It seems that we see William Shatner in
_Star Trek_, not simply see a representation of him, and
consequently we see that he has grown older in _Star Trek:
The Motion Picture_. However, we may also report seeing
William Shatner when he is depicted in a painting, though we
may feel that our experience of seeing is different in the
case of paintings as opposed to photographs. To the extent
that our ordinary concept of seeing permits us to speak of
seeing what is depicted in a motion picture, our ordinary
understanding of perception in the cinema conflicts with the
causal theory of perception, for how can we report that we
see William Shatner when our 'visual experience' is of a
representation of William Shatner? Visual theorists have sought to
resolve the paradox of pictorial perception in a way that
conforms to the causal theory of perception. As they have
been applied to the problem of perceiving motion pictures,
these theories are of at least four kinds: illusion
theories, transparency theories, imagination theories, and
recognition theories. According to illusion theories of
pictorial perception we see what a picture depicts because a
picture causes us to have a visual experience that is like
the visual experience that we have when we see the object.
We may be deceived by the illusion, in which case it is a
cognitive or epistemic illusion, or the illusion may be
merely sensory or perceptual. Theories of illusion were
highly influential in the film theories of the 197Os and
early 1980s that sought to explain the special power of
movies to shape the imagination. Transparency theories are
associated with the realist tradition of film theory: Bazin,
Kracauer, and Cavell. Transparency theorists claim that the
unique properties of the photographic image allow us, in
some sense, to actually see the object when we look at a
motion picture. The photographed object causes the image to
be produced in the photograph which causes us to have a
visual experience of the object photographed. The thing
photographed is not absent but indirectly made present to us
via its photographic reproduction. Imagination and
recognition theories of pictorial perception are of more
recent vintage and are associated with the turn toward
'cognitive' approaches to understanding motion picture
perception within film theory. Imagination theorists of
pictorial perception deny the fact that we see what is
depicted in a motion picture, our 'visual experience' is
simply one of a two-dimensional representation. If we are
still inclined to speak of seeing what is depicted in a
picture it is because although we do not actually see what a
picture depicts we imagine seeing what a picture depicts.
Recognition theorists, like imagination theorists, resolve
the paradox of pictorial perception by denying that,
strictly speaking, we see what is depicted in a picture. For
recognition theorists, pictorial perception mobilizes a
capacity to recognize objects already possessed by the
spectator. Recognition theorists may also deny that we
imagine that we see something and simply claim that what we
see is the disposition of colours on a flat surface that
cues our recognition of what the picture is of. Each of these theories attempts to
resolve the paradox of looking at pictures by rejecting one
or other horn of the dilemma generated by conceiving
pictorial perception in terms of the causal theory of
perception. Either we see what a picture depicts because
what we see is really the thing itself or an illusion of it,
or we do not see the thing itself and instead we either
imagine that we see what the picture is of or it affords us
a recognition of what it depicts. I shall argue that none of
these solutions are satisfactory: we require an
understanding of seeing (motion) pictures that, contrary to
imagination and recognition theorists, respects that fact
that seeing what a (motion) picture is of is a genuine case
of seeing, without committing ourselves to the idea that
what we see is either the thing itself, as opposed to a
representation of it, or else an illusion of the thing
itself. Such an understanding is predicated upon a rejection
of the causal theory of perception and hence of the paradox
it gives rise to. When I see a representation of William
Shatner in a painting or film I see William Shatner. To deny
the role of the causal theory of perception in the
explanation of pictorial perception is not, of course, to
deny the existence of a physical, causal connection between
the painting or film and the sensory organs of the viewer.
It is simply to claim that this connection cannot explain or
justify the content of our perceptual report. But how do I
justify my own claim that (motion) picture perception is a
genuine case of seeing? I do not offer an alternative theory
here about what it is we see when we look at motion
pictures. Instead, my strategy will be to diagnose what it
is that impels the theorist of vision to insist there is
something strange about our talk of seeing something that is
depicted in a motion picture. Dispel the strangeness, or
recognize how widespread this strangeness is, and the
pressure is allayed to revise our customary ways of speaking
on account of a theory. Following Wittgenstein, I shall argue
that the content of our perceptual reports is specified not
by a theory but simply by what we report that we see when we
make veridical reports using perceptual verbs. In the
_Philosophical Investigations_ Wittgenstein discusses cases
of visual perception that involve the seeing of an aspect,
such as looking at Jastrow's duck-rabbit figure or seeing a
family resemblance. [3] In aspect seeing any
characterization of the physical properties of what is seen
fails to unambiguously determine the nature of what it is
that we see, for while the physical properties of what we
see do not change we seem to see something different. For
example, when previously we have seen the duck-rabbit figure
as a rabbit, now we see it as a duck, but we cannot explain
the change in what it is that we see by any physical change
in the thing perceived. It is tempting to understand the
switch from the duck to the rabbit as an interpretation of
the figure, for we can choose to look at it one way or
another once we recognize that the figure contains two
aspects. However, when the aspect first dawns upon us we are
not in a position to 'choose' what we see, our perception of
the duck-rabbit as a duck is compelled upon us by the
figure. And it is the way the figure compels us to see it
under any given aspect (unless we switch) that renders the
perception of an aspect like ordinary seeing. I shall argue
that pictorial perception in general is a case of
'continuous aspect seeing': (motion) pictures allow us to
continuously see what they depict where the difference in
what we see between merely seeing a two dimensional array
and seeing what is depicted by that array is not specifiable
in terms of the physical properties of what we see. Once
again, this is not to deny the existence of a causal
relationship between an object with certain physical
properties and the sensory organ of the observer, it is to
deny that a specification of the physical properties of the
object can serve to characterize what we really see, and
hence support a denial that we really see what is depicted
in picture. My concern is to address the paradox
of looking at pictures. However, contained within the
problem of whether or not we can see what a picture depicts
is a problem posed by a certain class of pictures: pictures
of fictions. Fictional objects do not exist. How can
something that is non-existent be depicted, and if it cannot
be depicted how can we see it in a picture? The idea that we
can perceive fictional objects is surely nonsensical: a
'metaphysical impossibility'. [4] My approach to the
problem of perceiving fictions is simply this. Assuming that
fictions can be depicted, then the arguments that I make
about looking at pictures in general apply to pictures of
fictions as well. That is, just as we might report that we
saw Larry Hagman acting the part of J.R. being shot, we
might also report, if we were avid _Dallas_ watchers, 'J.R.
has been shot . . . I just saw it.' Similarly, assuming that
what is fictional can be depicted, then we can see what is
depicted in a painting, whether the painting is of a horse
or a unicorn. However, I shall not argue the case
here. II The causal theory of perception is
motivated by two apparently common-sense arguments about
visual perception. The first argument contrasts ordinary
seeing with hallucinations and the perception of illusions.
The dagger that Macbeth thinks he sees is an hallucination.
But suppose that while Macbeth is hallucinating the dagger a
real dagger was placed before him that corresponded to the
hallucinated dagger in every conceivable respect. We would
still not claim that Macbeth actually saw the dagger, and it
seems natural to explain this by saying that the reason
Macbeth did not see the dagger is that the dagger did not
cause his visual experience. Or suppose, to consider another
case, I was looking at a pillar and unknown to me a mirror
was interposed in front of the pillar that reflected a
numerically different pillar. It is certainly tempting to
explain the fact that I see the second pillar (in the
mirror) and not the first by the fact that the first pillar
was not causally relevant to my perception. [5]
Finally, suppose that it seems to me that I am perceiving a
clock on the shelf but it turns out that my visual cortex is
being stimulated in such a way so as to engender the
impression that I am seeing a clock, then it seems natural
to claim that I do not actually see the clock on the shelf
because the clock on the shelf did not cause my experience
of seeing the clock. It is tempting to think in these cases
that perceiving something and hallucinating something or
seeing an illusion have something in common, namely, a
perceptual or visual experience. The difference between the
case of genuine perception and hallucinations or illusions
seems to lie in the fact that in the case of genuine
perception my visual experience is caused by the presence of
the object in my visual field. As John Hyman points out in his
carefully argued critique of the causal theory, these
arguments fail to establish what they seem to. [6]
These stories appear to illustrate different ways in which
visual impressions may be caused: they may be caused by
hallucinations or illusions or they may be caused by an
uninterrupted perception of something. However, what they
conclusively demonstrate are only the different ways in
which someone can be causally prevented from seeing
something. They do not by themselves show that the concept
of perception contains the idea of causal connection between
the environment and our experience of it. They merely
illustrate the platitude that if I see something I am free
from any causal constraints that would prevent me from
seeing it. Nonetheless, these arguments do prepare the
ground for us to think of our concept of perception as one
that contains a causal relationship, for they allow us a way
to think of perception as a distinctive type of subjective
perceptual experience that is connected to something outside
subjective experience, that is, to the world that surrounds
us. If our 'visual experience' in the case of the
hallucination is one that is caused, and the 'visual
experience' we have when we hallucinate an object is
identical to the 'visual experience' we have when we
actually see something, then it is natural to conclude that
the 'visual experience' we have when we see something is one
that is caused by the presence of an object in our visual
field. This intuition gains support from a
second kind of argument based on the idea that perception is
a cognitive faculty, a way of finding out about the world
around us that is responsive to that world. How can we think
of perception as being dependent, in this way, upon things
in the environment unless we think of perception as causally
explained by things in the environment? We think of perception as a way,
indeed the basic way, of informing ourselves about the world
of independently existing things: we assume, that is to say,
the general reliability of our perceptual experiences; and
that assumption is the same as the assumption of a general
causal dependence of our perceptual experiences on the
independently existing things we take them to be of.
[7] In the case of hallucination, we do
not find anything out about our environment and this is why
hallucination is not a genuine case of seeing. But to say
that when we genuinely see something we are finding out
something about the environment is to say, it seems, that
something in the environment caused us to see it. The general claim that perception is a
way of informing ourselves about the world, and therefore
that our concept of perception contains in it the idea of a
causal connection, is credible only if it makes sense to
conceive of perception in terms of a relation that obtains
between a 'subjective' psychological event or perceptual
experience and the object perceived. Once this psychological
event is detached from the overall activity of seeing, then
a conceptual space has been created between what is seen and
the experiencing of seeing that allows for the specification
of a causal connection. For a causal connection obtains only
between two distinct existences, cause and effect, where it
is logically possible for one to exist without the other. In
this case, the causal connection lies between the object
perceived and the putative perceptual experience. Only then
can we speak of 'a general causal dependence of our
perceptual experiences on the independently existing things
we take them to be of'. But as I have suggested the
comparison between seeing something and hallucination seems
to establish just this point. The theory of what it is to
see an illusion or have an hallucination of an object --
that it involves the same visual experience as the one
involved in seeing the object -- seems to show how it is
that our visual experience of seeing can be detached from
the specification of what it is I actually see. The 'visual
experience' is the same in both cases but only in one case
-- the case in which the visual experience is causally
attached to the object seen -- is a case of genuine
seeing. However, is this claim coherent? Does
it makes sense to claim that the concept of 'visual
experience' can in this way be detached from and then
re-attached to the concept of seeing something? 'Is it not
implausible', Hyman writes, 'that the experience of hearing
something and the experience of seeing something are
experiences once can have despite failing to hear or see
anything at all -- even in total darkness and perfect
silence?' [8] One cannot have the experience of a
university education without having a university education,
or of playing the piano without playing the piano, or have
the experience of a toothache without having a toothache.
Why is the case of visual perception different? Clearly from
the third person perspective seeing something and
hallucinating it do not describe the same experience. 'They
are so different indeed', P. M. S. Hacker notes, 'that they
do not even look alike, for no observer would mistake
Macbeth's having an hallucination of a dagger for Macbeth's
seeing a dagger.' [9] Furthermore, even the person
who hallucinates or sees the illusion of a dagger will
distinguish their experience from the case where they
actually see a dagger or where someone else actually sees a
dagger. They will report that they seem to see a dagger or
that what they see looks like a dagger, rather than
reporting that they actually see a dagger. So what is the
visual experience in common between hallucination and
perception that allows us to think of ordinary perception as
containing a visual experience as its subjective
part? Suppose we consider the hallucination
from standpoint of someone who, unlike Macbeth, doesn't
realize that they are hallucinating a dagger. Surely it
seems to this person that they are seeing something in
exactly the same way as they would if they were actually
seeing the dagger. Indeed from the subject's point of view
there is no difference. But what exactly is it that is
shared in these two cases? The person who believes he sees a
dagger believes that he is having the same experience as a
person who actually sees a dagger. In this sense we can
speak of what someone believes they see as being, from the
subject's point of view, indistinguishable from actually
seeing something. However, for the person who experiences an
illusion to *believe* that he is having the same experience
does not mean that he has the same experience. For although
the reports we make about what we see in general provide a
sound basis for ascribing a certain kind of visual
perception to us, these reports, like any other first-person
avowal, may be defeated by (anomalous) circumstances. The
defeating circum stances are, in this case, precisely that
the person is not seeing a dagger but hallucinating it, and
thus although he reports that he sees a dagger, he actually
only seems to see it. While there is a clear distinction
between hallucinating x and seeing x, the subject who is
hallucinating is not in a position to draw it. Thus the
absence of his ability to distinguish between hallucination
and perception does not entail that the experiences he has
are the same. There is not something -- a visual
experience -- in common between genuine cases of perception
and cases where we merely seem to see something, therefore
the comparison between perception and hallucination provides
no basis for conceiving of perception as containing within
it such a visual experience as a component part, one that is
detachable as it were, from the concept of perceiving
something. Since, as I have argued, the causal theory of
perception depends upon the intelligibility of the idea that
our visual experience of something can be detached from the
exercise of our perceptual capacities in order to establish
the idea of a causal relation between the visual experience
and what is perceived, the failure to establish an
experience in common between the genuine case of perception
and hallucination renders the causal theory of perception
itself unintelligible. The causal theory of perception
requires that we can separate out a mental component of
perception from the physical component to make room for an
explanation of the causal connection between them. But there
is no room to be had. Mental and physical are indissolubly
linked in our perceptual reports. III The illusion thesis of pictorial
representation is one that is associated with contemporary
film theory, though its roots are ancient. The theory that
pictures are cognitive or epistemic illusions that cause us
to believe mistakenly that what we see is real has been
thoroughly debunked and can be laid to rest. [10]
But elsewhere I have tried to defend a weaker version of the
illusion thesis: cinema and other forms of pictorial
representations can function as a form of perceptual or
sensory illusion that I call 'projective illusion'. I define
projective illusion as a form of illusion that is akin to
our experience of an illusion like the Muller-Lyer illusion,
where we know that what we see is an illusion yet our senses
are still deceived. However, it is also a weaker form of
illusion than this kind of sensory deception, since in
projective illusion, as I define it, I can bring to bear my
knowledge of the fact that the representation is a depiction
to prevent projective illusion taking hold, or to break the
hold of the illusion entirely. [11] This idea of projective illusion is
both empirically false and conceptually confused. What is
distinctive about an illusion is that it is a special form
of representation that is configured in such a way as to
confound our senses: our senses become unreliable guides to
what lies before us. For example, in the Muller-Lyer
illusion we seem to see two lines of unequal length, even
though we know that the two lines are of the same length.
However, representations do not, in general, drive such a
wedge between perception and belief in this way; we do not
customarily take a representation for something other than
it is. I try to build into the theory of projective illusion
a recognition of the fact that my knowledge that the
representation is a depiction is sufficient to break the
hold of the putative illusion. However, the kind of mistaken
perception engendered by an illusion is not one that can be
corrected by my knowledge: that is what makes it an
illusion. I argue that the correction occurs in the manner
that I can change my perception when I perceive an ambiguous
figure like Jastrow's 'Is it a duck? Is it a rabbit'.
However, the idea that the correction of our perception of
projective illusion occurs in this way still presupposes
that I see the image as an illusion in the first place. As
Noel Carroll points out, if the illusion theory is wrong,
then so is the explanation of how the spectator's experience
of the illusion is countered. [12] The confusion that characterizes my
own theory is, I think, typical of illusion theories.
However, it is important to recognize the feature of looking
at motion pictures that illusion theories, however
confusedly, are trying to explain. Illusion theories take
seriously the fact that it is meaningful to speak of looking
at what a motion pictures depicts. However, illusion
theorists are mistakenly drawn to the counter-intuitive
conclusion that pictures therefore must be understood as
illusions, for they rely upon the assumption that what we
specify in our perceptual reports must be the content of a
visual experience that is caused by what it is that we see.
Since we make our perceptual reports in the presence of a
picture and not what is depicted in it, we must be under the
spell of an illusion that causes us to have a visual
experience of the object without the object being
present. I have argued, following Hyman, that
the causal theory of perception mistakenly assumes (a) that
the content of a putative 'visual experience' can be
detached from the specification of what it is that I see,
and (b) that the seeing of an illusion shares this content
-- a visual experience -- with actual seeing. It is these
mistaken ideas that motivate the analogy between pictures
and illusions: in seeing a picture of an object I am said to
have the same visual experience as when I see the object
itself. However, as we have seen, the assumptions underlying
the causal theory of perception are mistaken. The factor
that lies in common between the seeing of an illusion of x
and seeing x is simply the belief that one is seeing the
same thing, and, in the cases where the illusion is merely
sensory, not even this belief is shared. Clearly, in the
case of seeing what is depicted in a picture I do not
erroneously believe that I am seeing the object itself, but
neither do I seem to see something in a way that confounds
my knowledge that what I see is only an illusion. Once we
abandon the causal theory of perception together with the
explanatory role it bestows upon illusion for understanding
the role of 'visual experience' in perception, the argument
that seeing things depicted in a picture is like seeing an
illusion and hence like seeing things themselves loses its
appeal. IV Kendall Walton has provided a
rigorous, defensible version of the central claim of the
realist tradition in film theory, that what we see in a
photograph or motion picture is not simply a representation
of the object but the object itself. Bazin claimed that: 'No
matter how fuzzy, distorted or discolored, no matter how
lacking in documentary value the image may be, it shares, by
the process of its becoming, the being of the model of which
it is the reproduction; it is the model'. [13] This
assertion is based upon a conflation of photographic
representation with what the photograph is of. Walton
revises Bazin's account in the following way. He argues that
when we look at a photograph or a motion picture we may
speak with justification of seeing an object photographed
just in those cases where the object depicted in the
photograph is something that existed in front of the camera
when the photograph was taken (something that we can assume
in the case of the standard photograph of a non-fictional
object). However, we can see the object not because the
representation is in some sense the object photographed, as
Bazin claimed, but because the photograph allows us to see
the object indirectly. The object photographed is, in this
case, seen *through* the photograph in a manner that is akin
to the way that we look through eyeglasses or a telescope at
an object. [14] We thus really are looking at
William Shatner when we see _Star Trek: The Motion Picture_,
but he is not directly present to us, nor do we believe that
he is present to us in the manner of an illusion. Walton argues that the main reason we
can see what is depicted in a photograph is because the
photograph preserves a 'counterfactual dependence' between
the photographic image and what the image depicts that is
independent of the beliefs held by the photographer about
what he or she is photographing. In other words,
irrespective of what the photographer believes he is taking
a picture of, the photograph will register what is in front
of the camera. The 'counterfactual dependence' of the
photograph on the thing photographed means that were the
thing photographed to change (counter to fact), the picture
would change in a corresponding fashion, regardless of the
photographer's beliefs or intentions. The photograph
contrasts in this respect to the painting. Regardless of
what actually stands before the painter when he paints, what
he paints and we see is what he intends to paint and for us
to see. However, in the standard case, even if the
photographer intends to photograph something else, what he
photographs and hence what we see stood before the camera.
Gregory Currie expresses the contrast this way: the
counterfactual dependence in photography is 'natural' rather
than 'intentional'. [15] Natural counterfactual
dependence is not sufficient to establish transparency
because we can imagine, for example, a light sensitive
machine that printed out descriptions of what it records
that would obviously fail to produce representational
transparency. Thus Walton argues that visual transparency is
only guaranteed by the fact that photographs, unlike verbal
descriptions, preserve real similarity relationships between
objects: the word 'house' is more likely to be confused with
'hearse' than with 'barn', but a photograph of a house can
be confused with a barn just as a house can be mistaken for
a barn. The range of discriminatory error is alike in the
case of seeing photographs and seeing things. Walton's argument about photography
and cinema has the advantage that it can make sense of the
fact that we do speak of seeing the object depicted without
resorting to an illusion theory. However, it does so upon
the basis of a theory that draws a sharp distinction between
looking at photographic depictions of existing objects or
persons, like William Shatner, and looking at photographs of
fictional objects or persons, like Captain Kirk, or looking
at a painting of either William Shatner or Captain Kirk. For
Walton, when we look at a representational painting or a
motion picture fiction we imagine seeing what the painting
or the fiction represents. Walton is committed to the idea
that there is a sharp or categorical difference between what
we report when we exclaim 'There is William Shatner' when we
look at a painted poster of _Star Trek: The Motion Picture_,
and when we look at the film. In the first case, we imagine
that we see what is depicted, in the second case, we are
reporting upon what we actually see via its photographic
reproduction. Yet, is my conviction that I can see what is
depicted justified only in the case of looking at
photographs or motion pictures and not in the case of
representational paintings? Walton's argument about natural
counterfactual dependency is insufficient by itself to
establish the sharp distinction that Walton requires between
what we see when we look at a photograph and what we see
when we look at a painting. It merely establishes an
important difference between representational paintings and
photographs. The further argument needed is one which
establishes a relationship between the character of the
natural counterfactual dependency that characterizes
photography and the counterfactual dependency involved in
ordinary seeing. Walton writes: 'Why is it that we see Lincoln when we
look at photographs of him but not when we look at his
painted portrait? The answer requires an account of seeing .
. . I would subscribe to some variety of causal theory: to
see something is to have visual experiences which are
caused, in a certain manner, by what is seen. Lincoln
(together with other circumstances) caused his photograph
and, thus, the visual experiences of those who view it.'
[16] Reports about what we see are
counterfactually dependent upon what is seen. If the animal
caught in my headlights was a bear and not a deer, my report
about what I saw (if veridical) would be that I saw a bear
rather than a deer. However Walton is committed not simply
to the counterfactual dependency of ordinary seeing, but to
a characterization of that counterfactual dependency in
causal terms. [17] Since, when we see something, we
have a visual experience that is caused by what is seen,
ordinary seeing exhibits the same kind of natural dependency
that photographs exhibit. Furthermore, since ordinary seeing
is transparent, then so too is our perception of what is
depicted in a photograph. Once the casual theory of perception
is abandoned, the natural counterfactual dependency that
characterizes photographs can be used to explain only the
difference in relationship that a representational painting
or drawing has to the scene painted, and a photograph to
what is photographed: photographs are natural
representations, paintings are intentional representations.
This difference between paintings and photographs is crucial
to understanding the evidential nature of photographs and
films: photographs can reliably show us where things are
located and how they looked at a certain time and place. But
this difference cannot be conceptualized in terms of a
difference between a case of genuine seeing and a case in
which we do not, properly speaking, see the object depicted
at all. Furthermore, the fact that photographs or films can
count as evidence of what they depict does not entail that
when we look at a photograph or film we actually see what
the photograph of film depicts through the image, or that we
are brought into direct perceptual contact with the object.
Such a thesis could be justified only if it were correct to
describe 'ordinary seeing' and the counterfactual dependency
it entails in terms of the causal relationship that
characterizes the dependence of the photograph upon the
object photographed. But as we have seen there are good
reasons for denying the causal theory of
perception. V I have suggested that illusion and
transparency theorists are right to take seriously the idea
that we see what is depicted in a picture, but they
mistakenly try to fit their explanation of what it is that
we see within the framework of the causal theory of
perception; it is this attempt that leads to error. Pictures
are not like illusions and the transparency thesis draws too
sharp a contrast between looking at representational
paintings and looking at photographs. However, one may agree
with this criticism of illusion and transparency theories
without accepting that the reason for their failure is the
fact they rely on a particular theory of perception.
Instead, the reason for their failure might seem to lie in
their mistaken assumption that when we look at what is
depicted in a picture we actually see what it
depicts. As we have seen, other than in the
case where we look at a standard photograph of a
non-fictional object, Walton argues that looking at what is
depicted in a picture is a form of imagined seeing rather
than seeing, though he emphasizes that the activity in which
we imagine seeing the object depicted is bound up with our
actual seeing of the surface of the picture. Referring to
Meindert Hobbema's picture 'Wooded Landscape with a Water
Mill', Walton writes: 'Rather than merely imagining seeing a
mill, as a result of actually seeing the canvas (as one may
imagine seeing Emma upon reading a description of her
appearance in _Madame Bovary_), one imagines one's seeing of
the canvas to be a seeing of a mill and this imagining is an
integral part of one's visual experience of the canvas.'
[18] Walton's thesis of imagined seeing is advanced
as a general thesis about seeing pictures; he offers the
transparency thesis as a further thesis that pertains to
looking at photographs alone. Walton's account of imagined seeing is
derived in part from Wittgenstein's contemplations (in the
_Philosophical Investigations_ and elsewhere) on aspect
seeing. However, Wittgenstein's reflections on aspect seeing
are more complex and nuanced than Walton's extrapolation.
Under the rubric of 'aspect-seeing' Wittgenstein
investigates a range of cases that illuminate the diversity
and complexity of the concept of seeing and in particular
the borderline between seeing and imagined seeing. The
relationship of 'seeing aspects' to imagination is
illustrated by Wittgenstein in the example of a triangle
that can be seen in a number of different ways: as a solid
object, as the geometrical drawing of a triangle, as
standing on its base, as hanging from its apex, as a
mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow, as a pointer, as an
overturned object which is meant to stand on the shorter
side of the right angle, as a half-parallelogram, and as
various other things. [19] At least two considerations suggest
that seeing the aspects of the triangular figure is a case
of imagined seeing. First, discriminations between the
different aspects are not specifiable in terms of the
physical properties of what we see; we cannot discriminate
one aspect from another on the basis of the physical
properties of the object depicted. Secondly, it undoubtedly
requires imagination to see the triangle as one thing and
another, just as it requires imagination to see the shape of
creatures in the clouds as Leonardo asked of an aspiring
painter. Aspect seeing in this case is subject to the will
in a way that ordinary seeing is not. [20] The first
consideration is not conclusive. Despite the fact that we do
not discriminate aspects on the basis of different sets of
physical features, it is the physical features of the
triangle that lead us to see it one way or another; we do
not simply project properties onto the triangle at random.
Yet it is hard to conceive of our perception of the
different aspects as the perception of something different,
for the aspect lacks the fixity or permanence that typically
characterizes an object of sight. The 'perception' of the
aspects of the triangle does seem to be a good candidate for
imagined seeing. However, to concede that seeing the aspects
of a triangle is a case of imagined seeing is not to concede
that the thesis of imagined seeing provides a general
explanation of what we see when we look at a picture, for it
is only an unusual type of picture that elicits or
encourages this kind of imaginative activity. Typically, a
picture will endow a given aspect with a sense of
permanence, that is, a given aspect becomes a property that
the picture compels us to see: this is a picture of a wedge,
this is a picture of an arrow. While we must be able to
recognize what the picture is of in order to see picture of
a wedge or an arrow, in these cases it takes no distinctive
activity of the imagination to do so: our recognition of
what the picture is of is immediate and the aspect is a
permanent feature of the picture. The affinity of looking at what is
depicted in a picture with seeing, as opposed to an activity
of the imagination or imagined seeing, can be illustrated by
considering Jastrow's drawing 'Is it a duck? Is it a rabbit'
and Wittgenstein's discussion of it. The duck-rabbit figure
contrasts with the triangular figure for we are not free to
interpret what it is that we see in different ways. Instead,
we are compelled to see the figure one way or another.
Imagination is not required to see the two aspects of the
duck-rabbit figure, simply the capacity to recognize ducks
and rabbits. Seeing the figure, say, as a duck, is like
seeing a duck, for two main reasons. First, the perception
is immediate and direct. Someone who has only seen the
duck-rabbit figure as a duck, that is, who perceives the
figure as an unambiguous picture, will not report when asked
what it is that she sees: 'Now I am seeing the figure as a
duck', as if seeing the figure as a duck was the product of
some special kind of mental activity on her part. She will
simply point to a duck or picture of a duck, or make duck
noises in order to explain what it is that she sees in the
same way that she would explain what it is that she sees
when she sees an actual duck. It would make as little sense
for her to say, 'Now I am seeing the figure as a duck', as
it would for her to say at the sight of a knife and fork,
'Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork'. Wittgenstein
writes: 'One doesn't 'take' what one knows as the cutlery at
a meal for cutlery; any more than one ordinarily tries to
move one's mouth as one eats or aims at moving it.'
[21] Secondly, like a visual perception, seeing the
duck aspect is a mental state with a measurable duration.
For example, we might say, 'I saw the figure as a duck for
exactly two minutes, but now I am seeing the figure as a
rabbit and I shall do so for a further five
minutes.' The standard case of pictorial
perception does not involve the distinctive visual
experience of aspect dawning for a picture does not
typically offer the possibility of two contrasting
perceptions. The physical cues provided by the standard
picture as to what we see in it are not ambiguous. Rather,
representational paintings and photographs are like the case
where we see the duck-rabbit figure as a duck or a rabbit in
ignorance of the alternative 'interpretation' of the figure.
In the case where we just see the duck-rabbit figure as a
duck or as a rabbit, we do not see the 'duck' or 'rabbit' as
an aspect of the figure at all. Here the perception of the
duck or rabbit is simply like the case of standard pictorial
perception. Representational paintings, photographs, and
films manifest what Wittgenstein terms 'continuous aspect
seeing' in which, as I have said, the aspect becomes a
property of the picture that the picture compels us to see.
Unlike cases of imagined seeing, no distinctive activity of
the imagination is commonly required to recognize what a
painting or photograph is a picture of. Given the affinities
that continuous aspect seeing or looking at a pictorial
representation bears to seeing in general, it is surely only
the prejudicial adherence to a mistaken theory of perception
that prevents visual theorists from acknowledging that
seeing what is depicted in a picture is a form of seeing and
not simply a form of imagined seeing. For only the causal
theory of perception requires us to insist that what we
really see when we look at a picture is only a two
dimensional image and not what is depicted by that image.
[22] VI Some visual theorists agree that the
thesis of imagined seeing is not required to explain the
activity of looking at pictures, but argue instead that the
activity can be explained through the idea that when we look
at pictures we deploy capacities to identify and recognize
what they depict. The exercise of recognition capacities
does not require that we actually see the thing that we
recognize, merely that we are provided with a sufficient
number of visual cues to correctly identify something.
Pictorial representations can be understood to provide such
cues without it being necessary to postulate that we see or
imagine seeing what they depict. Noel Carroll argues against
the thesis of imagined seeing on the grounds that it seems
unnecessary to postulate the activity of imagining looking
in at least one class of depictions: non-fictional
depictions. What is in common between looking at non-fiction
and fictional depictions is simply the fact that we
recognize what they are by looking, rather than, say, by
reading: 'Recognition', he writes, 'without the additional
process of imagining seeing, is basic to analyzing depictive
representation.' [23] Gregory Currie has offered a detailed
elaboration of the recognition thesis. Currie, like Carroll,
proceeds from the assumption that 'cinematic images, like
paintings, are representations, that we perceive
representations of things when we see photographs'.
[24] However, this is obviously only a
starting-point for an analysis of what it is we see when we
look at a picture, for we can easily imagine circumstances
in which we look at a picture but we cannot see what it is
the picture is of: our glasses are misty or the room is
dark, we see a rectangular shape on the wall but we cannot
see that it is a still life. The difference between seeing a
picture and seeing what is depicted in it consists, for
Currie, in recognizing what the picture is of. The apparent
advantage of the concept of recognition is that it allows us
to capture what is in common between seeing an object and
seeing a picture of the object in a manner that is
consistent with the causal theory of perception. When we see
a horse, seeing the horse involves recognition that it is a
horse we see; when we see a picture of a horse we recognize
by looking at the picture that it is a horse depicted. What
lies in common between seeing a horse and a picture of a
horse is that both activities deploy horse-recognition
capacities, but in the one case we see a horse, in the other
case we merely look at the picture of a horse. But how is it
that when we recognize that the picture is a picture of a
horse by looking, we do not see a horse? The specifics of Currie's account of
how we draw upon our object recognition capacities when
looking at pictures develops a theory of pictorial cognition
proposed by Flint Schier. [25] Following Dennett,
Fodor, and others, Currie argues that the brain is organized
into a number of relatively autonomous subsystems that
operate on a hierarchy of the complex to the primitive.
Primitive subsystems of the brain act to categorize the
'visual input' as the object itself, whether or not what we
see is a depiction of the object or the object itself. More
complex subsystems then operate to correct this diagnosis if
it is erroneous and allow us to recognize the depicted
object as a depicted object, or alternatively, if what we
see is the object, they confirm the diagnosis. He admits
that his view of picture recognition constitutes a sort of
illusionism about pictures: 'but this is an illusionism we
can live with. It allows, exactly, that the person seeing
can recognize a picture as representing a horse without him
supposing he is actually looking at one'.
[26] Is this an illusionist theory and can
we live with it? Presumably Currie does not want to maintain
that the primitive subsystem of the brain actually sees the
visual input, so the 'deception' here is scarcely an
illusion. Furthermore, it seems inappropriate in this
context to speak of recognition or deception at all, since
the failure involved is more like that of a robot that lacks
the capacity to discriminate between certain sensory inputs
than the response of a human being. Can a robot display the
shock of recognition, can it be aware of its mistake without
quite knowing how to correct it? So why does Currie
personify the parts of the brain as homunculi that see and
are confused by what they see? It is, I think, because he
realizes there is a need to explain what it is that we see
when we recognize what is depicted in a picture, while at
the same time holding to the assumption that what we see
must be specifiable in terms of the physical properties of
the physical object that lies in our visual field. Since we
do not in this sense see the depicted object when we look at
a picture of it, the only way of explaining how it is we do
see what is depicted is the illusion theory. But the
illusion theory is untenable as a theory of consciously
looking at pictures, so it is buried in the subsystems of
the brain, in the cognitive unconscious, so to speak, where
it is hoped it can do no harm. But the illusion thesis
cannot be buried there without entailing conceptual
confusion. [27] If we subtract from Currie's
discussion the misleading talk of homunculi in the brain
doing the seeing and being confused, we are still bereft of
an explanation of how seeing enters into our recognition of
the depicted object. Is it meaningful to speak of
recognizing something by looking in a manner that does not
imply that we are looking at the thing we recognize?
Carroll's formulation, quoted earlier, certainly implies
this. He suggests we can recognize by reading or by looking
in such a way that the concept of recognition is detached
from the concept of seeing what it is that we recognize.
However, as Walton argues, the concept of recognition here
is detached from the idea of seeing what it is that we
recognize only by misconstruing the distinction between
reading about something and seeing a picture of it.
[28] Carroll asserts that when we look at pictures
we recognize by looking rather than by reading, but when we
read it is only by looking that we recognize the words on
the page, so Carroll has failed to articulate what is
distinctive about looking at pictures. Currie accounts for
the difference between our experience of written and visual
fictions in the following terms: visual fictions as opposed
to written fictions involve 'perceptual imagining'; for
example, 'I see displayed on the screen a man with a knife,
and I imagine that there is a murderer.' However, when
Currie writes, 'I see displayed on the screen a man with a
knife', he means that my man-with-knife recognition
capacities are triggered by the image. Since the recognition
thesis already leaves us bereft of a distinction between
seeing something and reading about it, the thesis of
'perceptual imagining' that presupposes the prior deployment
of our recognition capacities -- what we recognize cues our
imagination -- cannot restore the distinction that has been
elided. [29] Looking at a picture, whether a
painting, a photograph, or a film, we recognize what the
picture is of because we see what it depicts. VII I have addressed what are, arguably,
the four main kinds of theses that film theorists and
philosophers have offered to explain what it is we see when
we look at a motion picture: illusion theories, the
transparency theory, the thesis of imagined seeing, and the
recognition thesis. I have suggested that all these theories
are individually flawed, but that their underlying problem
is the assumption that they share in common: the causal
theory of perception. By requiring that we separate our
perceptual reports into a mental component and a physical
component the causal theory of perception imposes a
conceptual straight-jacket upon our understanding of what it
is to look at a picture: what it is that we see when we look
at something must be specifiable in terms of a physical
object array that produces in us a visual sensation. This
profoundly distorts our understanding of what it is we see
when we see depictions because it entails that we when we
look at pictures what we really see is a picture,
photograph, or film and not what they depict. Each of the
explanations I have examined thus far as to what it is to
see a motion picture conforms to the straitjacket of the
causal theory of perception either by producing by
theorizing that we see an illusion of things or the things
themselves or by denying that we really see what is depicted
at all. The insight afforded by the illusion
theory is to take seriously the idea that we do see the
object depicted when we see a motion picture. However, that
insight is then distorted when it is construed as the claim
that we have a visual experience that is identical to the
visual experience we have when we actually see an object
that is not a depiction. Walton is correct to recognize that
there are differences in the way we look at paintings and
motion pictures. However, the transparency thesis
misconstrues the distinctive character of cinematic
depiction by claiming that in photography and cinema we see
the thing itself through the photographic representation. As
a generalized account of seeing pictures, the thesis of
imagined seeing acknowledges that there is more to seeing a
picture than simply recognizing what it is of, but it
mistakenly construes seeing what a picture is of as a mental
activity that is added on to the activity of looking; but
looking at what a picture is of does not require a further
activity other than simply looking. Finally, the recognition
thesis either fails to offer an explanation of the visual
basis of pictorial recognition at all (Carroll) or it offers
this only by recourse to an illusion theory
(Currie). But surely one of these theories, or a
theory like them, must be right? Is it not superstitious to
say that we can see what is depicted in a picture? It would
be superstitious to claim that when we look at what a
picture depicts something that is absent or non-existent is
made present to us. But, of course, this is not happens when
we see what is depicted in a picture, for we do not when
looking at what is depicted cease thereby to see a
depiction. But then how can I claim that we see what is
depicted in a picture at all? It is because, as Wittgenstein
points out, the verb 'to see' has many uses, only one of
which is captured in reports about the deployment of things
in space, and we speak of seeing what is depicted in
paintings, photographs and films because we react to these
things in the same spontaneous way that we react to the
things themselves. As Hyman has written: 'when looking at a painting, the
natural answer to the question 'What do you see?' is a
description of the depicted scene, and not a description of
the disposition of pigments. This is not simply because we
have learned to assume that this is what the question is
after. We can see what is depicted; but it is generally more
difficult, and it may be very difficult indeed, to see how
the pigments are disposed.' [30] Photographs, like paintings, have a
surface, but the elements of the photograph are not
constituted out of marks inscribed upon that surface. The
surface of a photograph registers or records what it
depicts. Furthermore, the projected image has no surface
other than the screen upon which it is projected. Features
of the surface of the photograph, such as graininess, may
enter into our perception of it but they are not
constitutive of what a photograph depicts. The difference in
the relationship between surface and image in a painting or
drawing compared to a photograph or film suggests that we
can revive Walton's transparency claim once it is shorn of
the argument that what we see when we look at a photograph
or motion picture is the object itself. A photograph is
transparent because even though it has a surface, it is
usually not constituted out of marks inscribed upon its
surface. The projected moving image is transparent for it
lacks a surface altogether, other than the screen upon which
it is projected. Paintings, by contrast, tend to lack
transparency, though paintings that mimic photographs appear
transparent. This interpretation of transparency has the
distinct advantage that it is indifferent to whether or not
a photograph is mechanically or digitally produced, or
whether a film is animated or live action. That is, a
photograph or film remains transparent whether or not its
causal origins lie in the registration of reflected light
from an object. New York University, USA My special thanks to Malcolm Turvey
for encouraging me, by his example, to think through the
significance of Wittgenstein for film theory and for his
comments on this paper. Thanks also to Berys Gaut, Paisley
Livingston, Murray Smith, Steven Schneider, and Michael Zryd
for their helpful comments. Footnotes 1. This paper has been revised in
order to clarify a confusion in the original version --
published in Richard Allen and Murray Smith, eds, _Film
Theory and Philosophy_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) --
between the causal theory of perception as an explication of
the concept of perception and the role of causality in
perception. The result of this confusion was that in the
name of denying the causal theory of perception I at times
seemed to deny the role of causality in perception
altogther. This is all the more ironic, since this was
precisely a distinction that I was keen to observe. I am
grateful to Samuel Guttenplan for precisely identifying this
confusion in his review of _Film Theory and Philosophy_
('Analytic Philosophy and Film', _Film-Philosophy_, vol. 2
no. 36, November 1998 <http://www.film-philosophy.com/vol2-1998/n36guttenplan>;
accessed 16 April 2001). While I have made significant
changes throughout, I have preserved, as much as possible,
the structure and content of the original essay, whose
argument, I believe, still withstands scrutiny. 2. This characterization of the causal
theory of perception is taken from John Hyman, 'The Causal
Theory of Perception', _Philosophical Quarterly_, vol. 42
no. 168, 1992, p. 278. 3. The main source for Wittgenstein's
discussion of seeing aspects is _Philosophical
Investigations_, 2nd edition, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), Part II, xi. Further extensive
discussion of the concept is contained in three volumes of
Wittgenstein's notes on the philosophy of psychology:
_Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology_, vols 1 and 2
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), and _Last
Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology_, vol. 1 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982). 4. See, for example, Noel Carroll,
_Theorizing the Moving Image_ (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p. 368. 5. This example and the next are taken
from H. P. Grice, 'The Causal Theory of Perception',
_Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_, suppl. vol. 35,
1961, p. 142. 6. Hyman, 'The Causal Theory of
Perception', p. 279. The argument that follows is largely
indebted to Hyman's paper. 7. P. F. Strawson, 'Perception and its
Objects', in G. F. MacDonald, ed., _Perception and Identity_
(London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 51. 8. Hyman, 'The Causal Theory of
Perception', p. 283. 9. P. M. S. Hacker, _Appearance and
Reality_ (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 234. 10. See Noel Carroll, _Mystifying
Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary Film Theory_ (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp.
89-146. 11. See Richard Allen, _Projecting
Illusion: Film Spectatorship and the Impression of Reality_
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.
106-14. 12. Noel Carroll, _Theorizing the
Moving Image_, p. 368. I attempt to circumvent this kind of
objection to the theory by revising the concept of
projective illusion to one in which we entertain in thought
or imagine that we see the represented object. However, it
is not appropriate to label the thesis of imagined seeing
projective illusion for it is not an illusion theory at all.
If I imagine seeing I do not see, just as if I imagine
eating I do not actually eat. If imagined seeing is not
seeing, then it is not the seeing of an illusion
either. 13. Andre Bazin, 'The Ontology of the
Photographic Image', _What is Cinema?_, vol. 1, trans. Hugh
Gray (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1967), p. 14. 14. Kendall Walton, 'Transparent
Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism', _Critical
Inquiry_, vol. 11 no. 2, 1984, p. 252. 15. Gregory Currie, _Image and Mind:
Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science_ (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), p. 55. 16. Walton, 'Transparent Pictures', p.
261. 17. My interpretation of Walton's
argument is consonant with that of Gregory Currie in _Image
and Mind_, p. 63. Against Currie, Walton denies that he has
settled on an account of what it is to see something; see
'On Pictures and Photographs: Objections Answered', in _Film
Theory and Philosophy_, p. 69. Walton's dismissal of
Currie's reconstruction of his argument flies in the face of
the text I have quoted that demonstrates his clear
commitment to a causal theory of perception. For an article
that makes a similar diagnosis of Walton to the one I make
here see Jonathan Friday, 'Transparency and the Photographic
Image', _British Journal of Aesthetics_, vol. 30 no. 1,
January 1996, pp. 30-42. 18. Kendall Walton, _Mimesis as Make
Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 301.
Walton derives his thesis of imagined seeing, in part, from
Richard Wollheim's characterization of looking at paintings
in terms of 'seeing-in'. Unlike Walton, Wollheim claims that
'seeing-in' is not a form of imagined seeing but a case of
seeing. According to Wollheim, a picture is not an illusion
because seeing what is depicted does not preclude our
attention to the surface of the painting. The term
'seeing-in' is designed to capture what he terms the
'two-foldedness' of the experience of seeing what a picture
depicts. Yet, in spite of his intention, Wollheim's account
of 'seeing-in' becomes an illusion theory since his analysis
of seeing is cast in terms of the causal theory of
perception. He defines 'seeing-in' as the capacity to have
'perceptual experiences of things not present to the senses'
-- _Art and Its Objects_ (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1980), 2nd edition, p. 217. According to Wollheim the
picture of an object causes us to have a mental state that
is like the mental state of those who actually see the
object. While this experience of seeing something not
present to the senses is meant to coincide with the
experience of seeing the surface of the picture, Wollheim
does not explain how this coincidence of illusion and
veridical perception can be achieved. For criticism of
Wollheim on this point see John Hyman, _The Imitation of
Nature_ (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 217. It is
understandable then, that Walton should interpret Wollheim's
concept of 'seeing-in' as a form of imagined seeing: we
imagine seeing something that is not present to the
senses. 19. Ludwig Wittgenstein,
_Philosophical Investigations_, Part II, xi, p.
201. 20. The role of the imagination in
aspect seeing is emphasized by T. E. Wilkerson in 'Pictorial
Representation: A Defense of the Aspect Theory', _Midwest
Studies in Philosophy_, vol. 16, 1991, pp. 152-66. While
this emphasis is valuable as an account of aspect seeing it
distorts the role of the imagination in looking at
pictures. 21. Wittgenstein, _Philosophical
Investigations_, Part II, xi, p. 195. 22. My own thoughts on Wittgenstein
and aspect-seeing are partly inspired by the imaginative and
suggestive exploration of Wittgenstein's remarks by Malcolm
Turvey in 'Seeing Theory: On Perception and Emotional
Response in Current Film Theory', in _Film Theory and
Philosophy_, pp. 441-53. 23. Noel Carroll, 'Critical Study:
Kendall L. Walton, _Mimesis as Make-Believe_',
_Philosophical Quarterly_, vol. 45 no. 178, 1995, p.
97. 24. Currie, _Image and Mind_, p.
78. 25. See Flint Shier, _Deeper Into
Pictures_ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp.
188-95. 26. Currie, _Image and Mind_, p.
86. 27. On the 'reckless application of
human-being predicates to insufficiently humanlike objects'
see Anthony Kenny, 'The Homonculus Fallacy', in John Hyman,
ed., _Investigating Psychology_ (New York: Routledge, 1991),
pp. 155-65. 28. See Walton's remarks in 'On
Pictures and Photographs: Objections Answered', in _Film
Theory and Philosophy_, pp. 65-66. 29. In 'On Pictures and Photographs',
pp. 62-65, Walton offers further good reasons for thinking
that Currie's thesis of 'perceptual imagining' should be
rejected. 30. Hyman, _The Imitation of Nature_
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 42-3. Copyright © Richard Allen
2001 Richard Allen, 'Looking at Motion
Pictures (Revised)', _Film-Philosophy_, vol. 5 no. 25,
August 2001
<http://www.film-philosophy.com/vol5-2001/n25allen>.
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