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<th>Session/Time</th>
<th>Lecture Theatre 3</th>
<th>2F11</th>
<th>2F13</th>
<th>2F14</th>
<th>2F15</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thursday July 16</td>
<td>Opening remarks</td>
<td>2-2.30pm</td>
<td>2.30-4pm</td>
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<td>2.30-4pm</td>
<td>Rancière’s Film Philosophy</td>
<td>Opening remarks</td>
<td>1. Emiliano Battista</td>
<td>Panel: Ruiz as Cine Thinker: The Multiple Sides of an Anomalous Project</td>
<td>Documentary Cinema</td>
<td>Ethics &amp; Film I</td>
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<td>Marker’s Tomb: Rancière on Cinema’s Historical Powers</td>
<td>Chair: Gabri Ródenas</td>
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<td>Marker’s Tomb: Rancière on Cinema’s Historical Powers</td>
<td>Colliding the fictional and the actual in the Bosnian Valley of the Pyramids</td>
<td>Theology of Colour between Moral Law and Love: Reflections on Krzysztof Kieslowski’s Three Colours: Red</td>
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<td>Chair: John McSweeney</td>
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<td>1. Yun Hua Chen</td>
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<td>Hearing Loss: Voice, Memory, Documentary</td>
<td>Shock and Awe: A dehumanising 9/11 documentary</td>
<td>Black hole becomings: The insomniac body inside a time crystal</td>
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<td>The Spiritual Passage as Becoming-Imperceptible: Takva [a man’s fear of god]</td>
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<td>Towards an aesthetics of emergence: the participatory and the chaos of the operatic</td>
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<td>A Choreographic perspective on movement in Cinema</td>
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- **Plenary Session**
  - Chair: David Sorfa Caroline Bainbridge
  - Gestures in the Feminine: Toward an Irigarayan Cinematics
## Lecture Theatre 3

### 2F02
- **Flesh and Embodiment**
  - **Chair:** John McSweeney
  - **Chair:** Gabri Ródenas

### 2F15
- **Film as embodied or disembodied experience?**
  - **Chair:** Andrew McGilp

### 2F14
- **Overcoming Dualism:**
  - **Chair:** Andrew McGilp

### 2F13
- **The Nature of Film-Philosophy I**
  - **Chair:** Andrew McGilp

### 2F11
- **Ontology and the Moving Image**
  - **Chair:** Andrew McGilp

### Friday, July 17

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
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| 9.30-11.00 | **Flesh and Embodiment**                      | John McSweeney         | 1. Patricia Castelio-Branco<br> Film as embodied or disembodied experience?  
2. Greg Tuck<br> Love, Death and Flesh: Ontological antinomies in Tarkovskoi Shinya's Vital  
3. Dylan Trigg<br> The Return of the New Flesh: David Cronenberg and Body Memory |
<p>| 11.00-11.30 | <strong>Coffee</strong>                                    |                        |                                                             |</p>
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<th>Time</th>
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<tr>
<td>2.00-3.30</td>
<td><strong>Film Presentations</strong></td>
<td>Craig Smith</td>
<td>Joanna Callaghan</td>
<td>Aesthetic translation, or how I tried to make a film about Plato's world of forms</td>
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<td>2.00-3.30</td>
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<td>Martin Wyllie</td>
<td>Basket Case (short film)</td>
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<td>3.30-4.00</td>
<td><strong>Coffee</strong></td>
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<td>4.00-6.00</td>
<td><strong>Plenary session</strong></td>
<td>John Mullarkey</td>
<td>Daniel Fairfax</td>
<td>Parallels between the post-68 films of Jean-Luc Godard and the early philosophy of Alain Badiou</td>
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<td>4.00-6.00</td>
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<td>John Mullarkey</td>
<td>Badiou's Inessential Cinema</td>
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<td>4.00-6.00</td>
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<td>Nancy Davies</td>
<td>Value Theory and Science Fiction</td>
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<td>7.30pm</td>
<td><strong>Conference Dinner</strong></td>
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<td>Richard T. McClelland</td>
<td>Depictions of Revenge in Current Popular Cinema</td>
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<td>11.30-1.00</td>
<td>Plenary Session Chair: John Mullarkey Edward Branigan Of Theory Talk</td>
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<td><strong>Phenomenology of Film Experience</strong></td>
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<td>Chair: Samantha Holland</td>
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<td>1. Adriano D’Aloia: The Other side of the film: Edith Stein’s theory of empathy as a filmic experience theory</td>
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<td>2. Corin Depper: Imagining another world: cinematic suture and temporal philosophy</td>
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<td>3. David Yacavone: Cinematic Immersion and Aesthetic Experience</td>
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<td><strong>Psycho-Analysis of Film</strong></td>
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<td>Chair: Liz Watkins</td>
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<td>1. Craig Smith: Kurosawa’s “Crows” as a philosophical-psychological interpretation of Van Gogh's last painting</td>
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<td>2. Shannon Foskett: Imperceptible Cinema: Spacetime Quanta and Flicker Ontologies</td>
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<td><strong>Imperceptibles (Silence, Flicker, Relationality)</strong></td>
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<td>Chair: Richard Stamp</td>
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<td>1. Craig Smith: The Epistemological Lab: The Move to Global Participation</td>
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<td>2. Shamim Foskett: Imperceptible Cinema: Van Gogh’s last painting</td>
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<td><strong>Film Critique</strong></td>
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<td>1. André Dias: On (the dangers of) actively forgetting (the tradition of) film criticism</td>
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<td>2. Elena Orman: Thinking Images: Jean Epstein’s Philosophical Cinema</td>
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<td>1. Damien Cox: The Epistemological Lab: Total Recall and the refutation of skepticism</td>
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<td>2. Katrė Pärn: From point of perception to point of cognition: audiovisual</td>
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**Lecture Theatre 3**

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<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
<td><strong>The Nature of Film Philosophy</strong></td>
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<td>Chair: Edward Brailigan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1. Andrew McGeachigan: Reflections on the idea of Film as Philosophy</td>
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<td>2. Basilis Kroustallis: A Happy-go-lucky Case?</td>
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<td>3. Amanda Montgomery: Philosophy: Film as Philosophy: Between Saying and Showing?</td>
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<td>3.30</td>
<td><strong>Coffee</strong></td>
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<td>Anthony Paul Smith</td>
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<td>Melinda Szaloky</td>
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<td>5.30-6.00</td>
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A
High Seriousness and Low Culture: Allan Bloom and Saul Bellow on Film
John Adams

This paper arose from what I saw as the differences in expression between literature and film, inspired by a controversial passage written by Allan Bloom in his The Closing of the American Mind, which concerns the turning of young, poorly trained minds to the simplistic understandings of how the world works to be found within cinema. ‘Lack of education simply results in students seeking for enlightenment wherever it is readily available, without being able to distinguish between the sublime and trash, insight and propaganda. For the most part students turn to the movies…’ He goes on to say that students cannot discover what is ‘most serious about themselves’ in the cinema. As one who has for many years taught the philosophy of film, I was greatly troubled by these comments. But I also felt what could only be described as a sense of liberation, certain that Bloom was on to something, that these words could give thinkers of a certain mentality a sense of freedom, and the possibility of a new way of thinking about what is important about art. Bloom’s friend and colleague, Saul Bellow, agrees that film is a medium that cannot be trusted. ‘Art based on simple illusion is art in one of its cruder forms, and it is this that Hollywood with its technical skill has brought to perfection.’ He suggests that ‘as long as the chariots are faithful copies, the fire real Greek fire, it seems to make little difference that the dialogue makes you clutch your head, that the religious theme is trumped up with holy music and cunning lights.’ While Bloom and Bellow are clearly not film fans, perceptive filmmakers are also aware that the medium poses particular difficulties. The following is from Luis Bunuel, writing in 1953: ‘None of the traditional arts reveals so massive a disproportion between the possibilities it offers and its achievements.[…].A moderately cultivated individual would reject with scorn any book with one of the arguments that serve the film.’ Impressive use of images, authentic detail and careful editing cannot disguise the banality of what many films have to say. I suggest that for both popular and ‘artistic’ film, there are serious problems that confront the philosopher, that need to be addressed, but which appear to be ignored by contemporary thinkers, many of whom have interests that lie elsewhere. Bellow suggests that they ‘have gone over to junk culture. High-level junk culture, to be sure, but junk is what they generally prefer.[…].And much of junk culture has a core of crisis-shout-outs, conflagrations, bodies weltering in blood, naked embracers or rapist-stranglers.’ What are we to make of Bloom and Bellow’s unfashionable and provocative attacks on film and contemporary academic culture? This paper aims to show where the importance of such comments might lie.
The Other side of the film: Edith Stein’s theory of empathy as a filmic experience theory
ADRIANO D’ALOIA

The interest in the concept of empathy as a model to describe spectator’s involvement links up the Filmologic psycho-physiological experiments on spectator response (Michotte, Gemelli) with its most recent developments in neuroscientific research (Gallese, Rizzolatti). In the last years empathy has become a very fashionable word in psychologies and humanities, as Einfühlung has been in the neo-romantic age. And even if not always explicitly, it runs through the whole history of psychologies of cinema. Edmund Husserl argued that entropathy is constitutive of the comprehension of the Other, the Self, and the World. His assistant Edith Stein was the first to enucleate the specificity of empathy in her book On the Problem of Empathy, published in 1917. The aim of my paper is to outline the relevance of Stein’s intersubjective empathy for film theory (and namely for Filmology). I will focus on three points of relevance: 1) The notion of “primordiality/non-primordiality” as phenomenological explication of the fundamental issue of Filmology, that is the dynamic impression of reality/beliefs. Assuming the content of filmic emotion as intentional object, I will argue that, as memory, fancy and empathy, the filmic experience is the “living-experience” of a “lived-experience” (Erlebnis): it takes place here and now – in the bodily present of the theatre –, and, at the same time, it takes place there and once – in the indefinite space and time of the events on the screen. 2) The separation of the subjectivities involved in the empathic process as phenomenological explication of the relation between the spectator and the film character. The subjects of both empathy and filmic experience are one “at” or “with” the other, but they do not fuse with each other. The sui generis experience of empathy, eventually, consists in experiencing in the first person the Other’s primordiality in the paradoxical way of experiencing his/her non-primordiality. In filmic experience, the Other is the character, that is, a paradoxical “otherness”. One cannot say that the character has a subjectivity as Others in real life have. Nevertheless, as Stein would say, the “type human” of the characters – their human being like the spectator, a sort of “ontological consonance”, drives the viewer in mirroring the characters actions, emotions and even their intentions. 3) The interpolative role of empathy between the perceptual and the cognitive poles of experience as phenomenological explication of the psychological process of filmic experience in general. Stein argues that the empathic process has three grades or modalities of accomplishment: the emergence of the experience, the fulfilling explication, and the comprehensive objectification of the explained experience. In the same way, the filmic experience could be described as a perceptual act, that is lived as an emotional act, that is objectified by a cognitive act.
B
What is a Platonist Movie?
Alain Badiou

In this paper, I include some fragments of my translation (a work in progress) of Plato, namely my translation of the famous allegory of the cave. In my translation, I transform the original cave into a huge and absolutely closed movie theater....
Gestures in the Feminine: Toward an Irigarayan Cinematics
Caroline Bainbridge

Drawing on work underpinning my book, *A Feminine Cinematics*, I will consider the notion of gesture in Luce Irigaray's work. Her suggestion will be that that the scene of women's film-making can usefully be illuminated with reference to this means of understanding the 'practicable' of film so that cinema is seen as a constellation of meanings arising not only from the textuality of films but also from their formal and contextual properties and relationships. By charting a series of gestures in the feminine, this talk will highlight the specificity of cinema in offering a means of thinking otherwise about processes of subjectivity and the political potential that is enabled by such an approach.
Marker’s Tomb: Rancière on Cinema’s Historical Powers
Emiliano Battista

In “The Aesthetic Revolution and Its Outcomes,” Jacques Rancière identifies three ways in which the paradox of the aesthetic has been configured: life can become art; art can become life; art and life can exchange their properties. Much of Rancière’s work has been devoted to illustrating how these options are exercised, and in this talk I argue that his reading of Chris Marker’s The Last Bolshevik, in “Documentary Fiction: Marker and the Fiction of Memory,” illustrates the second configuration, that of art becoming life.

In that chapter, Rancière is interested in discussing what he calls cinema’s “historical powers”: Marker’s documentary, he writes, is a “cinematographic film about cinema’s historical powers” (FF, 168). What is distinctive about his approach is that he cuts into the problem of cinema’s historical powers by way of careful analysis of the genre of fiction—the fiction of memory in the title—that Marker mines for this film, that is both about the life and troubles of the Soviet filmmaker Alexander Medvekin and about “the Soviet dream and nightmare” (FF, 159), the “Soviet epic and catastrophe” (FF, 165). History is, certainly, an object of Marker’s film, and one way to discuss the relationship between cinema and history would be to ask if cinema is suited to the task of history, if it can capture or convey history faithfully, accurately, or whatever. This is not what Rancière has in mind when he speaks of cinema’s historical powers; he never questions, for example, the accuracy of Marker’s documents, or of his interpretation of them. Nor is his focus on the genre of fiction designed to suggest that history is just a “pretty story or evil lie, the flipside of reality that people try to pass off for it” (FF, 158). Marker’s film raises a more enigmatic problem, for his fiction of memory does not fictionalize history but, on the contrary, it historicizes fiction. Marker presents filmic images as facts of history. Marker “suggests that it is possible to tell the history of the Soviet century through the fates of Soviet filmmakers, through the films they made, those they didn’t make, and those they were obliged to make” (166). It is this investment of filmic images with historical value that Rancière wants to understand and discuss.

There are two distinctive features the plot of the life of art. The first is that it results in the “ambiguous historicity of art” (AR, 141); this ambiguous historicity is the fact that art comes to be treated as a fact of history—this is its “life.” Not surprisingly, the plot of the life of art always “entails a verdict of death” (AR, 142); every scenario of the “end of the art” belongs to this configuration of the aesthetic. A fiction of memory remembers the dead: the film attests to “the common destiny of cinema and Sovietism” (FF, 166), and also serves as the tomb (the French title is Le Tombeau d’Alexandre) which keeps their remains, like the Great Pyramid Rancière mentions at the beginning of the discussion (FF, 157). I conclude my talk by showing how Rancière rescues “cinema” from thereach of Marker’s tomb.
Of Theory Talk
Edward Branigan

A film theorist works with words – and perhaps only on words – when crafting an explanatory model designed to be persuasive to his or her community and fit for a time. In analyzing a given theoretical claim one should focus on probing the languages being used by a theorist, not in the first instance asking whether the theory sets forth a plausible account of film language or whether the theory’s inevitable spiral of generalizations about mind and culture are plausible. Instead, a theory should be interpreted as taking place within a grid of our anxieties and among the defenses we erect toward daily life through manipulations of ordinary language. It does not matter whether a theorist is aware of these anxieties and defenses: they come with the territory when one uses language. Conflict and indeterminacy are being regulated and exploited in theoretical discourse, not abolished through a polished surface that creates a world as a mirrored perfect image.

In analyzing a theory one must determine which networks of metaphors, scenarios, judgment heuristics, folk theories, schemata, and models are being implemented to frame the values being retrieved from (and projected onto) film. A theory is neither a puzzle of philosophical concepts nor an occasion to implement Ricoeur’s “hermeneutics of suspicion,” but rather the stage for a kind of anthropology, a “hermeneutics of entangled grammars,” akin to Bakhtin’s heteroglossia.
Recent work on ‘the voice in cinema’, to invoke the title of Michel Chion’s influential study, has focused on fiction films and the uncanny process of de-acousmatization, wherein the unattached, floating, and disembodied voice returns to the body with a jolt only to be liquidated of its force and fascination. Drawing on Lacan’s identification of the voice as a partial object, Chion, as well as Mladen Dolar and Slavoj Zizek, have turned to films such as The Testament of Dr. Mabuse, The Great Dictator, and Psycho in order to analyze the power of the voice, not as a mere vehicle for meaning or example of aesthetic beauty, but as a thing or surplus. But what of the voice in documentary film? Pascal Bonitzer and Joan Copjec point to the ways in which the authority of voice-over narration in documentary traditionally depends upon that voice remaining off-screen and unseen. In this paper, I want to approach this question in a different way, by turning to a thinker not primarily associated with the contemporary theoretical fascination with the voice, Jacques Rancière, and to a film that, for all the power of the images it presents, is dominated by the voice of its director, Terence Davies’s Of Time and the City.

In his analysis of Chris Marker’s The Last Bolshevik, Rancière explains that documentary is best understood not as the opposite of fiction, but as one of its modes. Documentary constructs and assembles, forging its reality out of its constituent parts. To forge, and not to feign, Rancière notes, is the etymological root of fiction. This is of particular consequence for films about memory, since it too, Rancière insists, should not be thought of as “a store of recollections” but rather as “an orderly collection, a certain arrangement of signs, traces, monuments” (157). “Memory,” according to Rancière, “is the work of fiction” (158). Of Time and the City, Davies’ 2008 cinematic lament for a disappearing Liverpool, exemplifies such an understanding of documentary memory as a work of fiction, not in the sense of the past it represents being imagined or invented or simply false, but in that it is an assemblage of bits and pieces of archival material which, when ordered, becomes memory rather than simply representing it. Davies narrates Of Time and the City himself, and it is his voice that binds together the assembled pieces to give the montage a narrative shape. This points to the problem of voice for documentary film. If, as Rancière argues, the documentary dream has long been to allow images to speak for themselves, or to allow its subjects to speak for themselves, voice-over narration, even if poetic and elliptical rather than the conventional “voice-of-God”, seemingly denies these opportunities. Yet, even as the voice attempts to shape the reception of the images, to communicate a content through speech, there remains a surplus, a significance and force beyond speech. Davies’s voice, in its oscillations between weariness, melancholia, acidity, and affectation, demonstrates the ways in which the voice materializes loss and shows that hearing loss is not simply a matter of listening to the content of speech, but to the matter of the voice.
C
Aesthetic translation, or how I tried to make a film about Plato’s world of forms
Joanna Callaghan

Ontological Narratives is a practice led research project that seeks to discover if philosophical concepts can be translated into aesthetic products and if narrative can play a role in developing a coherent vision of philosophical concepts. The project creatively combines philosophy, ontological systems and narrative form. The theoretical context is the area coined by Daniel Frampton as ‘Filmosophy’, that is the ability of films to be philosophy. What is essential is the notion of a filmic language that may replicate or engender the language of philosophy. Resulting in the production of a short 35mm film, A mind’s eye, the project has been funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and the Research Institute of Media, Art and Design at the University of Bedfordshire and is the first of a series of films concerning philosophy.
This paper will discuss and reflect on the process of conducting practice led research and consider some of the problems in making visual, filmic products from philosophical concepts. Extracts from the film will be shown.
A Choreographic perspective on movement in Cinema.
Beatriz Cantinho

The Title of my PhD practice based research is: “Crystal image – beyond metaphor: analysis of movement perception in interdisciplinary artistic work” and it concerns mainly the research of the possible relationship between dance and philosophy, and more specifically, how and to what extent the understanding of specific aesthetic concepts can inform experimentations within movement practices and interdisciplinary composition. The cliché repeats itself in almost all disciplines: artists do, theoreticians think. From my perspective, only a mutually informing dialogue between movement practices and aesthetic theory can provide an appropriate context for both practice and theory enabling them to reach their full potential. Philosophical practice provides methodologies of questioning and experimentations with concepts, which can be introduced to movement practices.

The interaction between philosophy and choreography can illuminate philosophical concepts in ways, which are grounded in the body. Spinoza’s question: “what can a body do?” (Cit in. Lepecky 2006) becomes crucial in the dialogue between philosophy and movement practice. The analysis of aesthetic concepts from a dance perspective illuminates and reveals discrepancies between aesthetic theory and movement practice. The investigation that I undertook in my doctoral research focuses on the relationship between the concept of the “Crystal Image” which is present in the work of French philosophers Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze, cinema 2 1985) and interdisciplinary choreographic composition.

The Crystal Image concept and its application to images produced in dance come from the recognition of specific qualities inherent to image presentation. These refer to qualities of time and image; “virtual aesthetics” (Bucci-Glucksman, 2002), translatable into ‘force’ and ‘intensity’; an image that contains past and present, an experience of a total time lived through an image. In my perspective, the analysis of the Time Image concept within cinema can inform movement and sound composition strategies and take their methods and techniques further. Although we should not forget that we are dealing with two different realities; cinema and performance. The formal relationship is evidently different: one being the screen and what this means to audience experience, another being life performance and the relationship between the performers and the audience that with any doubt establishes from the beginning a complete different level of experience with the so called image. Nevertheless some aspects of composition of the Time Image are possible to be transported from one to the other: From my perspective, the Time Image creates the possibility of presenting an image that instead of being filled with content possesses an emptiness that is then field by the observer. Taking into consideration, that while building an object that this object will take on a life of its own, growing in profundity through its continuous connections between its actual (visible) and virtual (invisible) qualities, perpetuating its own image endlessly. The challenge then is to understand which are the essential composition aspects to construct this object and how can concepts be applied to practice in a way that do not compromise how we expect this object to be perceived (not in its content but in its formal qualities).

Kieran Cashell

*Wittgenstein* (1993), Derek Jarman’s biopic of the Austrian-born Cambridge philosopher is a fascinating – if perplexing – film. In equal measure aesthetic and didactic, its status is ambiguous, and not only because didacticism in the philosophy of art is often assumed to diminish aesthetic value. Nothing, however, of the film’s aesthetic is depreciated by the intention to instruct. An already episodic narrative is interspersed with scenes of the philosopher at the blackboard, teaching. Yet even if the objective was to teach, the film is also highly aestheticised. Composed of a series of richly theatrical set-pieces, arrayed *tenebroso*-style in black interiors, Jarman’s film clearly aspires to a painterly aesthetic. This paper examines the aesthetic and epistemic dimensions of *Wittgenstein*. The consensus among professional philosophers is that the film, while idiosyncratic, stylised and subjective, nevertheless says something important and original about Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Take the story in the film about the boy feeling at home in the crystalline realm of ice. Although the ‘image of the ice as, precisely, home is [Terry] Eagleton’s and Jarman’s, not Wittgenstein’s,’ Naomi Sheman observes, ‘there is something oddly right about it’. Jarman’s film is in no sense a conventional biopic. It is as if he (unlike Eagleton, author of the original screenplay) has used the project to innovate ways of translating Wittgenstein’s philosophy to aesthetic form. The resultant representational strategies are best understood with reference to the picture theory developed in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922) Wittgenstein characterised the proposition (trans-linguistic statement) as an articulation of elements that, by virtue of shared logical form, corresponds to the disposition of objects in a possible fact. Under Jarman’s direction, the cinematic tableaux are transformed into propositions in the Wittgensteinian sense. Articulations of discrete elements (pictures), that is, are deployed to model facts from the life of Ludwig Wittgenstein. And the implication is that, in order to establish the truth value of these images, picture must be compared with fact. In this film, therefore, Jarman has refined his cinematic process into what, following the picture theory, I have called tractarian montage. It is because the philosophy is embedded in the film as a structural component of its form (and not just *presented* didactically) that *Wittgenstein* seems oddly right to Wittgensteinian viewers. For, as opposed to the formally represented philosophy, the philosophy presented didactically in the film is appropriated from the philosopher’s *later* work. A kind of stratified perspective results that becomes highly revealing of the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. A key instance of this double aspect perspective is the War scene where young Wittgenstein carries a banner with *Tractatus* inscribed on it while the VO quotes from *On Certainty*: ‘Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and a heretic’. Perhaps in *Wittgenstein* two irreconcilable principles have met. Yet the aesthetic and epistemic consequences that result from this collision are precisely what make the film philosophically interesting – indeed they provide a valuable opportunity to reflect not only on the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy but also, uniquely, on the relationship between his philosophy and his life.
Film as embodied or disembodied experience? Overcoming Dualism: early abstract cinematographic experiences as ‘pure sensation.’

Patrícia Castello-Branco

The last decade has witnessed a revival of the issue of the embodiment or disembodiment of spectatorship cinematographic experience: is film spectatorship an embodied or disembodied experience?

On the one hand, there is the phenomenological approach to film that, based on Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh, argues in favour of approaching cinema as a complex affective and embodied process (Sobchack: 2004); on the other, we have the recent Cognitive Film Theories that address film experience from a disembodied point of view, focusing in the mental conscious processes at play in the film’s spectatorship and how they can provoke emotional responses (Plantinga and Smith:1999).

In this paper I will propose an approach to the experience of embodiment in film spectatorship, focusing both in the importance of the spectator’s body -- taken as a ‘physical material nature’ (Benjamin: 1936) -- and on the ‘physical effects’ (Benjamin: 1936) produced by films. I will explore how this ‘physical effects’ can be a primary dimension of spectatorship. This approach entails the question of how can the physical effects produced by the moving images be conceptualised as the embodied ground of film’s perception.

The argument will focus in concrete film practices. In the first decades of cinema, we find several non-narrative trends which build on the claim of the cinematographic medium as a new field to explore ‘pure sensations’ (Porte: 1924). Two terms—kinetic vision and pure sensation —form the pivotal points to these early understandings of cinema. The connection between vision and the other senses, the role of motion and editing, are also central to these approaches. In accordance with Benjamin’s account for the ‘physical effects’ and ‘physical shock effects’ (Benjamin: 1936) produced by cinematographic experience, and the ‘absent-minded examiner’ (Benjamin, 1926) they entail, this focusing in pure sensations is seen also as a means to overcoming Cartesian Dualism.

I will start with a brief overview of Benjamin’s approach to the cinematographic as a ‘physical shock effect’ (Benjamin: 1936). I will then articulate Benjamin’s views with the experiments of the French vanguard cinema of the 1920’s (Gance, Dulac, Epstein, Porte), and also with the American Abstract Cinema (Belson, Fischinger, Smith and John Withney). I will also try and demonstrate how these latter experiments focus on abstract imagery in order to question the disembodied view of cinema’s spectatorship experience. I will argue that, in these early films, we find, in pure motion of shapes and colours, a path to achieve ‘pure sensation’ and ‘physic effects’ and not merely a means of illustrating abstract reasoning. Accordingly, they should not be considered as a Cartesian trend in cinema that privileges disembodied vision and addresses vision as the best ally of the cogito. Alternatively, through their focusing in the physical effects of cinema, they do intend to radically demonstrate the importance of an embodied and corporeal vision in cinematographic spectatorship that can be extended to all kinds of cinematographic experience.
Cinema as index of motion: the open-image and perception in continuous spaces
Charalambos Charalambous

Early theorists valued cinema as an index of reality, mainly due to the indexical nature of the photographic stills from which the motion of the cinematic image is animated. Film theories further grounded cinematic representation of reality through the introduction of classification systems for the image and by favouring visual primacy in film aesthetics.

Such approaches are challenged by changes of the cinematic medium (digital cinema), new film aesthetics and contemporary film movements. The New Iranian Cinema and more specifically the films of Abbas Kiarostami, constitute an exceptional case which requires a departure from classic film theory. It is an amalgam of film and philosophy that necessitates the formation of innovative tools in order to theorize the cinematic image as representation of reality.

Considering cinema as index of movement, leads to a revaluation of the cinematic image and its relation to reality. More importantly it allows for the proposition of a novel model for perception of such image; a model deriving from the mathematical concepts of continuity and open sets, which reconciles the infinite nature of the real with the limitations of cinematic experience. The concept of the open-image (equivalent to the mathematical concept of the open-sphere) is introduced and through a methodological expansion of the discontinuous impression of motion in cinema, to the continuous perception of movement, cinematic space and time, representation of reality and notions of truth are newly explained in the films of Abbas Kiarostami.

Lastly, this model for the perception of cinematic representation provides solutions on problems presented in previous theories: the need for infinite analysis of movement as discussed in the work of Henri Bergson and the need to reconcile image and object without a transcendental leap as described in the work of Gilles Deleuze.
Panel: A Deleuzian Journey: The Body and Space in Motion

This panel presents a close look at how the concepts of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari might be used to explore the filmic body and filmic space in contemporary cinema. The journey of the main protagonist in-between private and public, the sacred and the profane, two different cultures or two different countries will be analysed in various film examples from art house to mainstream. The body being the conveyor of meaning, the becoming of the characters as a process between places, situations, groups of people and feelings will be the common focus point for the three papers proposed. Making use of the concepts derived from the Cinema I, II and Capitalism and Schizophrenia, this panel is devoted to explore fresh connections between the philosophy of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari and contemporary film.

Paper 1: The In-between Spaces in Code Unknown (2000)
Yun Hua Chen

Code Unknown, whose second title clearly indicates the nature of it being Incomplete Tales of Several Journeys, is a film which pieces different trajectories together into a puzzle of contemporary Western society with its political, social and racial problems resulting from historical causes. The journeys of Georges, Anne, Maria, Jean, and Amadou are not journeys of adventure but rather journeys of flight. Crossing and recrossing spaces of white and bright colours, light and darkness, the proximal and the distant, and the seen and the unseen, these bodies are caught in-between fragments and in-between frames. On the one hand the story of their separate journeys is interwoven with bits and pieces of snapshots. On the other hand their bodies are in the constant process of being framed by the camera and eluding the frame. Instead of wandering freely between two spatial planes, every protagonist straddles two spaces drawn by a line of different kinds and unwillingly stuck in-between.

The actress Anne, played by Juliette Binoche, brings the dimension of virtuality into the multiple in-between spaces. She traverses the spaces in film reality and doubly-mediated images inside the film, that is, between the actual and the virtual in diegesis. Different levels of indiscernibility between the virtual and the actual imprison Anne in the in-between spaces, partially Anne the actress and partially her character. The gradually increased indiscernibility between the virtual and the actual during her four performances on stage or on screen is reaching Deleuzian “powers of the false” of crystalline images.

The bodies portrayed in Code Unknown can thus be seen as stuck in the disconnected and emptied spaces, the two states of the any-space-whatever. Their state of strolling, sauntering and rambling gradually separates them from situations motivated by sensory-motor movement and reaches pure optical and sound situations from which any-spaces-whatever proliferate. Although Michael Haneke focuses on one single location in each fragment, the bodies in Code Unknown seem to transcend the boundaries of fragments, framing and virtuality. Instead of enjoying the privilege of being both here and there, they are in-between and virtually neither here nor there. Their in-betweenness becomes their imprisonment and their any-spaces-whatever. Living smooth in striated space, they are bodies trapped in any-spaces-whatever and unable to react.

This paper will illustrate how the bodies of Haneke’s characters in Code Unknown (2000) are caught in a liminal state between fragments. I will use Deleuze’s Cinema 2 and A Thousand Plateaus and look at the characters’ bodies in Code Unknown as residing in an in-between status, not only in-between snapshots but also in-between frames and in-between the actual and the virtual.
Theology of Colour between Moral Law and Love: Reflections on Krzysztof Kieslowski’s *Three Colours: Red*
Myung-hye Chun

Inspired by the writings of Emmanuel Levinas and Paul Ricoeur for their theological ethics, the main objective of my paper is to explore how Krzysztof Kieslowski’s *Three Colours: Red* (1994) cinematically dramatises the ethical concept of fraternity as universal through the use of the colour red in contemporary hermeneutic thought. In Kieslowski’s filmic world, colour seeps between two great disciplines: ethical philosophy and religion. For Kieslowski, both philosophy and religion are part of the same inexhaustible spiritual process which is the approach of transcendence in Levinas’s sense. All of Kieslowski’s late work can be thought about starting from the notion of mystery which generates the conceptual gap between mere humankind and the transcendent. Meanwhile, the gap in the narrative can recall the enigmatic storytelling of the Old Testament. The resultant aesthetic is ‘biblical’. The Colour red as the original enigma of biblical symbolism of sin and redemption has the power to manifest the transcendental in sensuous form, where the more particular represents the more universal as a vivid, instantaneous revelation of the inexplicable. Ricoeur, famously in *The Symbolism of Evil*: ‘the symbol gives rise to thought’ (1967:352). My reflection on Kieslowski’s symbolic use of red in order to uncover the intentional meaning that accompanies the film text has the interpretative stance implied in Ricoeur’s aphorism. In *Three Colours: Red*, the two shades of red traverse three concentric circles – vengeance, justice, love. The brown, the defiled red, surrounding the vengeful retired judge symbolises ‘ethical dread’, the dread of the impure or of contamination. *Three Colours: Red* suggests that one becomes a judge, after losing one’s solidarity with the underdog. Wassily Kandinsky’s description of brown as unemotional, disinclined for movement matches the judge’s self-imposed isolation and misanthropic attitude to the world. Brown as a blend of red and black is a dirty colour in a spiritual sense, for black quenches the glow and vitality. But outwardly foul may be inwardly pure, as it is often vice versa. Kieslowski is interested in the difference between defilement and guilt. In defilement the judge accuses another, but in guilt he accuses himself. The judge, whose itineraries variously echo that of a jealous, punitive Almighty, finally remarks of the people he found guilty that in their place as the defendants he too would have killed and lied. For Ricoeur, guilt marks a movement from the religious to the ethical by being answerable towards God to towards the other person. Beginning in the position of distance so often ascribed to the holy God of the Old Testament, the judge draws close, just as that same God does through Jesus. In Kieslowski’s last film which conceives fraternity as alterity, the Old Testament order of punishment gives way to forgiveness, which leads to the Christian notion of brotherly love, namely, fraternity. Fraternity and forgiveness belong to the same family. It is logic of generosity whereby I give more than the other deserves in relation to me while expecting nothing in return. This logic of superabundance in Ricoeur’s terms, which is more ethical than ethical, is symbolised in the final sequence of the film, where the unbounded glowing warmth of red frames the pure nobility of the face of the young compassionate woman. However, the Christian notion of love and forgiveness proclaimed by Saint Paul in the New Testament emanates from an unconditional imperative. It should remain exceptional and extraordinary, standing the test of the ‘impossible’, otherwise then forgiveness is not pure - its concept is defiled. Despite the redemption of Christ, ‘the fulfilment of the law’ of God (Galatians 3: 13) has not yet taken place. It belongs to the time of the promise. Love that excuses even the unforgivable displaces justice but does not complete the law of justice.
Bela Tarr’s film Werckmeister Harmonies and the problem of allegory
William Coker

Bela Tarr’s film Werckmeister Harmonies exhorts a revision of the notion of allegory. The film tests both the transcendentalist idea of allegory as reading the sensible in terms of the intelligible, and Walter Benjamin’s version of allegory as a mode of registering historical crisis in the material world. The film collects opaque references, allusions which become aesthetic objects in their own right rather than readable keys to an outside meaning. These allegorical motifs stem both from the deliberate interpretive projects of individual characters and from hints made by the film itself in striking juxtapositions of images and voices.

Though the film portrays events in a Hungarian provincial city, we can locate neither the city nor the precise time of its portrayal, sometime during the last generation of the communist system. Only in one scene does the crisis of the system’s collapse come to the surface: when two circus-managers are disputing the appearance of their traveling show’s heralded “prince,” and this character is heard to speak loudly from off-screen, creating a scene in which the two voices effectively drown each other out-and at moments one of them speaks Russian. The near-unintelligibility of the dialogue at this climactic moment further underlines the sense that something is being kept from the audience which the characters’ allegorical readings cannot access. Moreover, this apparently concealed truth may well be content-less.

In the first scene of the film, the main character enters a bar frequented by factory workers and has the men perform the roles of sun, moon and earth in the enactment of a solar eclipse which he explains, in a trope conventional to devotional literature dating from the baroque period, as an allegory of the immortality of the soul. Both the difficulty the men have in enacting this scene-stumbling out of place and bumping into each other-and their placid acceptance of the act underline the “gap between performance and belief” cited by Alexei Yurchek as symptomatic of the last generation to be educated in the eastern-block system.

Allegory also surfaces in the traveling show’s presentation of a dead whale reminiscent of Melville’s whale. According to the protagonist a wonder of God’s creation, the dead whale reflects the larger phenomenon of allegory reified, turned into a dead object of the viewer’s gaze, which does not interpret so much as gawk. In one of Tarr’s characteristically long shots, the protagonist and the dead whale stand eye to eye. The gaze that would marvel at the wonders of creation becomes as inert as the unseeing eye of the whale carcass.

Against the background of contemporary discussion on the nature of allegory, this paper will focus on the dimensions of allegory as an opaque object of the spectator’s gaze rather than a guide to interpretation, and consider whether such terms as reification or commodification do justice to the aesthetic mode of Tarr’s film. Thus the film can serve as a prism for broader explorations of subjectivity in the post-communist late twentieth century.
What is film-philosophy?
Felicity Colman

Film creates environments where temporalised conditions of all kinds can be realized. Film forms produce and reveal physical and social entities, whose ontological dimensions question and resource the very metaphysical grounds from which they draw. It has been one of the great preoccupations of Western and Eastern philosophies to devise and critique accounts of how such conditions can be possible, thought, or even real. In the creation of all manner of different or new ontologies, film and its related screen forms have produced many models for critical thought and their requisite classification for investigation. Out of film thus arises a new philosophical entity: Film-philosophy.

There are many differences within each respective discipline field of philosophy and film (and its commonly known subject of film theory). How the two have converged to create a new discipline is a point of contention. Film forms service many of the philosophical categories through their very existence, and some theorists argue that film-philosophy is an illustrative methodoloy. Others argue that film itself is a philosophical process. The disparate camps of analytic and continental theories for both fields of enquiry further divide opinion. The question of what constitutes film-philosophy as a discipline is tied to the shifting notions of the traditions of the dual-disciplines it sources. This doubled inheritance is additionally qualified when we look at how the discipline of film-philosophy is practiced. In asking the question What is film-philosophy? this paper will focus on three of the core arenas where the discipline has broadly sited its critical thinking: phenomenology, metaphysics, and epistemology. These three domains of philosophical practice are arenas where film-philosophy expands and redistributes the purview of filmic conditions, structures and models. Finally this paper will look at how, in its development and address of specific content, the divergent practices of film-philosophy have set specific critical agendas for the study of the screen medium.
This paper will focus on the important and often overlooked role played by imagery in accounts of what it is to theorize within Film Studies and Film-Philosophy. It will provide a meta-critical overview of a variety of recent approaches: from the tropes of scientism and the imagery of the law court that emerge in the work of Post-theorists David Bordwell and Noel Carroll respectively, to the various models of theorizing as a shift of perspective that are currently emerging within Film-Philosophy. The paper will assess the very different models of perspectivalism set up by Stephen Mulhall, Andrew Klevan and myself, focusing on the construction of the theorist and the role of the film text. The perspectival model is valuable in that it enables the interlinking of the processes of theorizing, viewing and interpretation, which have been forcibly separated by the Post-theorists. I will argue in favour of a Nietzschean conception of the perspectival shift, which has the potential to offer a particularly interesting and active role for film texts in the construction and conceptualization of theory.
Many science fiction films explore radical sceptical predicaments, and are often used to introduce epistemology to philosophy students. *The Matrix* seems ready-made for the purpose, as do many other films such as *eXistenZ*, *Dark City*, *Thirteenth Floor*, *Abre los ojos*, *Vanilla Sky*, and so on. *Total Recall*, however, is special. *The Matrix*, for example, enacts a sceptical predicament through a fairly rigorous first-person narrative (at least in the crucial introductory stages). This has the advantage of motivating sceptical doubt, but it also limits ways of exploring responses to the sceptic. Films such as *The Matrix* are, in part, discovery narratives. They describe circumstances in which a protagonist discovers that their past experience has radically misled them. *Total Recall* works in a different way. It moves beyond the epistemic perspective of its protagonist almost from the beginning. The protagonist is assailed by sceptical doubts that seem very well founded (he really *ought* to doubt that he is having a riotous adventure on Mars), but are also false (he really is having a riotous adventure on Mars). Because of this structure, *Total Recall* allows us to focus critical attention on the condition of warranted belief rather than truth-possession. It encourages us to move beyond a motivation for scepticism to critical evaluation of scepticism. In particular, *Total Recall* turns out to be an excellent framework in which to explore the merits of contemporary externalist attempts to refute the sceptic. I use *Total Recall* to examine Drekste’s refutation of scepticism. Dretske uses an externalist account of warrant (a belief is warranted if it tracks the truth) to argue that the sceptical argument fails. It fails, according the Dretske, because the argument wrongly assumes that merely possible sceptical predicaments (I could be a brain in a vat; I could be suffering a schizoid embolism!) are relevant when determining whether a belief tracks the truth. Dretske’s refutation is often criticized on the grounds that it dispenses with a highly valuable principle of epistemic logic (the closure principle). But there is a stronger, more intuitively compelling, criticism to make. I develop this criticism courtesy of *Total Recall*. I proceed by comparing the epistemic condition of the two main figures in the film: Quaid/Hauser (Arnold Schwarzenegger) and Melina (Rachel Ticotin). Whatever else it is, *Total Recall* is a superb epistemological laboratory.
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Value theory and Science Fiction
Nancy Davies

Science fiction examples are often used in teaching to relate complex philosophical concepts to an area of literature or film that students are familiar with. However, I argue that science fiction can be of much more use than mere illustrative lecture material and is worthy of philosophical investigation in its own right. This paper concerns the multi-dimensional manner in which a series such as Firefly (2003) reflects modern ethical values; but moreover, I am interested in how Firefly engages the viewer moral education.

One reason to consider a very recent example of science fiction is that science fiction writing and film is illustrative of ethical concerns and standards of that time – a snapshot, if you will, of the cultural milieu. Much has been written on the significance of, e.g., Asimov, Lem, Dick, Wells, and so on. But, considering the current social climate requires investigating newer material.

Some issues that I will address concern:

Utopia: in the utopian societies of modern science fiction, the concepts good and bad (or good and evil) are often clearly demarcated and defined. This is not the case in my example. The 'heroes' of Firefly are the proverbial ‘bad guys’. Yet, we sympathize with them, and negative emotional engagement is directed at the interplanetary government. Why might this be the case? As mentioned, I think that Firefly (much like the new version of Battlestar Galactica) represent a snapshot of changing values. The government in this series seems to be aiming for a homogeneous approach to culture – trying to teach cultural outliers how to live well, based on the assumption (presumed to be unwarranted throughout the series), that the fringe elements of the vast society should be appreciative of such instruction.

Firefly defines good and bad based on a level of individuality previously perhaps thought to be divisive and undesirable. It also reflects the current aversion to ‘modern colonialism’. But naturally, things are not so simple. The values represented by the government and those by the characters of Firefly are not diametrically opposed. An interpretation of the series (and subsequent movie, Serenity), is that the two groups merely represent two different set of values. As much as we sympathize with the protagonists, we cannot categorically state that they are in the right (after all, they do on occasion kill people for seemingly petty reasons).

In such a society, then, we must ask: can we even say that good and bad are definable? I will disentangle the central themes found in Firefly – to illustrate the broader philosophical theme of shifting societal values, ethical values, the growing individuality of our culture, etc. It is interesting to note that the protagonists of this series are not only at odds with the government, but also the criminal element which they interact with on a regular basis. The government perceives them as criminals. What space do the characters occupy, then? Finding themselves on the fringe of every subculture which comprises their society they are at a loss of finding cultural markers to define their place in the universe. W hat alternative does one have but to be a 'bad guy'? In the absence of acceptance by all groups, subcultures, and society at large, one necessarily becomes defined as 'other', alternative, undesirable, and ultimately bad.
From his 1936 essay ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ onwards, Martin Heidegger engaged more thoroughly and more seriously with the role of art than any philosopher since Nietzsche. Central to Heidegger’s view of art was a belief that it suggested, through the emblematic work of the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, a means of overcoming the ontological malaise into which humanity had sunk as a result of two-and-a-half millennia under the yoke of Platonic Metaphysics. Art, when allowed to flourish outside of the stranglehold of ‘aesthetics’, offered for Heidegger nothing less than the first step in an ‘overcoming’ of this metaphysical bind. However, Heidegger’s writing on art, though hugely influential on the study of poetry and the visual arts, has had considerably less impact in Film Studies, due in part no doubt to his rather dismissive view of cinema as merely a technological product, and thus presumably incapable of ‘unconcealing’ the truth of the world in anything like the manner of verse or painting. Indeed the contemporary phenomenological turn in Film Studies (Sobchack, Frampton et. al.) has skirted around a full consideration of Heidegger’s work, despite an obvious indebtedness to his central concepts, favouring a more ‘embodied’ phenomenology that draws most heavily from the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

As a counter to this tendency, this paper seeks to sketch an alternative view, demonstrating not only that Heidegger’s work offers the potential for developing new ways of thinking about the ontology and phenomenology of film, but also that film – seemingly a metaphysical art par excellence – has the potential for developing a new understanding of Heidegger’s account of the role of art in the overcoming of metaphysics. In undertaking this analysis, Jean-Luc Godard’s 1963 film Le Mépris may be seen as exemplary, insomuch as it, through its narrative of the travails of filmmaking, embodies the interaction between two key Heideggerian concepts – ‘world’ and ‘earth’ – and furthermore echoes Heidegger’s attempt to rediscover a new role for art in a modernity that has increasingly relegated it to the periphery of life. Le Mépris, in its account of the making of an ill-starred, peplum-flavoured version of the Odyssey, has been viewed as a paean to both a lost classical culture and to a similarly vanished tradition of filmmaking, but it is also a work that demonstrates a belief in the capacity of art to reveal the world in a way that seems to accord quite closely with Heidegger’s views, albeit from a markedly different political perspective.
A spectre is haunting film philosophy – the spectre of film criticism... The present foundation of an academic sub-discipline around the hypothesis of a philosophy of film is not without its methodological dangers. Despite Stanley Cavell’s balanced approach, film philosophy has been establishing itself through the active forgetfulness of a whole tradition, that of film criticism. In the absence of a consensual definition of its range and scope, film philosophy is now in part negatively defined by its neglect of film criticism’s broad contributions to the knowledge of cinema. Such a naiveté or conscious neglect can nevertheless be considered as a strategic position, since it might allow for the glimpse of a philosophical 'tabula rasa' of cinema, as if cinema’s virginity remained intact to the very late but kind heart philosopher’s approaches. The corresponding disciplinary open field will then give room for some philosophical pirouettes while at the same time dramatically overlooking the most demanding and creative cinematic works, precisely those the tradition of film criticism was able to approach and establish in the vicinity of thought.

Andrew Klevan has recently focused on the specificities of “philosophical (film) criticism”, emphasising the discovery of such moments in films where the trace of “the movement of meaning” is visible, and concerning about the “appreciative dimension” that grounds the “experience in particular objects”. Despite such efforts, and since those dimensions are already fully available in the tradition of film criticism as practised for at least more than half a century, one might wonder if there’s a need for defining a specific philosophical criticism approach to cinema. One should perhaps attempt to privilege a philosophical extension of some considerations of critical thought, providing more formal conceptualizations, for instance. Positioned between art and philosophy and particularly permeable to cultural investments, cinema might demand for a more common and non-factious ground, where the reunion of a variety of approaches without an hierarchical standing would avoid the 'delirious tremens' of definition, and would be able to acknowledge the different ways in which cinema thinks. The establishment of this middle ground cannot in any way discount the literary tradition of film criticism, which surely mustn’t be regarded in its whole as mere unambitious “reviewing” of films. The reasons for the privilege of film criticism lay in its recognition of the film’s singularities and relation to spectatorship. Indeed, the sovereignty of cinema itself, which is a pre-condition for a balanced approach, is the most important lesson drawn from film criticism, at least since André Bazin and the "Cahiers du cinéma" tradition. Following Adrian Martin’s promotion of film criticism as full contact with theory and philosophy, we intend to present a particularly fundamental lineage of film critics who aren’t sometimes even translated in English.
SHOCK AND AWE: A DEHUMANISING 9/11 DOCUMENTARY
Neli Dobreva
What connections are there between a documentary film and a fictional documentary recreation of an event? Is it the same «form of life» or a phantasm of the Real? Does its content entail a particular understanding of the «affect» of a moving image? In my paper I will analyse two films: United 93 (2006), Paul Greengrass's documentary-style recreation of the United Airlines flight that crashed on September 11th, 2001, and Eugene Jarecki’s documentary Why We Fight (2005). I will explore the following question: does the documentary approach change the «eventuality» of the event in a particular way? According to Gilles Deleuze, the «event» designates that which occurs or disrupts without destroying the Real, or the «nature of the thing». In both films the Real acts as a screen between the reality and the fiction. What is significant here, is the fact that people who survived or witnessed 9/11 are directly involved as actors in these films; they re-act the event. I would argue, following Peter de Bolla, that re-acting the event, filming in real time, brings us to the Lacanian punctum, point de capiton, that imposes the Real as something shocking and awful and, in a sense, Sublime.
PANEL: RUIZ AS CINE THINKER: THE MULTIPLE SIDES OF AN ANOMALOUS AND UNIQUE PROJECT

This panel will examine the work of Raúl Ruiz across a variety of different cultural, aesthetic and institutional contexts, presenting him as a unique and anomalous cine thinker, whose work articulates questions of aesthetics and politics, singularity and multiplicity, interstices and singular points, austerity and the Baroque, film-making and speculative thought, cinema, television and pedagogy. In particular, this panel will present lesser known sides of Ruiz’s work, ranging from his Allende-period cinema in Chile, via his highly philosophical formulation of a Poetics of Cinema to his recent work for Chilean TV and as a pedagogue in the UK. Throughout the panel attention will be paid to the strategies that Ruiz has employed across these different situations to interrupt normal patterns of cinematic production and consumption and replace them with anomalous yet rigorous practices that open cinema up directly to speculative, investigative and interstitial thought processes well beyond the usual limits of both mainstream and art cinema practices and normative film theories.

Re-Ruiz: Returns, Reverberations, Revenants, Remembrance

Garin Dowd

This paper begins by considering the stakes of the hypothesis named in the title of L’Hypothèse du tableau volé/The Hypothesis of the Stolen Painting (1979). There a collector of paintings is vexed by an apparent hiatus in a collection of paintings by a certain Tonerre, which occasions the hypothetical conjecture. Like Jean-Luc Godard, Ruiz is interested in what happens between shots, between frames, “between two films zapped on television” (Poetics of Cinema, 117). What takes place in this between Ruiz calls “the missing fragment”, “the hypnotic point”, or “the sublime ennui”. The operation of Ruizian cine-thinking concerning such interstices generates a play of systole and diastole (one might also venture unfolding and folding). A consideration of the dynamics of plenitude and void is apt for a filmmaker often considered in the context of a Baroque heritage. Making reference to Poetics of Cinema, a selection of Ruiz’s films (mainly from the last decade) and intersections with philosophy (especially Deleuze) this paper will explore various modes of Ruizian possibility and incompossibility as these operate at the levels of a cinematographic ontology on the one hand and of narrative and mise-en-scène on the other. Returns, repetitions, reverberations, revenants and remembrance: Ruiz’s work I will argue operates according to stratagems the function of which is, in his own words, “to make visible the incompleteness inherent in cinema” (117).
I propose an approach to Marguerite Duras’s cinema, based on the way it echoes the notion of the figural, as it is understood by Jean-François Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze. In *Discours, Figure*, Lyotard focuses on two heterogeneous extensions: the discourse and the sensory experience. Between them there is dispute: the sensory, when incorporated by language, loses its weight; language is, in part, irreducible to the sensory. The dispute gives rise to the space of the figural, present in discourse, as well as in figure. It is a space which takes in a kind of dis-figuration work: the figural appears as an equivalent of desire, while it disrupts the dominant systems of representation.

Lyotard does not mention film when he develops the concept of the figural, but one recognises the same dis-figuration premises, now in relation to the order, or “good form”, of traditional cinema, in *Acinema*. The author opposes to representational-narrative cinema, in its attempt to reproduce the real at several levels, and in particular with regard to the movement, exactly the two aberrant extremes that it excludes: the excess of movement and the immobility, the abstraction and the *tableau vivant*, identified with experimental cinema. However, if one looks at cinema as a whole, from the perspective of the promotion of aberrant movement, as does Deleuze, not only it can be found outside the experimental frame, within the realistic-narrative films, but it is also what distinguishes the work of modern cinema: the dis-figuration of "normal movement defined by motricity" through the direct presentation of time.

In this sense, the time-image is the expression of the figural, inside cinema. I will analyse how the writing of Duras’s films – in *Aurélia Steiner (Melbourne)* and *Aurélia Steiner (Vancouver)*, in particular – explores the fascination by both the image’s immobility and fluidity, through its disjunctive encounter with the words, in order to argue that her films are paradigmatic of the constitution of a cinematographic “space-time” which is figural in the sense mentioned.
Colliding the fictional and the actual in the Bosnian Valley of the Pyramids
Steven Eastwood

In 2006 CNN reported to the world the discovery of gigantic ancient pyramids, not in Egypt, but buried beneath the hills that surround the town of Visoko, central Bosnia. In 2008, filmmakers Steven Eastwood and Geoffrey Alan Rhodes, in collaboration with the Visoko community, shot the feature film Buried Land. Their method of production was an inversion of the docudrama, where an actuality is translated to a fiction. An actor was brought to the community complete with a fictional narrative with which to engage the people in their everyday roles. Directly referencing scenes in the film, this paper recounts how a documentary mode was cultivated that inhabited a space of ambiguity between fact and fiction, between the actual and imagined, creating a visual environment where it is not certain where reality ends and fantastical 'buried lands' begin. The paper proposes a kind of cine-document not solely of the visible or the audible, but also one of relations and of ideations.

On their arrival, the filmmakers were surprised by a ramification of this method - the comparison to methods of parody: a national newspaper called the project “Borat in Bosnia.” Though the technique used can be compared to line-crossings into the dramatic from such filmmakers as Abbas Kiarostami and Errol Morris, it is perhaps better described as that practiced by Sacha Baron Cohen in Borat. But this creates its own arenas of mendacity, as Borat's representations of people being their 'real selves' has made evident. In Buried Land the falsity is declared, and directed at a subject and situation itself constituted by grandiose visions and contradictory information. Within the film, issues of objectification and bias are reconstituted as a part of the text, through direct reference to the manipulations of an outside or other to a community, after the style of Andy Warhol's 'Screen Tests' (1964-66) or 'Kitchen' (1965). Real players in the pyramid events, from senior figures in the Foundation to the miners who clear the tunnels looking for chambers, occupy a screen space that continually switches from handheld documentary footage to apparent casting sessions. Such explicit cinematic devices, along with a highly improvised and reactive directing style, were introduced on-set without interrupting the flow of actuality, in a conscious recuperation and re-appropriation of rhetorical devices. In total the filmmakers worked with three cinematic modes: direct cinema; free indirect discourse; and wholly cinematic.

This continued engagement with a real community through the lens of artifice has the objective of questioning actuality on the screen and of proposing a more radical format for documenting. Subjectivities ascribed to historical subjects, along with fabricated landscapes and animated sequences (mirroring those of the valley produced by the Foundation) are gradually introduced into the documentary frame. These modes of engagement parallel the epistemological complexities of the situation on the ground in Visoko. For the first time since the war, Visoko has been launched in to the public eye. 100,000 tourists have visited the Pyramid of the Sun Foundation sites; restaurants now serve pyramid-themed food; patriotism over the region's ethnic history is the subject of talk in the local Pyramid of the Sun Hotel; sides have been chosen between believers and cynics. International academics have been infuriated by the continuing claims of this small Bosnian group, who continue excavating, releasing sensational interpretations to the newsmedia in spite of the establishment's denunciation of their methods and findings.

Steven Eastwood and Alan Rhodes will use their recent experience to reflect on the successes and failures of working within this mode, asking, how can we document something whose truth has many sides? Drawing upon theories of minor cinema and the powers of the false, the paper argues that interiorities and fictions applied to actual people create a space for the documentary to differently engage with complex and contradictory factual situations. We suggest describing this methodology as rhizomatic documentation, where the narrative structure of the film-as-document is positioned, like the camera, as that which is performed ‘for’ the film. This is a report of false finds and fabulation from the minefields and experimental ecologies of fact-fiction filmmaking.
Parallels between the post-68 films of Jean-Luc Godard and the early philosophy of Alain Badiou

Daniel Fairfax

“Art is not the reflection of reality, it is the reality of this reflection.”

This statement, made famous in Godard’s *La Chinoise* (1967), is actually paraphrased from one of Badiou’s earliest works, “The Autonomy of the Aesthetic Process”, published in 1966 but still untranslated into English, in which the latter asserts that “The aesthetic effect is indeed imaginary; but this imaginary is not the reflection of the real, since it is the real of this reflection.” It is here that Badiou, writing for the journal *Cahiers Marxistes-léninistes*, expounds a theory of art in which the aesthetic effect is affirmed to be distinct from both the regions of ideology and science.

Badiou’s overcoming of the Althusserian science/ideology duality marked both a major refinement of aesthetic theory within Althusserian Marxist thought, which had until then been hamstrung by a murky attitude towards art, generally classified as an “ideological form”. And, while still strongly influenced by Althusser and Macherey, the article represents a point of departure for Badiou. In emphasising the autonomy of artistic works from what Althusser dubbed “Ideological State Apparatuses”, Badiou rejects the idea of granting them the status of producing “scientific knowledge”. Instead, art reveals a different form of truth – the “imaginary reality”. This breakthrough can be seen as an important step in the development of Badiou’s later concept of the differing types of “truth process” (scientific, artistic, romantic and political).

At the same time, Godard himself was moving from a strident critique of late capitalist consumer society, in films such as *2 or 3 Things I Know About Her* and *Weekend*, to, in the wake of May 1968, an avowedly Maoist political stance. This deepening politicisation and turn to revolutionary activism can be traced in a series of films from *Le Gai Savoir* (1968) to *Letter to Jane* (1972), many of which were made in collaboration with Jean-Pierre Gorin – a former student from the same rue d’Ulm circles as Badiou – under the name: the “Dziga Vertov Group”.

The relationship between their work and currents of French Althussero-Maoist thought can most clearly be seen in a trilogy of films made in 1969: *Pravda, Vent d’Est* and *Luttes en Italie*. Indeed, *Luttes en Italie* can most accurately be viewed as a film adaptation of Althusser’s then unpublished article “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”.

With the aid in particular of documents recently published in conjunction with Godard’s 2006 exhibition at the *Centre Pompidou*, this paper will examine the parallel development of Badiou’s aesthetic theory and Godard’s cinematic praxis in the late 1960s and early 1970s, analysing their common origins and exploring the ways in which the two figures intersected, within the broader context of contemporaneous French political and philosophical trends. Additionally, the paper will look at the influence of this period on Badiou’s later work on aesthetics (dubbed “inaesthetics”), including his more recent responses to Godard’s *Tout va bien* (1972) and *Histoire(s) du cinéma* (1988-1998).
Imperceptible Cinema: Spacetime Quanta and Flicker Ontologies
Shannon Foskett

This paper explores the relationship between cinema and some recent theorizing about “the virtual” (Bohm; Deleuze; Rodowick) in order to suggest a new angle towards thinking about the ontology of the moving image. I argue that a theory of cinema could be approached through the theory of the photon and all the conceptual and methodological problem that such a theory implies. The existence/non-existence of this subatomic particle, its dual discrete/wave-like nature, and its entanglement with other particles of the same system present powerful metaphors but also “observable” components for thinking about the (im)material, magical basis of cinema. Moreover, the popular understanding of movie as “flicks,” pointing to the perceptual process that constructs visual continuity out of the fast succession of discrete still frames, is not without its counterpart “flicker” theories of human perception of duration and existence of the physical universe. Insofar as the perception of movement itself has been argued to be the most fundamental basis for the realist claims of cinema (Gunning 2008), the nature of the light that moves shares no less real a connection to the phenomena of sense experience; indeed, it just is our sense experience. It is on this basis that I argue that an examination of what ontologies of light hold for cinema – indeed, what would be a consideration of cinema at its limits – is warranted.

To this end, I will outline the “becoming-quantum” of Deleuze’s writing and the nature of quantum mechanics as a science of the virtual in order to reveal cinema at its most imperceptible. To the extent that Deleuze’s writing is engaged in a continual becoming-virtual, it is equally engaged in a becoming-quantum, i.e., a becoming-quantized or becoming-mathematical. Furthermore, the atomic bond that exists between the quantum philosophers and the ancient Greeks also exists for Deleuze, in the figure of the clinamen, which serves as an emblem for quantum process and the minimal horizon of perceptibility. Indeed, the position of the observer, or spectator, occupies as fundamental and constitutional role for quantum mechanics as an experimental science as it does for the experience of cinema. I point out the relationship between Deleuze’s notion of ontological “depth” and that of the virtual Implicate Order proposed by physicist David Bohm in order to talk about the virtual space of observer anticipation and projection and the co-constructive role it plays in the experience of flicker phenomena. The ontological gulf between human scales of vision and microscopic activity further point towards the virtual “sub-atomic cinema” that can only be perceived through such quantum photographic techniques as gamma ray, single-photon emission imaging. Ultimately, this “sub-atomic” cinema relativizes our commonsense understandings of the moving image by tracing its facticity back to its experimental and experiential ground, in order to reexamine its speeds and force new collisions between our thought about art, science and philosophy. Indeed, cinema can be shown to be just such a “thought-accelerator” in this sense.
Panel: A Deleuzian Journey: The Body and Space in Motion

This panel presents a close look at how the concepts of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari might be used to explore the filmic body and filmic space in contemporary cinema. The journey of the main protagonist in-between private and public, the sacred and the profane, two different cultures or two different countries will be analysed in various film examples from art house to mainstream. The body being the conveyor of meaning, the becoming of the characters as a process between places, situations, groups of people and feelings will be the common focus point for the three papers proposed. Making use of the concepts derived from the Cinema I, II and Capitalism and Schizophrenia, this panel is devoted to explore fresh connections between the philosophy of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari and contemporary film.

Paper 2: Black hole becomings: The insomniac body inside a time crystal
Dave Fleming

In two films dealing with insomnia, Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999) and The Machinist (Brad Anderson, 2005), we find the sleepless protagonists transformed into dislocated seers and wanderers divorced from ‘normal’ ways of perceiving and acting. In these films insomnia can be seen to provide such a powerful force of affection that a dangerous process of mental and physical deterritorialisation is catalysed within each protagonist. Insomnia functions here to initially uproot and dislodge the characters’ bodies and minds from the normal plane of reality and opens them up onto another plane where reality and dream, past and present, actual and virtual become increasingly blurred and confused. Throughout both narratives we also witness a mental schizo-facturing create a tight circuit that all too quickly turns back around to affect and fracture the body. In both film’s the characters’ journeys of spiritual and somatic deterritorialisation is increasingly negotiated and inscribed through the locus of the fleshy and feeling body. Such ideas are further developed through framing the bodies in a series of modern non-spaces and any-spaces- whatever where time, space and identity are hollowed out and vitrified. In both films the spiritual deterritorialisation meets the body as a zone of violence and resistance and the body mirrors and reflects the immanent line of flight every step of the way. In these crystalline spaces I thus examine how models of a mind and body parallelism and an immanently embedded identity begin to emerge. Fight Club is examined as an example of an ethical cinema where the character’s immanent deterritorialisation is counterbalanced by a new organic line of flight and becoming. In The Machinist we find instead a (post 9/11) moral cinema where the character’s body remains vertically framed and the line of flight formulates a declination leading inexorably into a physical, psychological and spiritual black-hole. This black hole threatens to consume the individual, vitrifying the body and mind and hollowing them out. Using the theories of Deleuze I examine how the films function as an expressive blend of body and brain cinema, and aesthetically toy with both the movement and time-image modes of narration. The narratives thus intercept powerful bodily forces and agents of affection at the same time that they place the bodies within a crystalline cage where things are perceived and measured a little differently.
Devastating temporality, ‘becoming’ and the post-human: Challenging Deleuze through Antonioni’s *L’eclisse*
Hamish Ford

This paper examines the relationship between post-war European cinema and Gilles Deleuze’s discussion of such films in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, focusing on Michelangelo Antonioni’s *L’eclisse* (1962) as an apogee case. At its most intense and radical, such a film subverts ontological grounding through heterogeneous formal and conceptual violence. While Deleuze’s philosophical framing of Antonioni’s work is in so many ways useful and generative, there might also be a lacuna between his emphasis on the potential benefits of a progressive movement away from ‘being’ and that, for on- (and perhaps off-) screen subjects, inherited ideas of permanency seem to maintain strong if contradictory affective power alongside dissipating belief.

At the heart of Deleuze’s philosophical (and ethico-political) account of post-war European cinema is the idea of a transition to, or some utopian gesture towards, ontological transcendence through the trope of ‘becoming’ (contra a dialectical understanding, here somehow as separated off from ‘being’ altogether in a truly idealist gesture). Yet the formal-conceptual rigour and ‘skepticism’ with which on-screen subjects and world are rendered through a film such as *L’eclisse* is such that while ‘being’ may seem nigh impossible, the damage and affective violence this realisation inflicts is truly complex. Rather than willingly overcome in favour of a promised newness, lingering ontological investments are extensively expressed and ambivalently ‘felt’ across the film’s aesthetic, performative and affective layers at the same time as they are shown to be untenable within a temporally-defined post-war image and world. While affirming the frequent usefulness of Deleuze’s approach, this paper seeks to highlight where the philosopher might in fact short-change the radical implications of such cinema. Notably, I will ask whether the implicit utopianism frequently evident in Deleuze’s account of time-image films risks ‘taming’ or bracketing their more subversive details and devastating impact – upon the viewing subject, but also upon theoretical attempts to account for subjectivity, world, or cinema.

Situating the remarkable final seven minutes of *L’eclisse* as a kind of limit-point that enables a critical assessment of Deleuze’s philosophical contribution to our understanding of post-war film modernism, the paper will consider such concepts as *durée*, a temporally-affected gaze; the buried but apocalyptically impactful force of time wrought through indexicality, reflexively framed by modernist film form; the notion of *temps mort*, the time-image’s making us ‘leave Home’, seeing familiar space as an alien world; and, finally, the question of temporality’s forcing of ‘difficult thought’, bringing about the chance of creativity and radical change while necessarily maintaining the ‘other side’ of the same coin – rather less ‘positive’ realizations resulting from the subject’s fundamental ‘impower’ in the face of time.
In this talk, I propose to argue that David Mamet’s (1994) film *Oleanna* engages in doing philosophy. First, I’ll briefly address the idea of “film as philosophy.” Contrary to many other discussions of this topic, I’ll emphasize considering what counts as philosophy in this regard. Then I’ll draw an analogy between Wittgenstein’s type of philosophy (as typified by *The Philosophical Investigations* (1954)), and Mamet’s film. Wittgenstein’s philosophy is notoriously slippery to pin down, especially given the way in which it is properly read. (I take his opposition to philosophical theorizing seriously, along the lines of work by Floyd, Goldfarb, Cavell, Ricketts, Minar, and others.) Part of this difficulty may be due to Wittgenstein’s way of writing philosophy, but part of it may also be due to the fact that it was written, as well. Perhaps films such as *Oleanna*—and Bergman’s *Scenes from a Marriage*, which I spoke about last year—can do certain philosophical tasks better.

Second, because the film is Mamet’s adaptation of his own play, I’ll address some differences between theater and film productions with an eye toward those that are particularly relevant for doing philosophy. Though I see no reason why performances of plays cannot count as doing philosophy, films are better situated to be considered as such.

Third, for various reasons the best way to see that film can legitimately count as philosophy is by actually demonstrating instances. (This is, I think, at the heart of Mulhall’s work in *On Film*, incidentally.) Thus I’ll give a reading of Mamet’s film, paying attention not only to the screenplay but also to features particular to the film version. Ostensibly, the film is about sexual harassment and abuses of power; nearly every review of the film spoke about it as such. To view it solely in this way however leaves it isolated within the context from which it came: a particular cultural environment in the U. S. in the early 1990s. A more profitable way to regard the film is as about language itself, similarly to how Wittgenstein’s work is about language. The characters in the film explicitly argue about what their words mean, for instance, and it becomes clear that each has made certain common assumptions about meaning. This reading will allow me to show two ways in which the film can be said to be doing philosophy. First, methodologically the film especially invites the viewer to respond to it by categorizing what has transpired. But it also explicitly calls to the fore aspects of our language that will bear on what we say. Second, the particular features that are highlighted coincide with features Wittgenstein typically highlights in his discussions (especially with regard to linguistic meaning). This second way is what is typically called an “illustration” of philosophical views, which—especially in the case of Wittgenstein—can be quite helpful. The first way, however, is something else: it actually is doing philosophy, specifically in Wittgenstein’s sense. We get facts presented; philosophical assumptions about meaning are tested.
Questions about documentary representations of the other are always also connected to questions about the self, about the portrayer’s or the viewer’s openness towards what lies beyond one’s own conceptions. In this article, I want to explore how the documentary is based on the tension between visual registration and our conceptions. I will base my discussion on the body of work of the filmmaker and theoretician Trinh T. Minh-ha, whose contributions consist of maintaining this tension. By refraining from giving an explanation to every single visual sign, Minh-ha strives to construct a cinematic language that lets otherness prevail. Her theoretical work is comparable to the revision of mimesis in Theodor Adorno’s aesthetical theory. For Adorno, the mimetical consists of a moral understanding in which the viewer accepts the otherness of the other. With this discussion I wish to bring out moral questions concerning the documentary. Due to the uprising of postcolonial theory during the past 30 years, these questions of otherness have established themselves as a counter pole to the predominantly epistemological theoretical discussion about documentary representations.

Minh-ha’s body of work should be seen in relation to a critical documentary tradition that reacted against the conventions of filmmaking. What I want to highlight in this text is the revision of the notion of documentary film that Minh-ha and her likes have taken as their task. When speaking of the “subjective-objective” dichotomy, we often overlook that it presupposes a disassociation in a particular way, in which the subject does not encounter the object. In an ethnological context this entails a distanced attitude in which the ethnologist always remains the observer and the subject always remains “the other”.

The documentary easily lends itself to an exploitative attitude in which the director projects collective conceptions or subjective views on the world. On the other hand the notion of the documentary alludes to an attitude in which the author is sensitive towards features, gestures and material traces that can’t be constructed or directed. The latter notion is similar to Theodor Adorno’s (2004) idea of the aesthetics of materiality. Materiality, in the sense that Adorno uses the word, refers to two different aspects of depiction. Firstly, materiality refers to the medium itself and the technique that is used. Film as a medium, the different technical operations, the apparatus and the different stages of production provide certain material conditions for depiction. Secondly, materiality refers to the material qualities of the object in the film – features, gestures and other material traces that are registered irrespective of the intentions of the author. Therefore the primary moral question is not concerned with what art communicates, but how art mediates, how it reveals its relation to the world. It is by this moral standard that we as viewers accept it as a true representation (and we as viewers are corruptible).
G PANEL: RUIZ AS CINE THINKER: THE MULTIPLE SIDES OF AN ANOMALOUS AND UNIQUE PROJECT
This panel will examine the work of Raúl Ruiz across a variety of different cultural, aesthetic and institutional contexts, presenting him as a unique and anomalous cine thinker, whose work articulates questions of aesthetics and politics, singularity and multiplicity, interstices and singular points, austerity and the Baroque, film-making and speculative thought, cinema, television and pedagogy. In particular, this panel will present lesser known sides of Ruiz’s work, ranging from his Allende-period cinema in Chile, via his highly philosophical formulation of a Poetics of Cinema to his recent work for Chilean TV and as a pedagogue in the UK. Throughout the panel attention will be paid to the strategies that Ruiz has employed across these different situations to interrupt normal patterns of cinematic production and consumption and replace them with anomalous yet rigorous practices that open cinema up directly to speculative, investigative and interstitial thought processes well beyond the usual limits of both mainstream and art cinema practices and normative film theories.

‘From Chile to Klossowski’: The Unknown Ruiz of the 1970s Michael Goddard
The image of Raúl Ruiz as a Neo-Surrealist or Neo-Baroque filmmaker is largely based on his films from the 1980s, especially with the cycle of films beginning with 3 Crowns for a Sailor (1982). However, many of his films from the 1970s operate according to quite different aesthetic principles, which Ruiz himself referred to in relation to his Chilean films as a ‘Chaste Realism.’ This paper will investigate what happened to this chaste realism from Ruiz’s first major film, Three Sad Tigers (1969), through his filmmaking during the Allende period to his first works in exile in Paris in the 1970s. It will argue that throughout this period, Ruiz’s films destabilise conventional distinctions between aesthetics and politics through a focus on gestures and habits, a focus that would continue throughout Ruiz’s later cinema even in its most Baroque forms. The paper will begin with an examination of Ruiz’s anomalous place in relation to the new Chilean cinema that emerged in the late 1960s and show how Ruiz’s strategies for combining expressive innovations with the demands of political cinema were radically different from the then prevailing ideas of militant or third cinema which Ruiz was highly critical of. Instead from the beginning Ruiz’s project was to discern political and aesthetic gestures in order to create images adequate to Chilean and Latin American reality: this strategy would reach its apotheosis and limit in Ruiz’s ‘adaptation’ of Kafka’s Penal Colony (1970). Next it will look at Ruiz’s most direct response to the situation of exile in the film Dialogues of the Exiled, in which the attention to gestures and austerity remains but in the absence of, and arguably even through the destruction of any political community. Finally, it will examine The Suspended Vocation (1977), the film that both demonstrated Ruiz’s encounter with Klossowski’s thought that would be continued in the better known Hypothesis of the Stolen Painting (1978), while at the same time being a continuation of his previous film’s distillation of the gestures of the Chilean left, presented through the allegorical means of a series of conflicts within the Catholic church. This film is fascinating for not only for the way it combines austerity with multiplicity (the film is presented as the footage from two films made at different times, with different actors, one in colour and one in black and white and with different ideological investments in the story), and its use of allegory as a way of directly articulating the political with the aesthetic, a strategy that would characterise much of Ruiz’s subsequent work. The paper will conclude that for a full understanding of Ruiz as a filmmaker and cine-thinker it is essential to engage with this earlier unknown part of Ruiz’s career, which is no less philosophical than his subsequent work. Furthermore it will argue that Ruiz’s cinema, even in its most apparently European or mainstream examples, has to be understood simultaneously in both political and aesthetic registers in that Ruiz’s aesthetic strategies emerge directly out of the politics of the image that Ruiz developed during the militant era of Allende and further refined in his work in exile that consists of the rigorous, even chaste, investigation of the relations between, gestures, images and expression.
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The Real of a text: A psychoanalytic approach to film adaptation of literary texts

Irene Hee-Seung Lee

The inevitable and irreparable loss in translation is not the only matter of concern in the field of linguistic conversion from one language to another. ‘Lost in translation’ also forms the problematic centre of many academic debates in the study of media transformation among which film adaptation of literary texts is counted as a major symptom. Envisioning, actualising and materialising figures from a literary text on screen is one of the most pervasive filmic practices since 1902 when Georges Mli re-coordinated the adventures of Gulliver from pages onto the silver screen. Yet, rarely are we satisfied with the results of the film adaptation although this bitter disappointment never stops us from desiring to produce and watch the onscreen re-enactment of a literary text. From this complex psychical engagement of human subjects with the practice of film adaptation, it is possible to mark film adaptation of literary texts as a gateway to a more fundamental and primordial level of the subject’s relation to texts surrounding it. By visiting the theories of Benjamin, Derrida and Lacan, this paper will explore the film adaptation as a significant cultural site where we can uncover the veiled side of the human subject that seems destined to haunt the ungraspable ground between letter and image without ever being satisfied.

First of all, the paper will address the problem of identifying the object of adaptation: contrary to the general assumption that a literary original is an object of adaptation, what we desire to adapt or behold on screen is not the letter we read on pages: it is and should be something other than actual letters. With regard to this difficulty in recognising and articulating the object of adaptation, Lacan ‘clearly complicates’ the commonplace synchronisation between what is written, what we read and what is read. His psychoanalytic speculation of the asymmetry between signifier and signified in relation to the discourse of the Unconscious introduces a completely incomprehensible dimension of human psyche which he designates as the Real. In borrowing the Lacanian concept of the Real, the paper will direct its search for the object of film adaptation towards the unknown and unknowable territory positioned between letter (the Symbolic) and image (the Imaginary). Also, by reading Benjamin’s ‘The task of the translator’ and Derrida’s ‘Des Tours de Babel’ through Lacan the paper will contemplate how to share the philosophical insight that Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida bring into the true import of translation as an ancient and primal form of textual transformation to forever evoke discontent and, at the same time, desperation. As an introduction of the theoretical framework for my PhD thesis Transmediations of the Real: A psychoanalytic approach to film adaptation of literary texts, this paper aims to explore ‘the Real of a text’ from a Lacanian perspective and to locate it as a true object of every textual transformation by interrogating film adaptation of literature as an exemplary site. Indeed, this mysterious object of adaptation may lead us to a veiled dimension in which our unconscious touches and becomes interlocked with texts we encounter.
BEAUVOIR'S PHENOMENOLOGY & ACTION MOVIES: FEMINIST THOUGHTS ON ANXIOUS MASCULINITY & SUBJECTIVITY in FILMS STARRING JEAN-CLAUDE VAN DAMME
Samantha Holland

In this paper I investigate how four popular US action films speak to, work through, and represent anxieties about the embodied "self". Initially, I explore ways in which expressions of lived experience in the films both reveal anxious responses to issues of selfhood and sexuality, and suggest a startlingly Beauvoirian approach to thinking about them. Expanding on this, I argue that the films might be read as understanding yet rejecting notions of philosophy-as-system, and as embracing instead a more discursive – and anti-patriarchal, even feminist – approach to philosophy. In several films, martial arts action star Jean-Claude Van Damme plays two characters; my focus is on how the resulting fragmentation of the central character(s) produces films that in many ways run counter to western philosophy’s – and mainstream narrative film’s – shared impetus towards system and closure. This is why the films can be read as rejecting notions of philosophy-as-system, representing it instead as relational and discursive – an approach advocated in and by the work of Simone de Beauvoir.

To illustrate and evidence this reading, I look closely at elements of all four films in relation to Beauvoir’s work and Sara Heinämaa’s articulation of her phenomenology. I draw an initial parallel between the films and Beauvoir’s approach to philosophy by arguing that just as Beauvoir comprehends yet questions philosophical systems and doctrines by appealing to the evidence of her lived experience, so the films seem to both understand what Van Damme’s characters apparently set out to represent – a unified and dominant masculine subject – but question the validity of that very aim by appealing to his lived experience.

I develop parallels between the films’ and Beauvoir’s key concerns, showing that the films do ‘not compromise the specificity or particularity of the lived experience to adjust it to the idea of a totality or one comprehensive system’ (Heinämaa 6). For instance, I consider how the focus on Van Damme’s body perhaps gives him/his characters a more intimate experience of the lived body as alien than many masculine subjects have. I investigate how this might explain not only the films’ failures to shore up dominant certainties about being-a-man, but their alternative suggestions (more akin to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s and Beauvoir’s) that difference is a dynamic concept, more reliant on gestures and movement than on bio-scientific bodies and organs.

Throughout, I foreground the significance of gender representation to the discussion, suggesting that the films’ representations of philosophy as discursive rather than systematic goes some considerable way to explaining why they are so frequently derided – and why Van Damme, in particular, is often “feminised” through repeated critical references to his gay fan base and homoerotic imagery.

My discussion, then, uses Beauvoir’s feminist phenomenology to re-think ways in which masculinity in film is theorised. In particular, I suggest that filmic representations of masculinity have at times been theorised too reductively, as shoring up notions of woman as absolute other, when some representations of masculine subjects arguably reveal or display dissatisfaction and unease with precisely such essentialist notions.
While the death and the rebirth of cinema has been announced at regular intervals since its birth, cinema as an industrial, commercial, creative and cultural practice has arguably never been as important as it is today. The previous sentence implies two common assumptions about cinema which this presentation will discuss. The first connects cinema to its death and its rebirth and focuses on the philosophical, aesthetic, cultural and social object cinema which modernist filmmakers and critics in the 1960s and 1970s saw simultaneously at the centre of artistic, political and economic struggles and were desperate to capture in its moment of extinction. Jean-Luc Godard's *Le Mépris* (*Contempt*, 1963) and Wim Wenders’ *The State of Things* (1982) are emblematic examples of this sensibility. Its opposite, yet related attitude, is at play in Michel Gondry’s film *Be Kind Rewind* (2008), an inventive ode to the magical powers of enchantment of a cinema from below. This ethos related to the simultaneous conviction about the exception of cinema and of its imminent disappearance (and possible re-birth) still plays itself out today in aesthetically, culturally and creatively but mainly through the institutionalisation of film development and funding and the advent of cinema studies as a widely accepted area of academic study.

The second assumption underpinning our initial statement is that cinema has never been as important as it is today. The cultural capital of cinema is easy to demonstrate in great parts because it has been institutionalised. From extensive public funding in many corners of the world, to economic incentives, tax breaks, protectionist measures, quotas even in places like Hollywood, few industries benefit from so much political, economic and institutional support and exposure. In the European Union for instance, the development of cinema is very much related to the idea of Europe. Therefore substantial amounts of money have been invested in funding development, creation and development of projects which all contribute to the creation and sustaining of a collective cinematic culture.

This presentation arises from a project I am currently pursuing, a book on the state of knowledge in the field of cinema studies and the developments of contemporary cinema. The presentation will specifically discuss the idea of the exception of cinema as it manifests itself in aesthetic and philosophical discourses and filmic practices, and in the development of cultural policies. It draws on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Gilles Deleuze, Antoine de Baecque, Thierry Jousse and D.N. Rodowick among others.
Towards an aesthetics of emergence: the participatory and the chaos of the operatic
Barbara M. Kennedy.

In *What is Philosophy* Deleuze argues that the mind/brain provides the interstice for a beyond of subjectivity which is felt at a level of proto-subjectivity: an involvement of the brain in connection with both mind and the body as molecular coagulations. There is an intersection in contemporary cultures of performance, drama, dance and filmic texts of a consilience across the arts, sciences and philosophy. In their final collaborative text, Deleuze and Guattari write that science, art and philosophy as forms of thought or creativity have the brain as the junction of all three. Using arguments from several of their texts, I want to engage with discourses from science, art and philosophy to consider the pleasures and sensations of dance, choreography and performing textual bodies.

I want to take some of these ideas in strategic encounter with Deleuze Bergsonism and scientific discourse which is rethinking the proprioceptive and visceral beyond the phenomenological parameters into thinking through “affect” within the biogrammatic. The biogrammatic is a space that exists NOT in the world but in the interstitial realm of vision-object; a peri-personal world and liminal space. Synaesthetic forms are formulated from “experience that has already been lived: habit, memories, a pastness within the present, enfolding in a co-existence to mobilise futurity”. (Massumi, *Parables of the Virtual*)

Current debates within Deleuze-Bergsonian film studies is taking some new directions in a concern with the imbrication of technoscientific and bio-aesthetic through philosophic engagement with the brain/body inter-relationals. (see *Schizoanalysis of Cinema* (EUP Edinburgh – to be published) Dance and performance, differently, whether live or filmic effectuate a wide array of physical, emotional and aesthetic traces. Where do these sensations reside? How can we explore the temporalities of moving bodies, both in real time and in recorded time beyond the more formal debates of aesthetics. Taking my own work on performance and dance work through an assemblage with Deleuze-Bergsonian effectuations of temporality and the beyond of affective spaces, this paper then moves into innovative debates on cognitive/proprioceptive states which assemblage discourses from psychology, philosophy and science. In so doing it explores the movements in the texts/bodies specifically *Madame Butterfly* through which to explore the concept of the biogram as that which advances us from the diagram of Deleuze’s *Logique de la Sensation* through a cyborgian collusion with bio-aesthetics and theories of proprioceptivity, viscerality and synaesthesia in the biogrammatic. Sound, movements, bodies and brains are affective ‘modulators’ through which we experience the moves of the butterfly…the entraining of the brain.

“ *Within the green fields of Deleuzian grasses the white butterfly’s movement captures: aparalleltic evolution - the wasp and the orchid*”. (Kennedy: *Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation*)
Film as Thought Experiment: A Happy-go-lucky Case?
Basilis Kroustallis

If films truly advance, and not only illustrate philosophical arguments (see defence of this claim in Mulhall, 2001; Goodenough, 2005), it seems that one of the convenient ways this may happen is for films to express thought experiments. The fictional and narrative but at the same time argumentative structure of thought experiments seems suited to a medium with a similar fictional structure and a widespread appeal. So, a number of philosophers have argued not only in theory but also concerning specific films (e.g. The Third Man, Carroll, 2002, The Matrix, Wartenberg, 2007) that they function as enlightening cases of familiar philosophical arguments. But a major obstacle to this conception seems to be the 'as if' challenge: congenial narrative structure in films and thought experiment would mask the essentially different nature of the two informational sources, cinematic and philosophical.
Films are described as ambiguous and philosophically needlessly complex reports of situation that best serves entertainment rather than purported philosophical value (Smith, 2006, but also see Sorensen, 1992).
The paper defends the conception of film as thought experiment against the 'as if' challenge, and proposes a set of criteria (or constraints) that will determine such a role. A film should challenge commonsense assumptions (as bizarre cases in thought experiments do), and present a constant thesis expressed by the same or different characters at different times and places. Most importantly, it should entail the following paradox: dramatic elaboration of the thesis would rob the film of immediate entertainment value, yet at the same time thesis development would resonate emotionally with the audience. Mike Leigh’s recent film Happy-go-lucky (2008) is a case in point, for it presents as a test case the possibility of subjective happiness without corresponding objective circumstances.
Happy-go-lucky is a bizarre situation of an ultra-optimist London school teacher (Poppi Cross), with continuous (and not momentary or coincidental) feelings of happiness despite changing and not continuously easy-going situations. The film risks being non-immediately entertaining (Poppi Cross appears even irritating at a point), and the omnipresent feeling of joy only increases in the light of uncomfortable circumstances, although Poppi’s change to a gloomy mood would trigger more immediate dramatic interest. Yet at the same time, there seems to be genuine rapport with Poppi Cross, as a spectators’ wish that continuous subjective happiness in the light of uncomfortable circumstances should have a positive outcome. The above thoughts would imply that Happy-go-lucky presents a philosophical thought experiment.
Contemporary American Film Philosophy: Disciplining the study of film
Andrée Lafontaine

There is something intriguing regarding the recent proliferation of books on film and philosophy on the American market. If we are to believe current advocates of the field, films are inherently philosophical. The recent discovery, by philosophers, of the philosophical interest of film would be the result of demographic and intellectual developments: a substantial pool of philosophers familiar with cinema had to emerge to invest an area of study that had been “ceded” by film theorists. The constitution of American film philosophy is presented by proponents as a “paradigm shift”—serious philosophy replacing “sloppy” Theory. As it emerged with a series of volumes in the mid-1990s, film philosophy allegedly sought to bring “rigor”, “clarity”, “solidity”, “standards”, “methods” and critical evaluation to the study of film. Coupled with Noël Carroll’s (un)dialectical method—the confrontation of different theories pertaining to specific problems in order to declare a winner—contemporary American film philosophy can be seen as both an affirmation of what constitutes good philosophy and an attempt at disciplining the study of film. Using elements from Stephen Toulmin’s studies on intellectual disciplines and Foucault’s genealogy, this paper seeks to trace a history of American film philosophy as a distinct discipline that constituted itself outside of, and in opposition to, Film Studies. In doing so, it will highlight a loose sketch of its epistémè, avoiding a simple alignment with the analytical/continental conflict. Only by bringing to light the discursive and philosophical underpinnings of the discipline can we hope to move beyond the two trends currently dominating American film philosophy: on the one hand, the sterile clarification of concepts and logical implicatures and, on the other, the detection of philosophical themes in specific movies. This paper ends by questioning whether film studies benefits from having firm disciplinary boundaries and agreeing on a set of collective goals and procedures — all elements central to the constitution of an intellectual discipline for Toulmin.

Cinema and Parallax: Psychoanalytic Film Criticism after Zizek
Robert Lapsley

In Seminar XI Lacan famously remarked that, before art, psychoanalysis experiences only embarrassment and that, consequently, there should be no “application” of psychoanalysis to the realm of aesthetics. In light of these remarks, this paper will consider the nature and status of Slavo Zizek’s extensive analyses of cinema in three contexts: Lacan’s teaching, psychoanalytic film theory and aesthetics.

Firstly Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lacan, of course, discussed artistic texts at length in his teaching – most notably, Poe’s purloined letter, Antigone, Hamlet, the Coufontaine trilogy and the novels of Marguerite Duras - but in contexts which largely precluded their use as illustrations of particular theories. As the recent publication of “My Teaching” reminds us, for Lacan the truth was always new. In Zizek, on the other hand, truths often appear to be pre-given such that texts can function as confirmations of particular arguments. Until recently Zizek’s work was marked by an avowed debt to Jacques-Alain Miller and while Miller is undoubtedly the most interesting and intelligent of the “post-Lacanians”, he is committed to a greater degree of clarity and systematicity than is to be found in Lacan’s open-ended, creative wordplay. Hence, despite the excellent jokes, Zizek’s version of psychoanalysis can often seem a rather gloomy affair and a far cry from what Lacan termed his “gai savoir”. Secondly psychoanalytic film theory. Since the seminal work of Screen in the seventies, the Anglo-American psychoanalytic study of film has sought to combine two approaches: thematic analyses, for example in Bellour’s unsurpassed study of Oedipal trajectories in North by Northwest, and metapsychological examinations of spectatorship in, for example, the work of Baudry, Metz and Mulvey. Zizek has contributed importantly to both strands, vastly extending the repertoire of thematic motifs informing narratives and, even more significantly, advancing beyond the simplifications of earlier metapsychological conceptions with his deployment of notions such as the gaze, the appropriate distance and the sinthome. This paper will explore the further uses of the concepts he has made available for a thinking of narrative cinema. In particular, it will consider the implications of the notion of the parallax view for a thinking of art as a response to the real as impossible.

Thirdly, the aesthetic. Making rather free use of the Kierkegaardian triad, it could be said that Zizek has tended to concentrate on the ethical and the religious at the expense of the aesthetic. Thus texts are routinely evaluated in politico-ethical terms – typically he identifies the modes of jouissance they subtend and warns against the political consequences which ensue – and the solution proposed to the impasses such texts negotiate is analogous to a Kierkegaardian leap of faith, namely a self-transforming act. Missing, in much of his writing, is any detailed consideration of the aesthetic (in the traditional sense) as other than a defence and protection against the supposed trauma of sexuality. Surprisingly, given the extraordinary range of his own aesthetic tastes, evident enthusiasms, sympathies and passions, Zizek frequently shares the blind spot of psychoanalysis in relation to art. Only occasionally does he hint at a more productive approach; it is these suggestions this paper will seek to develop.

Finally, and more speculatively, the paper will examine Zizek’s explicit criticisms of Deleuze. Did Zizek’s Millerian reading of Lacan lead him to undervalue Deleuze? Lacan - and in this, as in much else, he was closer to Deleuze than is often supposed - was an exemplar. Is Zizek?
Cixous, Lacan and the current question “how to get in touch with the feminist side of film writing?”
Birgit Maria Leitner

How might we think of a filmic écriture féminine of authors / auteurs? To give an answer there upon the lecture is going to question the “feminist side of film writing”. The presentation will focus on Agnès Varda's “Kung Fu master” (France, 1987) and a part of “La Captive” by Ch. Akerman (2002, according to M. Proust’s “In search of lost time”, vol. 5). Both clips will be analyzed by a reading from the point of view of Jacques Lacan's researches in contrast to Hélène Cixous' thinking of the pre-symbolic in feminine writing (“the voice of the mother”, “the level of emotion”, “the pervasion of the voile/veil”, “the spiritual encounter”).

The feminine side in film writing is considered as scene of the unconsciousness and the reflexivity of desire. With Lacan the paradox of the “not-all” of the female part of sexual difference will be picked up. It relies on a gap between the subject and the signifier. In how far Lacan's objet petit a might fill the gap, feminist auteurs have repeatedly shown - often in a “subversive” (“converse”) point of view. The lecture aims at picking up Lacan's analysis with its possible references to thoughts about femininity in film writing and its “stroboscopic modus”. Therefore we'll view the difference between Lacan's and Cixous' propositions on the imaginary. Looking at the sequence by Varda, in what sense do we have to consider feminist facts as much as film- and author specific characteristic features for the cinematic interpretation? Or, on the contrary are we concerned with significant less signs of the moving images which have to be thought as removed from gender-related constituents?

These questions and more will be discussed by two short film-philosophical close-readings.
This paper is a consideration of the critically acclaimed film by the artist Steve McQueen dealing with the sixty-six-day hunger strike by the Irish Republican prisoner Bobby Sands. Radical in form and content, its visceral imagery challenges the viewer to experience the unfolding suicide of a committed activist. Made by an artist rather than a commercial filmmaker it effectively subverts the conventions of narrative and story to operate through a set of images that push it to connect with philosophical questions of sense and meaning. In this way, the paper is framed by Deleuze’s belief that an encounter between disciplines happens when similar problems are posed so that resolution can lead productively from one domain to the other (“They are the same shudders in quite different terrains.” Deleuze, 1998: 49).

McQueen’s artistic procedures work through questions of creation, as a re-creation or type of repetition, to construct a film-world of sensation that communicates something of the intensity that pulses through circuits of bodies and matter. McQueen stretches the limits of the familiar filmic codes to produce a glimpse of the tension at work in reducing compositional elements and formal sensibilities down to an almost unbearable level. Through reference to Bresson and Dreyer, the techniques of McQueen are considered in relation to the sensual experiences emanating from the lived body on screen. The dissolution of Sands’ body speaks of an implacable resolve to overcome the limits imposed upon him by the State, to seek a redemptive line of escape, but one that is ultimately and inescapably defined by the tragedy of his death.

The joyous potential of the Spinozist question of ‘what can a body do?’ becomes the sadness of ‘what can an incarcerated body endure?’ Sands’ struggle is for recognition as a political subject, a subject defined by his anti-colonial resistance rather than as a less-than-subject criminal and is about a ‘mode of existence’ rather than simply terms of identity (“the alternative is not between terms but between the modes of existence of the one who chooses” Deleuze, 1986:114). The fulcrum upon which the film pivots is his choice to embark upon the suicidal path of a hunger strike. Can this be seen as a moment of Kierkergaardian choosing, to act on a choice driven by a moral commitment, of a conception of truth established through passionate subjectivity? By ‘choosing to choose’ in the face of the intolerable is what is at stake an attempt to break the bad repetition of endless violence and to take a different line, of one limited by the paradox of seeking an affirmation of life through death? Or is it, in fact, an ‘evil choice’ that has no other possible outcome?
This paper proposes three goals in theorising the relationship between cinema and philosophy: (1) to affirm a general congruence between Alain Badiou’s inaesthetics and John Mullarkey’s usage of François Laruelle in relationship to film; (2) to move beyond their conclusions and, through Peter Greenaway, suggest film’s inaesthetic potential is located in specific cinematic practices; and (3) to suggest that the resulting understanding of film helps expose the underlying political orientation of inaesthetics.

The argument for these conclusions is presented in three sections. First, I briefly show Badiou’s schematisation of aesthetics criticises existent relationships between film and philosophy. In doing so, it delineates a space conducive to Mullarkey’s appropriation of Laruelle. Inaesthetic procedures must be non-philosophical in order to be truly inaesthetic, even if Badiou at times fails to realise this standard.

Second, I argue that in order for cinema to be non-philosophical, it must operate as cinema; that is, it cannot operate as literature, photography, or any other medium. I define this cinematic operation in terms of Greenaway’s four tyrannies: 1) the tyranny of text; 2) the tyranny of the frame; 3) the tyranny of the actor; and 4) the tyranny of the camera. Greenaway argues that film rarely escapes the determination of 19th century European literature. I agree and submit that cinema operates as non-philosophy as it engages with one or more of these tyrannies.

I offer as an example of this cinematic non-philosophy Alain Resnais’ film L’Année dernière à Marienbad, a film which effectively combats these four tyrannies. The film’s importance is made clearer through a consideration of Ginette Vincendeau’s presentation of the films’ four refusals: 1) the refusal of plot; 2) the refusal of point of view; 3) the refusal of chronology; and 4) the refusal of naturalism. Through these four refusals, Marienbad is perhaps the most striking example of film’s potential as non-philosophy, and thus as a truth procedure.

Third, I return to the nature of inaesthetics as a truth procedure. I argue that while Badiou maintains a division between inaesthetics and politics, an analysis of inaesthetics’ non-philosophical core reveals it is an inherently political procedure. The disruption of the state of the situation in cinema holds broader material and theoretical consequences. The consequences are material due to its rejection of hierarchies and processes of filmmaking. They are theoretical in its rejection of the dominant ideology undergirding the cinematic themes of the state of the situation. I conclude by suggesting these consequences do not undermine the independence of cinema from other disciplines, but reveal its democratic potential in refusing not only cinematic tyranny, but tyranny in all its forms.
M
Memory - Repetition - Return: temporal divergence in *Mulholland Drive* and *Lost Highway*
Adeline Mannarini,

The concepts operating in the cinema of David Lynch resist a purely psychoanalytical definition. In this paper we propose a more Deleuzian reading based on his theory of repetition.

The most complex aspect of David Lynch’s films *Lost Highway* and *Mulholland Drive* is their temporal structure. The temporal divergence of these two films are the central focus of this paper. By focusing on character motivation, we will look at the different syntheses of memory present in each film. As a critique of Slavoj Zizek’s reading of *Lost Highway* in his book “The Art of the Ridiculous Sublime”, we will contra his argument which suggest that a traumatic repetition of the Oedipal relation is the key to understanding this film. Zizek’s analysis leads to conclude that *Lost Highway* is but an illustration of the Lacanian “impossible relation”.

By presenting the work of Deleuze in “Difference and Repetition” and Bergson’s “Matter and Memory”, we will give a presentation of the 3 syntheses of memory. Heavily drawing on psychoanalytical theory, particularly Lacan, Freud and Janet, we will analyse which type of synthesis is present in cases that draw similarities to the protagonists in David Lynch’s 2 films. Contra to Zizek’s strictly psychoanalytical reading of these films, we will work towards another, more Deleuzian type of repetition, one which liberates, rather than encapsulates the individual.

Lacan’s PHD paper in “De la Psychose Paranoiaque dans ses Rapports avec la Personnalité” on paranoid schizophrenic patient Aimée bares a strong resemblance to Lynch’s protagonist in *Mulholland Drive*. As the paranoid suffers over investment, remaining in tension between her capitalising on the delusion and her exposure to the world, we will address this system of foresight and regime of anticipation. To this purpose we will look at the Lacanian theory of the superego. Furthermore, Lacan insist on her delusion being based on an “illusion of memory” which is at the base of her psychogenic delusion. For both Aimée and Diane in *Mulholland Drive* striking at the idealised self, is an attempt at rendering the delirium useless and thus making it vanish altogether.

In order to understand Deleuze’s transition from the second synthesis of “contraction-memory” to the third synthesis, we will look at Bergson’s work on what he terms the “adaptation” to the present. The role of virtual memory and its complex mechanism, as well as Bergson’s work on déjà-vu and the Freudian text on “The Uncanny” will be theories we will closely address in this paper. We will address Bergson’s theory of a “contemporaneous” past with the present “it has been” and draw parallels to the Freudian theory of Nachträglichkeit.

We will conclude with a proposition, following which *Mulholland Drive* and *Lost Highway* in particular display a rather more profound drama inherent to repetition, as opposed to the strictly psychoanalytical reading of trauma Zizek suggests in his book.
Kurosawa’s dream “Crows” as a philosophical-psychoanalytical interpretation of Van Gogh’s last painting
José Manuel Martins

What does it mean - for the painter’s action and location, and for painting as such - this literal ‘Jenseits’ gesture: crossing the horizon? Kurosawa’s tour de force culminates the ironic inversion of all the classical psychoanalytical (and hermeneutical, and aesthetical-philosophical) relations: this time, we will find dream itself (narrated as film) undertaking the analysis, and a work of art theorizing aesthetically in its own right about the very nature of painting in general (and not just this one in particular); moreover, so I will argue, Kurosawa’s scope is not to psychoanalyse an author, but an objective art process as such.

Psychoanalytical and Phenomenological items will be interwoven as follows:
1. Shapiro’s and Jean Paris’ combined readings show how Oedipal ambivalent conflict and/or psychosis leads van Gogh’s painting to a final collapse, both of the sun leitmotiv and of space construction;
2. Entering the picture’s space illustrates both a Merleau-Pontyan sort of reciprocal incorporation as Chair and a Freudian/Lacanian narcissistic return to the mirror phase (Benjamin and Kandinsky explicitly report their childhood enchanted experiences of merging into colourful environments as a model for artistic activity and aesthetical contemplation);
3. Van Gogh’s own verbal (and rather phenomenological) lesson about how painting comes about would stress and double the previous point (“I just lose myself in [that natural beauty]. And then, as if it’s in a dream, the scene just paints itself for me”);
4. The locomotive- (and funereal raindrop-) like repetition compulsion, and the over-interpretative feature of the ominous crossing of the very limit of visibility/life, connotes here the Freudian death drive, thanatos, but it reverts to Kurosawa’s credits to have recuperated its relevance in the first place to aesthetical rather than to psychoanalytical theory. That crossing of the Line, supposedly Van Gogh’s very last actional account on what painting is all about, is indeed cause not only of death, but (after) of (before) painting: in fact, this phantasmal suicide projection is paradoxically productive of the very landscape and its picture, and manifests in which way dying works as the ultimate creative resource: in order to paint the face of death (the crows) at the same time as that of life (the wheat field), as in Holbein’s Ambassadors (that makes us cross the line of the Visible), creative Eros must anticipatively be always already Thanatos;
5. And it is precisely by means of this aesthetical recuperation that a parallel psychoanalytical recuperation may also take place: as much as the painter merges in the middle of its motive, and paints from there, not “in front of it” (a first “crossing”: “le peintre apporte son corps” – Cézanne/ Ponty), so does that absolute crossing represent the most accomplished act of “making it wholly visible” as radical anamorphosis - that is, of what one calls “painting”. The Japanese visitor, and us as film spectators, do “telescopically” exactly the same: out of sheer fascination, each of us trespasses the corresponding limit in the series. Accordingly, as much as Freudian thanatos is not only the opposite of the life drives, but also, more ambiguously, their principle, their tendency and their accomplishment (as absolute “inorganic-like” rest), similarly does it operate as a Bataillean absolutification (and not dissolution) of eros itself: it is the Jenseits, the Beyond which functions like a sort of the Eros of Eros, its peak in the absolute, and not in death or nothingness.
6. And so, Merleau-Ponty’s lesson of the Invisible as condition for the Visible, Bataille’s of thanatos as absolute, therefore creative eros, and Kurosawa’s and van Gogh’s of painting as an extreme movement of transcending within the immanence, will all meet André Malraux’ epic view of the creation of visual forms as the triumph of the mortals as mortals over death and even over cosmic annihilation.
Attraction-image: Early Silent Deleuze
David Martin-Jones

This paper reconsiders Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the movement-image by exploring the early chapters of Cinema 1 – analysing in particular Deleuze’s engagement with Henri Bergson’s philosophy, and Deleuze’s subsequent emphasis on montage when defining the movement-image – in relation to Film Studies scholarship on early silent cinema. In light of debates surrounding the spectacular nature of the early silent cinema, in particular its relationship to its context of production and consumption, this direction offers a more nuanced understanding of the role of montage in so-called “primitive” cinema to that theorised by Deleuze. The ramifications of this are of importance for our understanding of Deleuze’s definition of the movement-image, but also for movement-image cinemas in general, especially those structured as much around spectacle as they are narrative.

The early silent ‘cinema of attractions’, as described by Tom Gunning in his seminal article of that name (1986), preceded the films of D. W. Griffith with which Deleuze begins his writing on montage in Cinema 1. Accordingly early silent cinema has a different relationship to movement and time than Deleuze perceived in the movement-images of classical Hollywood from around the time of Griffith onwards. Through analysis of several early silent trick films by directors like Georges Méliès, this paper argues that Deleuze’s conceptual starting point in Cinema 1 needs to be reconsidered, to facilitate a fuller understanding of the function of spectacle in movement-image cinemas. In the early chapters of Cinema 1, Deleuze’s explains away Bergson’s pronouncements on the ‘cinematographic illusion’ as a product of the early silent cinemas to which Bergson was exposed at that time. However, there is now evidence that even in its earliest years, silent cinema was an edited form. Whether through the splices needed to create stop-motion substitution effects in trick films; a range of in-camera effects, such as multiple exposures and lap-dissolves; or through the manipulation of sets, as in rolling backdrops used to create scenes of falling, flying or underwater travel; early silent cinema introduced duration into the image in a variety of ways. It was, in effect, a movement-image “before” montage.

Thus, whilst classical Hollywood continuity editing was in many ways the perfect fit for Deleuze’s Bergsonian-inspired conception of a sensory-motor cinema akin to our everyday experience of life on the plane of immanence (movement-image), early silent cinemas were not a primitive precursor to this montage form. Rather, Deleuze’s ideas are conditioned by a certain human-centrism (or at the very least, sensory-motor-centrism), that unwittingly “silences ” the different form of movement-image found in early silent cinema. In contrast to, for example, the organic whole of the classical US continuity form (as seen in Griffith’s Birth of a Nation (1915)), early silent cinema constructed a non-continuous expression of the whole. This non-continuous form of montage relies upon a mix of continuity of framing (continuous space) and discontinuity of editing (non-continuous time), to produce a spectacle or trick that, unlike classical narrative editing, relies precisely upon the exposure of the edit. This is the early silent movement-image, the “attraction-image.”
Depictions of Revenge in Current Popular Cinema
Richard T. McClelland

Recent popular films like *V for Vendetta* (2007), *Lucky # Slevin* (2007) and *Quantum of Solace* (2008) depict revenge as a form of justice and as a source of intense pleasure. Revenge behavior is, of course, ubiquitous and persistent in human cultures. It can also be shown to be common to human hunter-gatherer cultures, which anthropologists commonly suppose open a window onto the history of our species prior to the agricultural revolution of 10,000 years ago. It can also be found commonly among our closest primate relatives (in evolutionary terms). Moreover, the psychological functions of revenge and its associated pleasures can be given a profound scientific footing in contemporary cognitive neuroscience and a form of psychoanalytic theory informed by those findings. Furthermore, we can show that revenge behavior appears relatively early in human psycho-social development. In sum, revenge is almost certainly deeply rooted in the evolution of our species and represents a highly adaptive behavioral strategy. It is not surprising, then, that films would reflect some of these features of revenge. Neither is it surprising that contemporary audiences would find such depictions fascinating and otherwise attractive. Indeed, such audience responses are to be expected. The pleasures of revenge can also be given fairly specific conceptual analysis and scientific foundations. Our claim here is that understanding these underpinnings of revenge and its associated pleasures can furnish a fresh and exciting critical foundation from which to understand contemporary film-making and contemporary film experience.
In the current, academic conjoining of Film and Philosophy, there has been comparatively little reflection on the analogous relations of the latter to literature and the other arts. This presentation will argue that relations between film and philosophy can only be mediated adequately through a consideration of the general, transdisciplinary concepts of art, the artwork and criticism. Many of the claims advanced regarding the philosophical status of films, films as philosophy, or ‘filmosophy’ are hindered by their evasion of this issue and its consequences. Artworks are intellective and expressive: they relate to the world, raise and address questions, and can, in addition, appropriate philosophy and science, *inter alia*, as material for their productions. Here, the issue is not whether or not film counts as (high) art. Rather, films are both cultural objects available for analysis by various disciplinary techniques towards different ends and productions with their own aspirations. Features and qualities pertaining to the latter dimension, such as reflection or reflexivity are misconstrued if annexed to Philosophy (conceived in professional fashion). Modern inflections given to ‘art’, and their pertinence to film, such as Manny Farber’s notion of ‘termite art’, will be considered.

Attending to the difference between critical-theoretical discourse and criticism, this paper will articulate the demands placed on a form of reflective judgment which attempts to redeem subjective enthusiasms and experiences through a different order of claim. My broad contention will be that insofar as readings of particular films constitute the stakes of this debate, it is how these readings function as criticism that matters. These writings are really making claims about the merits of films as artworks: why these films demand attention. In this manner, labelling this aspect as ‘Philosophy’ because they demand the attention of professional philosophers is a red herring, even a category error, entailing and involving restricted forms of self-conception and recognition.
In the aftermath of deconstruction’s unease with concepts of presence, realism and embodiment, the work of Jean-Luc Nancy marks a recent turn in French philosophy to rethink the body in terms of materiality, exteriority and exposure. Central to Nancy’s project is a focus upon the sense of touch, developed in texts such as *Corpus* (1992) and *Noli me tangere* (2003). For Nancy, touch offers a way of understanding our existence as a mode of contact which takes place as spacing and withdrawal. Nancy’s touch thus remains a deconstructive one: we are simultaneously both in touch with and separated from ourselves and others; our connection to the artwork or, beyond that, to the world, is one which can only take place as interruptive contiguity, as a touch-in-separation.

Derrida’s *Le Toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy* (2000) has been crucial in marking the importance of this deconstructive spacing within Nancy’s touch, focusing in particular on Nancy’s divergence from a phenomenological tradition which would seek to align touch with presence, immediacy and continuity. In the context of cinema, Nancy’s deconstructive approach provides a way of distinguishing his thinking of contact from the phenomenological underpinnings of recent models of embodied spectatorship elaborated by film theorists such as Laura U. Marks and Vivian Sobchack. Touch between viewer and film is thought by Marks and Sobchack in terms of presence, fusion and immediacy. The work of Nancy provides a useful intervention in qualifying this touch – persistently and deconstructively – with an irreducible spacing.

Developing the significance of Nancy’s thinking of contact for film theory, this paper will examine the way in which cinema plays a central role in Nancy’s investigation of modes of interruptive touch between viewer, artwork and world. Drawing on a range of Nancy’s writings on film, including texts on Claire Denis, Abbas Kiarostami, Nicolas Klotz and Jean Renoir, the aim here will be to demonstrate that cinema provides a specific space for Nancy in which to further explore the intervals and separations within his philosophical model of contact. In bringing a deconstructive caution to questions of realism, presence and materiality, Nancy’s engagement with cinema helps us to think further – and feel more – about our relation to our bodies, to other bodies, to our experience of film and to our existence in the world.
Michael Haneke and the Meta-Antagonist
Emily McMehen

I aim, in this paper, to discuss the role of the spectator relative to the narrative order of the films of Michael Haneke. Haneke allocates the spectator a unique role beyond that of an audience member, beyond that of a viewer implicated in the violent and transgressive interchanges delineated in his films. He prescribes to the viewer – the single viewing subject – a role beyond that of spectator or adjudicator. Michael Haneke instead assumes that his viewer occupies many positions at once within the moralized symbolic order of his films: he is at once spectator (read: audience member), spectator (read: single viewing subject), sympathizer (the role assumed as granted by every viewer of cinema – that he/she should identify with the protagonist and thus wilfully wish for a resolution that favours the protagonist and his objectives in the narrative order), and meta antagonist (a role that transcends the imperatives of the narrative: the viewer in Michael Haneke’s films does not identify with the antagonist, but instructs him). His films are unique in that they outline in an explicitly diagrammatic way the multiple positions occupied by the viewer, and the affective capacity of each position respectively. The complex multiplicity of this role as spectator identifies key issues in the reading of the narrative/symbolic order in Haneke’s films, but also poses questions about the nature of the cinematic object from the viewpoint of the spectator. How does temporality, or the temporal nature of the narrative-driven film, affect the spectator? How does this role change in between the screen upon which a cinematic spectacle is viewed and its re-representation upon a monitor over which the viewer has unmitigated temporal control? I propose that Michael Haneke’s films present a model through which we may come to understand the nature of our roles as viewers/spectators as they apply to the cinematic medium, aligned with Heidegger’s notions of temporality and simultaneity. In particular, Benny’s Video (Austria, 1994) and Funny Games (Austria/USA, 1997/2007) utilise obvious ruptures in the temporal order of the narrative to both manipulate the viewer into a state of passive acceptance through shock, and to identify him/her as the reason for the prolonged melodramatic transgression. I propose further that Haneke’s films present the single viewing subject with more than a fundamental problem of the human psyche to be solved, and in fact disrupt the conventions upon which the cinematic subject/object relationship is based. My essay will expand upon these issues and draw parallels between the supposed nature of the audience member as single viewing subject and the single viewing subject as “meta-antagonist”, or a subject who orchestrates and promotes – through desire – a necessity for conflict and transgression within the narrative order of film, while simultaneously promoting and endorsing the evolution of the cinematic language.
Aesthetics or Inaesthetics? Approaching the Political in Godard’s *Notre Musique*
John McSweeney

In *Notre Musique* (2004), Jean-Luc Godard offers a sophisticated reflection upon the possibilities and limits of a politics grounded upon the image. Or rather, more precisely, as the extended use of ‘black’ frames at crucial junctures exemplify, Godard equally interrogates the possibility that the real exceeds the aesthetic, and hence that the aesthetic may either be ‘less’ than the political, or remain distinct from the political as such. Attentive, in turn, to the specificity of the cinematic aesthetic, *Notre Musique* poses questions to the cinematic image similar to those raised by Alain Badiou’s “inaesthetics”. Not least, (through the re-staged lecture on cinema incorporated within the film) Godard problematises the nature of cinematic movement, reduced to ‘shot/counter-shot’, suggesting that no intrinsic imagistic difference distinguishes this binary pair. Insofar as it is only superimposed ‘text’ (e.g. constituting the sequence externally as fiction or documentary) that allows for such differentiation (and often gives to images their significance), Godard, like Badiou, raises fundamental questions about the capacity of the movement of cinema to present. At the same time, Godard offers a notion of the image, which suggests that it bears potential as the vehicle of a Badiouan “truth procedure”, combining capacity for presentation of the inexistent and proximity to the void: in its perfection (idealisation?) in the icon, the image involves “no movement, no depth, no artifice” but opens upon “the sacred”, while in concrete experience the power of the image is available to us only by its proximity to the void.

The paper examines how Godard’s exploration of the image in its relation to the void, through a ‘historical dialectic’ of images, proposes a politics which remains undecided between an aesthetics and an inaesthetics – not as a postmodern deferral of meaning, but as a reflection of the unavoidable tension between the “weakness” of the cinematic art (Scemama) and the unavoidable ability of approaching the void of the Real through the aesthetic – moreover, through an aesthetic always already caught between the “weak force” of specific arts and the ambiguities of textual superimpositions. Godard’s ‘historical dialectic’, it is argued, mediates this tension as a constructive practice, by incorporating attention both to the typically invisible (inexistent?) elements which complicate the coherence of a situation and reveal something of its truth (Godard, for instance, shifts focus from the guests at an embassy book launch to the faces of the waiters and waitresses who serve them), and to the historical multiplicity of elements as something approaching Deleuzian “pre-linguistic images” and “pre-signifying signs”, by whose specificity cinema’s truth procedures must be repeatedly complicated. Holding this tension between the singularity and specificity of the image, Godard argues for a cinematic art between aesthetics and inaesthetics, which must equally live with the possibility – if it is do justice to the complexity of historical experience – that its pursuit of truth may find that it has been subverted by the charms of the image.
Rushes
Martin McQuillan

This paper concerns an attempt to make a film adaptation of the 'Envois' section of Jacques Derrida's *La Carte Postale*. It will discuss the screenplay and pre-production of the film.

To date there have been two attempts to present Derrida’s work through film-based media (*Derrida: the Movie*, dir. Kofman, 2003, screenplay published MUP, 2005; *Derrida d’ailleurs*, dir. Fathy, 1999, screenplay published Galilée, 2000). But what ought a deconstructive film to look like? In a nutshell the problem runs like this: how can certain forms of textual production, avant-garde film-making say, be any more deconstructive than other more ‘traditional’ forms of representation? According to the logic of deconstruction every text is always already in deconstruction (‘deconstructing itself’) and no text is more innately deconstructive than any other. It is not sufficient to quote Derrida or to be informed by him (e.g. Valerio Adami’s ‘Dessin pour un portrait après Glas’) in order to produce ‘deconstructive art’. Rather, it is quite possible that the most deconstructive text happens in ignorance of Derrida’s work. Works such as Kofman’s, Fathy’s or Adami’s might be taken as ‘readings’ of texts by Derrida which leave a trace in or counter-sign those texts by the exercise of practice-led research, but this does not ipso facto make them ‘deconstructive’. So, what is required of a film which seeks to represent deconstruction? That is to say, to represent that which makes representation itself a problem.
This paper examines how Jacques Rancière’s writings on cinema relate to the mixture of symbolist aesthetics and film theory in the writings of Emile Vuillermoz, a key author of early French film criticism. In *The Future of the Image*, Jacques Rancière elaborates on an idea of the “sentence-image” in a discussion of Godard’s uses of montage in *Histoire(s) du cinéma*. Rancière offers an account of the significance, and shifting potentials, of the sentence-image as a way of approaching montage in aesthetic forms that employ heterogeneous elements and different means of expression. Rancière develops a distinction between two different ways of understanding the sentence-image: a dialectical conception of collision and a symbolist conception of interconnection. By elaborating on an idea of symbolist montage alongside the more familiar terrain of dialectical montage, Rancière explores an important way in which filmic (and non-filmic) montage can be seen as a process of connection rather than fragmentation, continuum rather than clash, mystery rather than revelation. This paper discusses how Rancière’s analysis relates to his perspectives on symbolist aesthetics and on cinema, as well as his wider philosophical and political project. The paper’s main focus, however, is on how Rancière’s conception of a symbolist sentence-image can be productively situated alongside earlier writing on symbolism and film. In this respect, I focus on Emile Vuillermoz’s film criticism for *Le Temps*. In his articles, indebted to symbolist aesthetics, Vuillermoz examined cinema as a novel aesthetic form, particularly through his examinations of its distinctive ways of showing the world, its relation to music, theatre and other arts, its social potential, and its seemingly fantastic possibilities. Vuillermoz was also drawn to film editing’s potential to juxtapose and hold together diverse and seemingly distinct images, forms and impressions. A major influence on contemporaneous film theorists, the influence of Vuillermoz is also present in the works of Gilles Deleuze and Daniel Frampton in terms of cinema’s relation to Bergson and cinematic subjectivity. Informed by scholars on early French film theory, such as Richard Abel and Pascal Manuel Heu, I focus on the articles written by Vuillermoz for *Le Temps* in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Tracing the relationship between Vuillermoz’s film criticism and Rancière’s writing on cinema is not an effort to deduce a direct influence, but rather an attempt to see how early film criticism can illuminate, and in turn be illuminated by, contemporary approaches to film and philosophy.
Film as Philosophy: Between Saying and Showing?
Amanda Montgomery

The question of whether film can do philosophy and under what conditions it does so often results in the following dichotomous positions:
(1) The Modest Route: Film as ‘Mere Illustration’
Film can do philosophy if it presents a philosophical argument in a non-standard medium.
(2) The Ambitious Route: Film as Philosophically Necessary
Film can do philosophy if it presents a philosophical argument that could only be adequately presented in a non-standard medium.

The discomfort with position (1) is that the film medium itself is philosophically inert, whereas the discomfort with position (2) is that it places more of requirements on non-standard mediums of philosophical practice than it intuitively ought to.

On this basis Wartenberg attempts at a solution to this position, namely (3):
(3) The Goldilocks Route: Film as Philosophy in a New Medium
Presenting a philosophical argument is a necessary or sufficient condition for ‘doing philosophy’ and film can add to this presentation through the medium of film, while adding something that is reduced in translation but does not become a necessary condition for some set of philosophical ideas.

He does this by arguing that film can present philosophically interesting thought experiments. In my paper I add to this the condition of originality and show this to have been satisfied in the presentation of a Gettier case in Welles’ Touch of Evil several years before it was formulated in a philosophical paper.

In this film police officer Menzies has a justified true belief of the guilt of a convicted criminal since;
(i) Menzies is justified in believing that the accused is guilty because (a) he had a motive and (b) Menzies found incriminating evidence that he was guilty.
(ii) It is true that he is guilty because Quinlan only plants evidence when the accused is guilty (as evidenced by the confession of the man in question).
(iii) Menzies believes that the accused are guilty.

It turns out (see ii) that Quinlan has framed the accused with planted evidence that Menzies finds. Therefore although Menzies has JTB that the accused are guilty, the evidence used as justification could easily have lead to an incorrect conclusion. Given this we would not intuitively want to say that Menzies really knew that the accused was guilty. As such we have a case of true, justified belief that is not knowledge, and thus the JTB theory of knowledge is false.

In the closing section of the paper I will argue that though this is an example of film as producing an original and philosophically important thought experiment, the same thought experiment is in fact adequately presented in the traditional medium of philosophy, such as the formulation above. Thus (3) in fact reduces to position (1) since that which is not translatable into a standard Gettier case is not philosophically relevant. I conclude that those who advocate for film being able to do philosophy should focus instead on (2) rather than (1)/(3) if they want to avoid the challenge of the film medium being philosophical inert.
At the Drawing Board of the World: Reading the Filmmaking of Victor Erice's
Dream of Light
Trevor Mowchun

That films have passed through a process of creation is a fact that the power of
photographic and narrative illusionism conceals. Inspired by Walter Benjamin’s
assertion that the work of art is the death mask of its original intuition, this paper will
aim to show that the medium of film can be significantly sensitive and responsive to
the process through which the world itself is appropriated in time and space. The
most obvious explanation for the neglect of this aspect of and approach to film is that
the great majority of films, in common with most works of art in general, are made to
assume a state of resolute completion for audiences who have come to instinctively
expect a sense of completeness while intuitively wishing for some form of perfection.
For those who choose to think and write about the films they see, the instinct is just
as strong to conceptualize a given film as unambiguously finished and hence as
constituting an enhanced crystallization of its process of construction. It is possible,
although far from profitable, to approach a film as a palimpsest of the forces that
produced it, but any attempt to remove the death mask or find cracks in it would have
to come at the expense of the film’s identity by working against the grain of its
contribution. There do exist films, albeit few and far between, which take as their
subject the process of their own making, making it their mission to document that
very process into a diary-like narrative. The traces of creation in film are not limited
to the incidental, accidental or even the arbitrary, but can be seen as decisive and
meaningful instances of an aesthetic of contemplation. A film by Spanish director
Victor Erice called The Dream of Light (a.k.a. The Quince Tree Sun) epitomizes such
an enterprise by beginning as a documentary featuring the creative process of realist
painter Antonio Lopez that unfolds as a dramatic dialogue, a silent debate, between
the conditions of painting and filmmaking as expressed by the perspectives of the
painter and filmmaker who wield them. This essay is an interjection into the terms of
opposition and exchange between the representational languages of film and painting
enacted within Erice’s highly singular film. In documenting its own self-examination
of cinema through a contemplation of painting’s examination of the world, the film
leaves itself unfinished and breaks free of Benjamin’s death mask. The structure and
style of the film will be interpreted as amounting to a critique of the representational
form of painting which just as naturally, although unlike cinema far from
automatically, criticizes the representational nature of film. Cinema and painting,
which normally proceed in accordance with their own specific configurations of
space and time, when put face to face cease to look the other way and so reflect each
other’s distortions and limitations while still having to coincide and collaborate and
conflict but on opposite sides of the same dream to represent the unrepresentable.
Through a close reading of The Dream of Light it will be shown how cinema, on the
receiving end of painting’s inward stare, and in the light of its own incessant outward
staring or exposing, is exposed as it is, which in the end turns out to be for what it is:
an autonomous automatism, or just the lens of an eye with everything in front of it
and hence nothing in the world that will turn away from it except what cinema itself
is.
Badiou’s Inessential Cinema
John Mullarkey

The short essay by Alain Badiou, ‘The False Movements of Cinema’ is only an outline (when Badiou writes about art, it is more often about literature, theatre, and music), yet it is indicative of Badiou’s approach to any non-philosophy in that it claims to respect its autonomy. Indeed, for Badiou, philosophy itself is dependent on four other fields, or ‘conditions’, for its truths – science, politics, art, and love. Philosophy itself does not produce truth, but only collects together the truths that are created within these fields in any particular era. Philosophy is radically conditioned by the local truths of these multiple domains, one of which, art, must include film as well. Yet, despite this ‘inaesthetical’ approach, it has been argued that Badiou still fixes cinema within a strict and traditional aesthetic domain. The purpose of this paper is not merely to examine whether this judgement is fair to Badiou but also how his own image of an inessential cinema might actually operate within the field film studies.
Image and Word: Gombrich's Relevance to the Philosophy of Film
Kristóf Nyíri

Encouraged by Mullarkey's liberating book *Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and the Moving Image*, and building on my own previous attempts to come to terms with the pictorial turn in philosophy, in the envisaged paper I plan to provide, first, a nutshell account of a tradition running from Plato through Hume to Titchener, Bartlett, Wittgenstein, Arnheim, H. H. Price, and Allan Paivio, a tradition that can be conveniently summarized under Paivio's term "dual coding approach". I will then show that the work of the outstanding art historian and philosopher of images Ernst Gombrich on the one hand squarely fits into this tradition, and, on the other hand, offers a wealth of insights that have, Bordwell's recurring and important references notwithstanding, not been properly exploited by film philosophy. Presenting Gombrich's views, I will primarily concentrate on his emphasis on images as natural signs, i.e. on the radical difference between the picture and the word, on the element of resemblance involved in pictorial representation, and on the capacity of images to convey information that cannot be coded in any other way; but also on his stress on the importance of the interplay, the mutual support, of word and image, bringing to the fore, at the same time, his arguments about how pictorial meaning can be disambiguated not only by verbal, but also by visual context, especially by temporal changes in the visual context. This latter observation will bring me to Gombrich's wide array of rich theoretical insights on how image, movement, and time hang together. Our phenomenal world is in constant movement, the idea of the stationary eye is misleading, no stationary view can give us complete information, indeed one-eyed static vision produces total ambiguity; it is the test of movement – when we move our head, when we ourselves move – that establishes the true spatial structure of our surroundings. Naturalistic art has to create a suggestion of movement and speed in stationary images in order to render a convincing semblance of the visible world; there is a tension between camera snapshots, images arrested and frozen, and the living impression of movement and change. By contrast, film provides veridical information about real movement and real time. We see movement, not a succession of stills. Gombrich's philosophy of images constitutes a helpful background for a philosophy of film precisely because it focuses on those features of pictorial representation that have to do with the absence, and feigned presence, of movement in non-moving images.
“He who became aware of how genius is produced, and desired to proceed in the manner in which nature usually does in this matter, would have to be exactly as evil and ruthless as nature is. - But perhaps we have misheard.”

“If anyone wanted to imagine a genius of culture, what would the latter be like? He would manipulate falsehood, force, the most ruthless self interest as his instruments so skillfully he could only be called an evil, demonic being; but his objectives, which here and there shine through will be great and good. He would be a centaur, half beast, half man, with angel’s wings attached to his head in addition”

In the Michael Bay film Transformers, Earth is invaded by Megatron and the evil Decepticons to find The Cube (the ‘Allspark’ with the power to give life and create worlds). Optimus Prime and the Autobots, having discovered that The Cube is on Earth, have come to stop Megatron and the Decepticons from getting to it first and to save Earth from domination by the Decepticons who will use the cube to turn every electronic object into robotic life forms. What ensues is a battle between good and evil amidst classical and delirious architectural references.

In the Paul W.S. Anderson film, Alien vs. Predator, Alien(s) are bred on Earth as game for Predator(s) using human hosts – Predator(s) come to earth for this seasonal hunting sport. If Alien(s) succeed in outmanoeuvring Predator(s), thus making host of humanity, Predator(s) use a self-destruct mechanism to execute a total purge; if on the other hand Predator(s) win, humanity is spared and they leave to return again. However, in order for this enterprise to prevail, the Predators enslave humanity, impart scientific knowledge on them, teach them to prepare the hosts, build great temples and weapons, and guarantee them relative tranquillity. Here we recall a resemblance to architecture and the sacrifices of the Aztecs to their demon-gods.

Beyond the battles of good versus evil, or of lesser and greater evils, we have a representation of a certain attitude towards aliens (foreigners, immigrants, students, ‘deviants’, etc.) and their place relative to health (infection of the host in alien, the cancerous researcher in Alien vs. Predator, the transformation of mechanical and electronic devices in Transformers into Decepticons, etc.) – identity and security in a theatre of the weak.

With reference to Alain Badiou, this paper will argue the truth of this representation; it will argue that - as in human subjectivity - the battle between Alien and Predator, does not the effective usurpation of one by the other but the agonistic productive force upon which concrete subjectivity is dependent, and that the event of the demon-god, devil or tyrant (Megatron or Predator), in its blind brutality, is the ‘necessary condition’ for a continued agonistic struggle.

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2 Ibid. p,115
Thinking Images: Jean Epstein’s (Anti-) Philosophical Cinema
Elena Oxman

Despite having produced a vast and diverse body of writings on the cinema, Jean Epstein remains best known as an Impressionist theorist of the 1920’s who specialized in “lyric statements” about the visual essence of cinema—its *photorGenie*.4 “*PhotorGenie*...one runs into a wall trying to define it. The face of beauty, it is the taste of things. I recognize it as I would a musical phrase.”5 It is perhaps not surprising that *photorGenie* has been dismissed as a mystical, or, indeed, a mystifying term, and that its best known proponent remains pigeonholed as a “naive” classical theorist. And yet, while *photorGenie* has served as the consummate marker of Epstein’s naiveité, it also suggests a relation between cinema and thought that increasingly comes to the fore of his theory and comprises one of its most compelling aspects. Even in his early essays, Epstein reminds us that it is the *Gene*—the intelligence or brain of the cinema that *photorGenie* quite literally invokes. “The Bell and Howe is a metal brain,” he writes in 1921, “standardized, manufactured, and marketed in thousands of copies.”6 Epstein’s early writings celebrate the potential of this cinema-brain to present reality in a new light, to “transform” it in the same fashion as a painter or a poet. And yet, by the time of his 1946 volume, _L’intelligence d’une machine_, Epstein had linked the cinema’s aesthetic capacities to a properly philosophic vocation: “the cinematograph is a dispositif that constructs, which is to say, thinks an image of the universe.”7

Epstein will develop this notion of cinematic thought most fully in a series of volumes that he writes between 1946 and 1953— _L’Intelligence d’une Machine_ (1946), _Cinéma du Diable_ (1947), _Esprit du Cinéma_ (1946-1949) and the unfinished manuscript _Alcool et Cinéma_—a body of work that has yet to be recognized for its remarkable contributions to the emerging field of film-philosophy. In this paper, I will explore Epstein’s later writings in conjunction with several of his films, focusing on the manner in which the cinema poses a challenge to philosophy’s dominant “images of thought” and thus proposes what Epstein calls an “anti-philosophy.” If for Epstein, the philosophical import of the cinema lies not in what philosophy can think about the cinema but in “what the cinema can offer to philosophy,” this is because the cinema presents thought images (*les pensée-images*) that challenge, provoke, or unsettle philosophy, forcing it to “think” differently. In returning to Epstein, I aim to explore this notion of the cinema as a rival dispositif of thought, and to excavate a vital, and overlooked chapter in the emergence of *la pensée-cinéma*.

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4 Dudley Andrew refers to Epstein’s “lyric statements about the uniqueness of cinema” in _Major Film Theories_, (New York: Oxford University Press) 12.
6 Abel, 244.
BERGSONALIZING PERSONA
Ozge Ozduzen

In this paper the main attempt is to make an analysis of Ingmar Bergman’s *Persona* (1966) with the help of Bergsonian and Deleuzian concepts. The most prominent reason for writing a film analysis paper in relation to Bergson’s and Deleuze’s philosophies is the role that Bergson attributes to art. In Bergson’s words, “the aim of art is to show us in nature and in mind outside of us and within us, things which did not explicitly strike our senses and our consciousness.”8 The main thesis here is that cinema enables the audience to see what the ordinary eye does not see more than other branches of art like painting, sculpture, music, etc. In that sense in *Persona*, Bergman enables us to see what we normally cannot see especially in making a crystal image; a mutual image between Elizabeth Vogler and Sister Alma, who are the two protagonists of *Persona*. In this regard, throughout this paper *Persona* will be analyzed as a striking instance of one of Deleuze’s sub-categories of the concept of time-image. At this point, the most significant aim is also to trace the footprints of Bergson’s feasible approach to cinema, especially to *Persona*. In doing that, other than Deleuze’s cinema books being a reference point, especially Bergson’s *Matter and Memory* and *Creative Evolution* will provide a firm basis.

In his famous article *The Possible and the Real*, Bergson underlines that “there is more intellectual content in disorder and nothingness than the order and existence because they imply several orders and existences.”9 As *Persona* can be considered to be one of the most chaotic films ever made, Bergson’s general attitude concerning artworks can be attributed to Bergman’s films, especially to *Persona*. The multi-layered structure of *Persona* provides the capability of conveying the presence of many orders at the same time. In such a framework, with *Persona* the possible is put into its proper place; into the place that it has long deserved. It is argued, however, that the fact that the possible attains its proper place does not lead to the wide open gates of freedom –in contrast to what Bergson suggests- but rather it triggers a once and for all state of depression and yearning.

The possible achieves the position that it has been longing for with the post-war cinema. In order to discuss such a thesis, *Persona* should also be analyzed in terms of the Deleuzian concept of time-image. It can be said that contemporary post-war cinema does not consider the world to be a “shapeable” realm but rather takes it to be a “scattered” realm in which everything lost its significance, order and reliability. For Deleuze, “contemporary philosophy has taken on other measures that belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness and excess.”10 What Deleuze mentions about philosophy can as well be applied to time-image. In that sense, comprehending *Persona* as a crystal image, which is one of the sub-categories of Deleuze’s concept of time-image, will be a supporting argument, because it will provide sufficient ground for the above claim that with *Persona* the “possible” and the “disorder” acquire the most reasonable place possible rather than the dominance of the “real” and the “order”.

From point of perception to point of cognition: audiovisual subjectivity in cinema
Katre Pärn

In cinema as in literature, the story is mediated to the spectator from and through someone’s partial, i.e. subjective point of view. This subjectivity that guides and limits the selection and presentation of the always partial information in film may be so to say psychological and concern the general worldview of the mediator or it may be perceptual and concern the arrangement of audiovisual material as if perceived – seen or heard – by someone inside or outside the diegesis.
Determining the locus of perception by selecting and combining partial views and sounds is one of the most powerful ways for assigning meaning and coherence to audiovisual elements. This locus of perception or experiencing mediator could be either camera, author, diegetic character, extradiegetic narrator, or even the spectator herself. Manipulating with this locus thus means controlling to a certain extent the way spectator interpretes various situations in film, how she assigns meaning to what she sees and hears on screen, since knowing the object depicted on screen or the source of the sound does not exhaust the meaning potential of a scene and acknowledging a presence of a mediating perceiver can alter how spectator interprets the scene.
The techniques for constructing diegetic subjectivity in cinema have been by now theoretically modelled both on visual and aural level as a specific structures or specifically manipulated visual and aural elements that are perceived by viewer as seen or heard by a diegetic character. However in most cases the visual and aural subjectivity are discussed as separate instances, being linked with each other only in episodic remarks about the inescapable relationship between image and sound in cinema. There is still a lack of attempts to integrate the visual and aural techniques of subjectivity into one model. Yet in cinema audiovisual subjectivity concerns both visual and auditive structures, and often what is called ‘point of view’ and ‘point of audition’ are combined into unified structure of ‘point of perception’.
This combination between visual and auditive elements becomes even more essential in case of constructing a human perceiver who not only sees and hears, but also interprets what she/he sees and hears (or does not see or hear). In these cases the diegetic character becomes not only a point of perception but also point of cognition: character’s interpretation of what she sees and hears becomes so dominant that spectator will assume not only character’s spatial but also psychological position in diegesis.
This kind of point of cognition sequences are essential in constructing unreliable diegetic character-narrators in as has been done in films like Atonement. My paper will analyse the central audiovisual mechanisms behind this kind of total structures of subjectivity.
Panel: A Deleuzian Journey: The Body and Space in Motion

This panel presents a close look at how the concepts of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari might be used to explore the filmic body and filmic space in contemporary cinema. The journey of the main protagonist in-between private and public, the sacred and the profane, two different cultures or two different countries will be analysed in various film examples from art house to mainstream. The body being the conveyor of meaning, the becoming of the characters as a process between places, situations, groups of people and feelings will be the common focus point for the three papers proposed. Making use of the concepts derived from the Cinema I, II and Capitalism and Schizophrenia, this panel is devoted to explore fresh connections between the philosophy of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari and contemporary film.

The Spiritual Passage as Becoming-Imperceptible: Takva [a man’s fear of god]

Serazer Pekerman

The highly controversial Turkish film, Takva (‘A Man’s Fear of God’, Özer Kızıltan, 2006), tells the story of a radical Muslim, Muharrem (Erkan Can), who leads an ascetic life the aim of which is simply to get closer to his creator. Surrounded by people who know and respect him, Muharrem, whose name means ‘forbidden’ in Arabic, manages to hide in a zone of familiarity in the centre of Istanbul. He lives in an old neighbourhood, works in a store which sells sacks and pays regular visits to his sect. After being chosen by his Sheikh (Meray Ülgen), the influential leader of the sect, Muharrem leaves his safe routines to collect rent from the tenants of the sect. His encounters with life outside the borders of his zone put him in a questioning state of mind that ends up in limbo. The film presents Muharrem’s conflict and trauma caused by an inevitable encounter with the ‘other’: various people with different beliefs and ideas. His safe pattern as an imperceptible member of the congregation disappears and, losing his ability to move in this new world, Muharrem becomes catatonic and turns into an internal exile imprisoned in his body.

Özer Kızıltan, the director of the film, explains his aim in an interview: ‘Jean Paul Sartre claims that hell is other people, we tried to make a film in which the other is not hell’ (Official site of the film, Interviews). In the Turkish media the film received strong reactions from diverse groups. Takva divided audiences, who either totally adored or harshly criticised the film, or both at the same time. Proving a success in film festivals both in Turkey and abroad, the film, like its main protagonist Muharrem, appealed to certain ‘in-between’ groups particularly the wasted generations that have oscillated between being Turkish, European, Muslim and secular Republican. Muharrem in fact posits a metaphor for all Turks, who might similarly end up in a limbo of fear, anger, and hatred after a traumatic encounter with the ‘others’.

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari claim that religion may provide a possibility for becoming-imperceptible. Following Kierkegaard’s ‘knight of faith’, Deleuze and Guattari claim that ‘to be “like” everybody else … is an affair of becoming … [t]his requires much ascetism, much sobriety, much creative involution.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 p. 308). In Takva, Islam is represented as a potential of a Deleuze and Guattarian becoming through Muharrem. Following Muharrem’s movement through private and public, religious and non-religious spaces, this paper explores the way in which Muharrem’s sacred path conforms to Deleuze and Guattari’s process of ‘becoming-imperceptible’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980).
The Badiouian subject trapped in *Gomorrah*: Undecidability and choice in post-reflexive cinema

Maria Poulaki,

In the last few years we are witnessing a proliferation of ‘network narratives’ (Bordwell, 2006) in the expanded web of world cinema. Either as a commercially profitable trend, an effect of the technological and physical transformation of our globalized societies, or an expression of a new kind of cinema in the digital era, the political importance of this cinematic movement has not yet been sufficiently addressed. This paper addresses this issue, through the scope of Alain Badiou’s philosophical doctrine.

Badiou’s philosophy gives the political a radical meaning. The Badiouian subject, condemned to inhabit the ‘glocal’ (Wellman, 2002) networks of ‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994), is nonetheless divested of its reflexivity. Constantly faced with self-defining choices among tracks or ‘subject positions’ that only reflect the partiality of identities ‘counted’ in specific situations, the networked subject is for Badiou fundamentally irreflexive; it is impossible to acquire full reflexivity, as the totality of the possible choices will forever escape the design of the ‘game’. Yet the political lies in a decision that still has to be made, even from this “standpoint of the undecidable” (Badiou, 2007).

‘The war isn’t for me’, says Ciro in the recent ‘network film’ by Matteo Garrone, *Gomorrah* (Italy, 2008). ‘But you’re in it; you know that’; is the answer that he gets. You can’t escape the situation, says similarly Badiou; and when you are in the ‘war’, you cannot avoid choice. This choice, however, can be made in terms of another ‘counting’; one that does not distinguish individual identities but that releases what connects all different positions. The individuals populating the modular narrative of *Gomorrah* are constantly faced with self-positioning choices: whose side are they on and who are their enemies. But subjectivization for Badiou lies in making the way to the ‘uncountable’ of our narratives; that which discloses what inexists in the pre-figured multiplicity of our choices.

Cinematic narrative has been considered as equilibrium between chaos and order; as a protecting shield with which contemporary spectators deal with the antithetical pulls of modernity (Casetti, 2008). Now that cinema reflexively plays with its cyborg nature producing chaotic narratives, this shield turns into a merger. However, to discover the subjectivities that emerge out of this loss of equilibrium, this paper argues, we need to adopt an irreflexive scope, similar to that of the cinematic heroes trapped in these increasingly complex narratives. For the Badiouian subject chaos does not exist; it is the name that we use for what is missing from the counting of the established situations and threatens them with collapse. A subject emerges in its encounter with the ‘chaos’ that inhabits every situation, and not in its protection from it. From this perspective, Badiou’s doctrine opens up an uncountable choice for political existence within the network where subjectivities, narratives and cinema are moving.

Will Ciro be able to choose as a subject, despite his counting by Camorra? And is there some political collective subjectivity that a rises like an event out of the contemporary developments of world cinema?

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11 Camorra, the Neapolitan criminal organization, to which the title of the film indirectly refers.
Since the very beginning, film theorists have been preoccupied with questions of medium specificity. To answer the question, “What is Cinema?” film theorists have largely pointed to what was unique about cinema—what it can do that the other arts could not.

The question of medium specificity thus became quickly and influentially allied with ontological questions about the image itself. How, in other words, does the cinematic image come into being? And how does the origin of an image (following Bazin) suggest stylistic features that will develop in close fidelity to the specificity of its origin. The medium specific claims so often made about cinema in its photographic moment have led a number of theorists of the digital today to argue that the digital image—because ontologically distinct from the photographic image—will necessarily lead to a reconceptualization of film style along the lines of a digital ontology; that it will proceed, in other words, from a break with a more causal conception of the origin and ground.

Rather than uphold this distinction, what I would like to propose instead is that film theory—even in the moment of the digital, even as cinema itself seems always about to disappear—has for too long maintained a rather parochial conception of ontology itself. That is, film theorists have largely been concerned with how an image comes into being, when we could be asking the larger ontological question, namely: what is the meaning of being? And might it mean to be with images. If we take seriously this larger ambition of ontology, which will attempt to understand being as inseparable from the image—and particularly if we assume a post-structural conception of multiple being (which continues to elude film theory)—then we may also arrive at a genuinely post-foundational aesthetics of cinema. It will be one in which the specificity of style itself bears no relation to how an image comes into being. Rather, by engaging in a critique of Heidegger’s conception of mitdasein (being with others), which he takes to be constitutive of being itself—especially insofar as true being is said to occur at the moment in which one removes oneself from the noise of others and everyday life—I will propose an ontology of cinema that figures that image as the productive equivalent of mitdasein, in which being itself is as informed by an image (and importantly so) as it is by our more traditionally “human” contact with the other. My notion of being-with-images, that is to say, will work to replace a stable subject, whether the one posed by psychoanalysis or phenomenology—with multiple being. To do so will be to reorient the way in which we have thought of ontology in film theory over the last century.
Camera Obscura: Thinking Darkness in Sans Soleil
Alan Robinson

I took the measure of the unbearable vanity of the west, that has never ceased to privilege being over non-being, what is spoken to what is left unsaid.
Chris Marker Sans Soleil (1982/3)

In the literature on Sans Soleil, (1982/3), several conventional readings have been established. They fall into three main categories. Either the film is seen as an extension of Marker’s travel writing and documentary filmmaking: or as a meditation on western Orientalism: or, mediating between these alternatives, as (auto-) biographical, and as an essay on time and memory. I propose that primarily Marker’s film essays a world, by structural and compositional elements of the film, which revokes the subjectivity of the west.

This rests on the claim that Sans Soleil deconstructs two foundational moments of western thought: “[What] Parmenides already noted, and Heidegger likes to reiterate, that ‘being and thinking are the same.’” 13 Secondly, that meaning is lodged in the persistent Lichtmetaphysik of the west. ‘Speculative Realism,’ (Quentin Meillassoux After Finitude, 2008, Ray Brassier Nihil Unbound, 2007) attempts to think the world without the ‘vanity of the west’: without the ambition, intention or determination of human thought. I argue that Sans Soleil presages just such speculation. A Lichtmetaphysik imbues almost every avenue of thought with its metaphor, privileging space over time. By the 1970s, a debate was well under way in French cineastes circles on cinematic dispositif – apparatus film theory. Marker employs this to problematize the film with respect to light: by foregrounding the technical means of its own making. Withdrawing overt authorial control, he creates the fiction of an autographical film: “Of course I’ll never make that film. Nevertheless I’m collecting the sets, inventing the twists, putting in my favourite creatures. I’ve even given it a title, indeed the title of those Mussorgsky songs: Sunless.” Marker disrupts naturalistic representation throughout the film. By separating the audio and visual in a way more radical than in any previous work, Marker controls the relation of thought, reflection, to the exigencies of what is viewed. A narrative arc of Odyssey allows what is portrayed visually to maintain a distance from any reflection on it: a traveller seeking a home – Sandor Krasna – with a waiting Alexandra Stewart: a world of embodiment in light is reflected by a disembodied word.

In an email correspondence with Ray Brassier, Mike Watson offers the interesting conceit of the universe as a work of art by designation14. Perhaps, conversely, the autographical film is no mere fiction: perhaps, the ‘vanity’ of the director is only one more technological element of its construction: perhaps, in the end art thinks by its own means and constitution, not by way an ideal, but by the accumulation of historical precedent: ‘factically’ in Heideggerian terms. For some decades artists have drawn on the random, the accidental, the serial, to raise the possibility of a self-generating artwork. But perhaps this has been the case all along: Sans Soleil only serving to highlight the principle.

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12 The original French version was released in 1982. A slightly re-edited version in English was released in 1983. One change was the substitution of the lines from T S Eliot’s Ash Wednesday (1930), “Because I know that time is always time/And place is always and only place/And what is actual is actual only for one time/And only for one place,” for the quotation from Jean Racine’s Bajazet (1672), “L’Éloignement des pays répare quelque sorte la trop grande proximité des temps. (The distance between countries compensates somewhat for the excessive closeness of time)” See ‘Notes on Filmmaking,’ essay by Chris Marker accompanying the Criterion DVD of La Jetée/Sans Soleil.
13 Kisiel, Theodore, Heidegger’s Way of Though [New York, London: Continuum, 2002], p175
14 http://www.slashseconds.org/issues/003/002/articles/mWatson/index.php
The present paper is an approach to Jim Jarmusch’s American Insomnia Panorama (in opposite to American Dream). I would like to show how his stories about outsiders and marginal characters are a criticism of the hegemonic cinema (as a reflection of the status quo). This may be seen not only thematically but also in a filmic way: The kind and duration of shots; the transitions; the way he plays with filmic time; the sets… all against the mainstream cinema.

In the other hand, I will try to point out how Jarmusch carries out a personal double code of popular and high culture. I will show some devices he frequently employs in order to embody this code such as intertextuality and tribute.

One of the main ideas I want to defend is that this film director, as other American artists after the European Avant-gardes, recycles the European culture, which is the background of his own cinema, and offers an original product -as intellectual as the European ones but closer to the new spectator-. In the same way his trip to Paris let him know some of the American outsiders of Hollywood like Samuel Fuller, Cassavetes or Nicholas Ray, now Jarmusch let us (Europeans) know or revive some European film-makers such as Bresson, or Jean-Pierre Melville, and Japanese (like Seijun Suzuki), among others. Thus, Jim Jarmusch, like Tarantino, creates a link between the European Avant-garde and a certain American Tradition. I will not go as far as to say “Independent Cinema” partly because the concept itself is certainly problematic. But, unlike Tarantino’s work, Jarmusch’s cannot be called “postmodern”. “Modern” either. They are in a certain “limbo”: they are not classic works, neither modern nor postmodern.

It can be said that Jarmusch employs all sorts of devices in order to articulate a criticism of the American Dream and of the (stereotyped) American Way of Life. One of the mechanisms is to put characters, actions and opinions out of context. That is why the figure of the stranger (usually a foreigner) and the language are so important in his films.

With Night on Earth, he takes his attacks further. These attacks are not violent or political. They are philosophical ones. Jarmusch finds out the same problems as in America. I am talking about solitude, lack of communication or mutual understanding, racism, blindness, etc. And this is the second main idea I want to talk about.

To sum up, this paper will explore the transition from the first Jarmusch works to the last one of what we could call his “first period” -from Permanent Vacation (1981) to Night on Earth (1991)-. I will examine his first attempts to draw the failure of the American Dream and how all those problems, like some fragments of a recycled culture, settle into Europe and the rest of the world. Briefly, how Jarmusch offers us a vision of what can be called Worldwide Insomnia.
PANEL: RUIZ AS CINE THINKER: THE MULTIPLE SIDES OF AN ANOMALOUS AND UNIQUE PROJECT

This panel will examine the work of Raúl Ruiz across a variety of different cultural, aesthetic and institutional contexts, presenting him as a unique and anomalous cine thinker, whose work articulates questions of aesthetics and politics, singularity and multiplicity, interstices and singular points, austerity and the Baroque, film-making and speculative thought, cinema, television and pedagogy. In particular, this panel will present lesser known sides of Ruiz’s work, ranging from his Allende-period cinema in Chile, via his highly philosophical formulation of a Poetics of Cinema to his recent work for Chilean TV and as a pedagogue in the UK. Throughout the panel attention will be paid to the strategies that Ruiz has employed across these different situations to interrupt normal patterns of cinematic production and consumption and replace them with anomalous yet rigorous practices that open cinema up directly to speculative, investigative and interstitial thought processes well beyond the usual limits of both mainstream and art cinema practices and normative film theories.

Ruizian Ruptures of the Mainstream: Chilean Television and British Film Studies
Alejandra Rodríguez-Remedi

Raúl Ruiz has spoken of his interest in understanding how cinema works “from inside”, from the position of someone with first-hand experience of the politics and technicalities of professional filmmaking but, as an interdisciplinary critical thinker, capable of abstracting himself and unveiling the poetics beneath. Citing Jean Epstein and Sergei Eisenstein as formative examples, Ruiz alludes here to what we may call the “speculative filmmaker” ethically committed to exploring the possibilities emanating from the merging of theory and practice in ways which can contest the conformity of repetition, narrative uniformity and automatism generated by the culture industry. In this paper, I will argue that the radical bifurcations of Ruiz’s work, taking two recent aspects of it as case studies, possess a holisticity and a faithfulness to this political project.

In the first case, I will be addressing how the miniseries’ La Recta Provincia (2007) and Litoral (2008) have impacted upon mainstream TV audiences in Ruiz’s native Chile. Both State-funded (quite a coup for a director forced to flee the country into exile in 1973), these series’ have received primetime national broadcasts and garnered higher-than-expected ratings. Discourses of critics and viewers, many of whom were being exposed to Ruiz’s work for the first time, have emerged marked by perplexity, boredom, frustration and patently insincere praise but also a seemingly genuine admiration and desire for more. Could this attest to the widening of “audiovisual field” and personal introspection that Ruiz strives to stimulate through his films?

In the second case, I will analyse the implications of the distinctive role that Ruiz is playing as a teacher within UK film studies and argue that this pedagogical activity is a key ingredient of his creative practice. In fact referring to himself as a “general”, a “trainer” or a “coach” rather than as a “teacher”, Ruiz launches a barrage of “general education” at students conveyed through the integration of seminars-cum-lectures, miscellaneous class notes redolent of the first two volumes of his Poetics of Cinema, and a diverse range of screenings. His methods clearly break with the conventions of academic film studies in that he attempts to help students play as freely as children as they create their own short fiction films, encouraging their understanding of the potential of cinema as a means of exploring the full complexity of human nature.

As is the case with his audiovisual and theoretical production, I will argue, Ruiz the master bricoleur has successfully subverted televisual and educational hegemonies in his ongoing combinatory venture.
Competitive Philosophical Approaches to Cinema Subjectivity
Dennis Rothermel, Department of Philosophy, California State University, Chico

It would only be natural that philosophers would incline to the discussion of subjectivity in the narrative structures of cinema. Efforts from within the analytic tradition and particularly informed by cognitive theory have explored how point-of-view (POV) shots elicit the viewer’s identification with the viewpoint of a character in the film. The upshot of this thread of discourse is that POV shots are defined contextually, and hence no reliably universality of meaning is easily imputed, either on behalf of convention or the nature of human cognition. A phenomenological treatment of the special case of subjective camera in The Lady in the Lake (1947) builds upon Jean Mitry’s critique to construct this film as a uniquely demonstrative example by negative extreme of how falsely POV shots serve as equivalent to human embodied experience. Gilles Deleuze’s exploration of the very same passage in Mitry extends to Pier Paolo Pasolini’s theoretical discussion of the applicability of a notion borrowed from linguistics, free indirect discourse, to something similar in cinema such as engenders, in the very best examples of the art, cinema poetry. The progression of Deleuze’s discourse leaves Mitry and Pasolini behind, and particularly to find enlightening guidance in particular films by Michelangelo Antonioni, Jean-Luc Godard, Eric Rohmer, as well as Pasolini’s own. That POV shots are established by context and subjective camera is invariably obtrusively clichéd and stilted are points that Deleuze gallops past at the outset, hardly with a need for mention.
Imagining another world: cinematic suture and political philosophy
Richard Rushton

In film studies, suture has typically been understood to designate the ways in which films can close off certain discontinuities (of framing or narrative) in order to provide coherence and visual pleasure. Against such notions, this paper aims to understand suture as an opening up which is facilitated by processes of bridging or bringing together — in short, of suturing. Far from closing off alternatives, suture instead provides ways of imagining how two (or more) things might be connected where it seemed there could be no possibility of connection. As a simple example, we might understand what Stanley Cavell calls ‘comedies of remarriage’ as engaging in processes of suture: the bringing together of a couple where it might have seemed the couple would remain disconnected.

The stakes of this paper lie, however, in political philosophy. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe proposed an ambitious theorization of suture in relation to the political. While discussing Elia Kazan’s On the Waterfront (1954) at length, I demonstrate how Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of suture is relevant for understanding the kinds of worlds presented on film and the kinds of relationships spectators can have to those worlds. My analysis is guided by two insights: 1- that suture involves a subjective identification with something external to the self; and 2- that suture entails imagining a different kind of society (for suture provides a bridge between this world and the possibility of another world). In this way, the notion of suture can provide us with an understanding of the political possibilities of cinema in ways that are not merely reducible (as Edward Branigan has recently claimed) to the formal qualities of ‘framing’.
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Relocating the good life. Virtue ethics in virtual film worlds
Philipp Schmerheim,

Is there a good life within a fake world? Several contemporary Hollywood films address this question by positioning their characters within simulated or fake environments, environments that for these characters turn out to be anything but ‘real’. While the main characters of The Matrix, The Thirteenth Floor, or Vanilla Sky find themselves confined to computer-generated, simulated environments they are knowingly or unwittingly immersed in, the physically ‘real’ yet intentionally confined, manufactured and controlled living spaces of The Truman Show, Dark City, The Village, or The Island entertain an Orwellian vision of ideologically controlled societies; and they even radicalize this vision because their characters are made believe that the world they live in, and the identity they have assumed within it, are ‘authentic’, while in fact the world they believe to be real is merely a gigantic TV studio (The Truman Show), an social laboratory in outer space (Dark City), or a subterranean scientific facility for raising clones (The Island).

In these films, the issue of the good life is, however, not exclusively correlated to the ontological make-up of the world. Especially The Truman Show, Dark City and The Island throw the characters under a sort of externally induced identity regime: Truman Burbanks’ self-image is constantly manipulated by TV show director Cristof while at the same time the people he shares his world with are nothing but actors being paid for acting as Truman’s wife, best friend or colleague. The inhabitants Dark City each night undergo an identity change induced by the alien species that without their knowledge keeps them under control. The inhabitants of the subterranean facility in The Island are equipped with fake memories and misled about their actual function as organ donors for the persons they are clones of.

By literally re-locating and aesthetically redesigning the films’ diegesis, these and other films re-negotiate the elements involved in the good life: one’s own actions, the influence of the people one shares life with, and the preconditions of the (physical) environment one inhabits.

In my presentation, I will explore the moral implications of these different visions of manipulated lives, concentrating not so much on the bare-bone ‘philosophical structure’ of these obvious moral conundræ, but rather looking at the way in which the films play with the moral implications of their narratives. I will also relate these films to Stanley Cavell’s recent register of moral perfectionism films in his book Cities of Words.
Violence and the Responsibility of the Audience in Michael Haneke’s Ethical Cinema

Susanne Schmetkamp

The Austrian director Michael Haneke belongs to the most impressive and provocative contemporary filmmakers. With his extraordinary and supremely truthful movies – like Funny Games, The Piano Player, or Hidden – he founded a new kind of cinema that combines art and morality, and in some special regard challenges the audience to the highest degree. “Moral without art decays to some bad paedagogy,” Haneke once said. But he is far away of being a dogmatic moralist, for “a moralist aims to convey fixed moral conclusions, and they see moral issues in terms of right and wrong” (Wheatley, 2009, Michael Haneke’s Movies, 188). Instead, Haneke describes violence, dread, and “the evil” in general without explaining or justifying it. He does not give any decisive answers, but provokes the spectator’s own responsibility in terms of both her reception of films, that is the medial and aesthetic reception, and her conditio humana – as a normative concept – within actual society. Watching Haneke’s movies is not easy, and it is not mere entertainment. However, it is authentic and especially painful, and this is how violence really is. Haneke forces the spectator to look into the face of pure evil (f.i. in Funny Games). In this respect, the recipient herself becomes an affected participant of the motion picture. These and some other correlative aspects shall be pointed out in my presentation. I want to discuss Haneke’s inconvenient approach to the correlation of Aesthetics and Ethics. I am going to focus on his conception of ethical cinema, and on the impact of his films upon the audience. One of my main theses is that the works of Haneke agitate and challenge our concepts of trust and correlative expectations. Trust is a necessary condition of our co-operative activity. This involves “the willingness of one party to rely on another to act in certain ways” (Williams, 2002, Truth and Truthfulness, 88). We seem to know how to handle cases in which trust is undermined like cases of lying and deceiving. However, Haneke calls this into question, namely in two respects: First, the protagonists of the story itself are confronted with the fragility of interpersonal relations, and therefore have to reconsider their trust in relations as well as they have to abandon their normal expectations. Second, the audience is irritated in its expectations towards the dramaturgy of the movie. Whereas conventional movies – especially in the mainstream cinema – make a decision between the good and the bad, and justify or, in contrast, condemn the evil (and therefore fulfill the trustful expectations), Haneke’s films do not. What does that mean for our ethical conceptions? What does it mean for concepts like trust and responsibility? As I mentioned before Haneke does not answer this decisively, but he introduces new important ethical questions. Furthermore, the relation between movie and recipient is challenged: the spectator herself is affected, and therefore both a kind of a victim and a kind of a responsible accomplice. It is in this connection Haneke develops some kind of moral statement, nonetheless, in so far as he stresses the importance of empathy and humane life. As my presentation takes into account both the relation between philosophy and film in general, and the relation between aesthetics and ethics in the films of Michael Haneke in particular it suits the following topics of the conference: “Film as Philosophy”, “The Philosophical World-View of particular Directors”, “Aesthetics and Film”, and “Morality and Movies”.
Before the Rain: Exploration of philosophy of time in film
Aysegul Sentug

*Before the Rain* (1994) a cinematographic fest, a film by Milcho Manchevski. Its narrative is completely the opposite of what David Bordwell called in “Classic” Hollywood Narrative since it does not have the clear use of events and actors, it has completely complicated chronological chain, and narration is restricted. The narrative is not structured with beginning, middle and the end, the resolution at the end is replaced by an overwhelming question mark over the minds. Before the Rain, qua an independent movie, has a lot of philosophical features in it. Although it is not a film that philosophically motivated intentionally, it has some grounds of philosophical issues such as philosophy of time, terror, sublime, religion, and politics. Time could be the main motif in the film since the film has exploration of philosophy of time not only in its narrative but also in its mise-en-scene. It is not organized in a chronologically linear way of a cause and effect chain, but in an elliptical sequence in three parts entitled “words”, “faces” and “pictures” in which almost all the characters and events are interrelated. In that sense, it can be called as a portmanteau film. The main plot presents Christian Macedonian and Muslim Albanian affairs under a mystic blue sky, on steep craggy mountains in an infinite desert. The key phrase “The circle is not round, time never dies.” appears throughout the film. Hence the film presents itself chronologically elliptical which could be a good manifestation of Nietzsche’s “Eternal Return”.

Furthermore, Kantian understanding of time could be explored throughout the film. For Kant, time is the *a priori* prerequisite of all phenomena since it is always a framework to everything, it is unlimited itself but each part is limited. The limited part could be the part we sense and the unlimited part of the time is the notion of time itself. Time is the sequence of the past, present and future; if there is no past since it is no longer, and there is no future since it is not yet; then only the present exists and appears us as an eternal present. This eternity appears us only in moments which we can not really measure but pretend to measure. We can measure each moment, but not time as a whole. *Before the Rain* shows that we can only grasp fragmented moments –just as we can grasp each parts of the film itself, but not altogether. We cannot connect past, present and future in a single whole or a complete circle, instead we only connect them in the present which always intersects with past and future. Just as for Kant we fail in representing infinity as a whole but we can represent it in each moment. This means each moment has a partial eternity in itself. Chrysippus says “only present exists”. Like in Einstein’s theory, “present” is a point in space-time, *hic et nunc*, which means “here and now.”

The film makes the audience think about whether the film makes a subjective account of time by claiming “all we have is now” or not. If the “time” is only in present, as it appears to us, how can we give a plausible definition of the “duration” from the Big Bang, or even before the Big Bang till the time we were born? If time were only subjective, how could subjectivity have come to emerge in time?” Before the Rain, has raw material to philosophize itself. Fundamentally philosophy of time, especially ontology of time could be taught through thinking this film. Moreover, manifestation of some theories, such as Kantian or Nietzschean understanding of time is explorable in this film.
Godard’s *La chinoise* and the apprenticeship of hopefulness (without hope)
Adity Singh

This paper will engage with the ideas expounded in Jean-Luc Godard’s *La Chinoise* (1967), guided by concepts taken from Alain Badiou’s philosophy, in particular, from his elaboration of the subject of a truth procedure. More specifically, this paper will attempt to defend the concept of hopefulness (or ‘abstract hope’) against (concrete) hope understood as hope for a telos. This concept of (abstract) hope is derived from Badiou’s philosophy of the subject and is closely related to his concept of affirmative courage.

The argument will be a close study of the plot and the ‘represented matter’ of Godard’s *La chinoise* (i.e., images, objects, phrases written on the wall or declaimed, dialogues, courses, etc) and through an analysis of these, it will try to extract the motif of hope from the film. *La chinoise*, while on the level of bare plot is a tragedy, and a Sophoclean one at that, is nevertheless, on the level of meta-plot, infused with the subjective motif of hopefulness.

The effort of the paper will be to take part in the film—which as the film’s intertitles claim, is “in the course of being made”—and, placing itself as the audience of a Brechtian play, it will try to engage critically with the ideas presented in the film, all the while distancing itself from the enunciations of the characters/plot, so as to keep in view the contradictions that lead to its dénouement.

For the examination of the ‘represented matter’ of the film, this paper will use Jacques Rancière’s excellent analysis offered in *La fable cinématographique*. The particular focus will be on his elaboration of the use of colour in the film, which will be applied to a presentation of the dialectic of the inside and the outside (vague ideas and clear images), which is at the centre of the film.

Finally, the paper will discuss the tragic dimension of the film, in order to bring to light a “clarity”, an “illumination” [Badiou: éclaircie], both retrospective and anticipatory, that is delineated in the plot of the film – a plot which is also an argument, and an exposition of the problematic relation between theory and practice, between “vague ideas” and “clear images”. The pivotal question of the film, indeed, is the Maoist one of the “relation between knowing and doing” – the enactment of which leads to its tragic dénouement.

In this exposition of the path to the tragic dénouement of the film, the paper hopes to find the overarching motif of hope, a hope that is the “enduring fidelity” of Badiou’s subject.

Ultimately, the thesis of the paper is that the “apprenticeship” that *La chinoise* ends with—which, for us, is the anticipatory dimension of the plot, the future that the dénouement points to—is the essence of the Badiouian concept of hope. Hope, as presented in Godard’s *La chinoise*, is an apprenticeship.
Why should a Jungian film theorist learn to count to four?
Greg Singh

The film analyst Luke Hockley has recently stated that Carl Jung’s notion of ‘image’ encapsulates more than visual images; it is ‘a metaphor which provides a key means through which to understand the psychological reality of a situation.’ The image is in the viewer’s psychological and affective responses; in the film on the screen; and in this intermittent and difficult-to-determine space between the two in what can be thought of as a ‘third image.’

To my mind, this suggests a useful model for thinking through processes of meaning-making during the act of viewing film. This act, and the experience of it, is a complex negotiation of embodied and material relations between production and consumption, text and context, film and viewer. For Hockley, and others such as Christopher Hauke, the emphasis on ‘third image’ ultimately reflects Jung's model of inner and outer worlds; a model that may be thought of as a split between the spiritual (or pneumatic) and the material (or hylic) based upon Hellenistic syncretism, and influenced by Cartesian dualism and the idealism of Immanuel Kant. However, Hockley’s particular approach also reveals a dialectical tension that is too often overlooked in post-Jungian film analysis.

This paper will renegotiate the strengths and the shortcomings of such film-viewing analysis, by appropriating Zizek (1991)’s idea that the dialectic is not a threefold phenomenon (i.e. film, viewer, meaning), but engages a fourth term – the negation of the negation, the ‘interior’ of the first term – that may be described as meaningfulness. In fact, by revisiting Jung’s typology of the functions of consciousness (sensation, thinking, feeling and intuition), one may map out a fourfold structuring of viewing relationships that reveals a dialectic of viewing that incorporates the semantics, affection and cognition of the film-viewing experience.

Through an analysis of examples from the films of Wes Anderson (Rushmore, The Royal Tenenbaums, The Life Aquatic with Steve Zissou, and The Darjeeling Limited) this paper will discuss the dialectical nature of the four ‘images’ of post-Jungian film scholarship (screened, psychological, negotiated and meaningful), particularly in relation to such questions as cinephilia, everydayness and the phenomenology of film experience.
Shooting the Animal: On Animal-Philosophy and Film-Philosophy
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The practices of animal-philosophy and film-philosophy share a common origin in that both look to something altogether different from philosophy in order to do philosophy. This paper brings together these two non-philosophical practices in order to pose and address the question, “What is film thinking when it thinks the animal?” After a brief analysis of the hegemonic Disney-ification of animals on film the paper considers two very different ways of framing the animal on film: that of Michael Haneke’s recurring motif in his films of showing the actual death of a non-human animal before the simulated death of a human animal and Robert Bresson’s Christological depiction of the life and (simulated) death of a donkey in *Au hasard Balthazar*. Following and developing the analyses of Peter Steeves on Haneke and Lloyd Baugh on Bresson, we argue that both film-makers reveal an instance of the death of God in the death of the animal, but by tracing the differences in the way these animals are shot (both by the camera and on camera) we begin to understand not only what film is thinking when it thinks the animal, but also the way that film can think differently about the animal.
Interface: The Move to Global Participation
Craig Smith
This paper uses examples from the work of American artist Matthew Bakkom (Born 1968) and of Mexican-Canadian artist Rafael Lozano-Hemmer (Born 1967) to demonstrate significant differences between models of ‘interface’ and those of ‘interactivity’ in contemporary installations of projected film, video and photographic media. This media includes both traditional forms of projected celluloid film (Bakkom) as well as midi-synthesized and responsive forms of electronic and digital media including, but not limited to, video (Lozano-Hemmer).

The paper will seek to define and demonstrate ‘interface’ as a specific construct that has perpetuated the evolution of cinematic events into relational forms conducted through theories and practices of audience participation (Kaprow, Agamben), duration (Viola, Bergson) and site-specificity (Kwon, Deleuze). The paper will emphasize that the interface of relational forms designates a significant conceptual shift from user-to-technology (interactive) engagements to the instrumentalisation of a globally distributed "participant team." This "team" is simultaneously engaged with the event of time-based media across multiple locations in successive or simultaneous arrangements. The paper considers these works as those which take a relational approach, following the 21st Century, multi-national curating of Nicolas Bourriaud who applies David Harvey’s concepts of the dynamics of human value to the contradictions inherent in the relations of capital.

The paper will use visual illustrations and diagrams of two artworks by Matthew Bakkom (*The Intimacy Machine*, 1998 and *The Cinevator*, 2000) and one repeating installation of work (originally commissioned by the East Midlands Development Agency) by Rafael Lozano-Hemmer (*Under Scan*, 2005-present). The artists’ works create references across media formats in their critique and application of projected, interactive film and projected media requiring community participation. Under the dynamic theme of interactivity, the artists’ work references a diverse range of ideals for community participation such as self-betterment, democracy, populism, truth, contingency, nationalism and representation. A crucial aspect shared by these three illustrated examples is each artwork’s inability to function without the participation of an audience (group) or viewer (individual). The paper will recount successive moments of participation and describe the dynamic actions of participation for each of these artworks. These moments and actions of participation, as well as the technological forms that structure such participation, will be mapped upon one of the two categories of ‘interactivity’ and ‘interface.’

The author hopes that the mapping of these categories can be applied by artists, curators and other researchers to distinguish ‘interface’ in theories of *expanded cinema* and related lens-based, projected media practices from those practices and audience engagements traditionally defined as ‘interactive.’
The (W)hole of Film
David Sorfa

In this paper I would like to explore the ways in which film-philosophy uses examples from films to make arguments about both film and philosophy. I wish to take as my starting point Steven Mulhall’s fascinating discussion of taking the “whole” film seriously in his discussion of the Alien and Mission Impossible series. The idea that a “proper” interpretation must take into account the entire film (and even possibly its predecessors, its genre stable mates, its auteur – broadly understood – context and any number of other fields) and be, in some way, “true” to the voice of the film is fundamental to the thought that film might be/do philosophy.

There would seem to be a logical problem here to which Jacques Derrida points in Limited Inc.: that is, meaning requires a context in order to be fixed, but that context is, as Derrida says, “illimitable” and argues that this is not a temporary aberration but rather the base logic of the possibility of meaning itself. In other words, it is only by *not* discussing the whole of (the) film that we can discuss film at all. Paul Ricoeur’s work on interpretation and psychoanalysis will also be examined here.

I wish to develop an argument around the use of examples and exemplarity within the discussion of film and think about the ways in which film clips are used in oral lectures and the ways in which those clips are re-described in written academic articles. Just as Derrida shook the supposed relationship of transparent speech to obscure writing, so I wish to complicate the notion of the clear moving image as opposed to the re-presentation of that image in writing (I will discuss the legacy of F.R. Leavis in Film Studies here). My paper will also take as its focus Christian Keathley’s identification of the “cinephiliac moment” as being the cornerstone of what we now understand academic film study to be.

Rather than looking at the arguments of film (presuming that films can indeed “argue”, I wish to examine the ways in which arguments around film are constructed and what this construction implies for both film and philosophy.
Animation in (and out of) philosophy and film studies
Richard Stamp

This paper addresses an emerging scholarship of the relation between philosophy, film studies and animation, which proceeds from a certain problematisation of the distribution of these terms. In consonance with film studies scholarship on the ‘cinema of attractions’ (Gunning 1989), Gilles Deleuze situates the animation at the very origins of cinema - as an integral part of its prehistory of trick films, lightning sketches and other vaudevillian phantasmagoria. His famous definition of the cinema as ‘the system which reproduces movement as a function of any-instant-whatever’ thus includes the cartoon film within the genus, cinema:

if it belongs fully to the cinema, this is because the drawing no longer constitutes a pose or a completed figure, but the description of a figure which is always in the process of being formed or dissolving through the movement of lines and points taken at any-instant-whatevers of their course. (1986: 5)

One of only two references to animation in his two volumes on cinema, it is clear that for Deleuze it is a matter of its belonging to cinema. But is this historically or conceptually justifiable? Alan Cholodenko (1991, 2007) has argued forcefully for extending and inverting Deleuze's (and Gunning's) formulation: all film, he contends, is an instance of animation - and the thinking to which it gives rise might itself be described as a process of (re)animating philosophy. Yet such a claim, although thought provoking, lacks substantial engagement with the specific materialities of animation. This essay thus begins from a dissatisfaction with the alternative between Deleuze's ontological hierarchy and Cholodenko’s deconstructive inversion of it, preferring to focus on the unclaimed and under-explored field of relations that each ignore within the material and technical specificities of the cartoon film. It will be argued that the sheer fact that the discrete cartoon instants can be drawn, painted, traced, posed, stuck, scratched or, indeed, computer-generated, etcetera, means that any thinking of animation must begin from the always contingent conceptuality of its materials, processes, techniques and forms. Consequently, this essay will set up possible routes and questions thrown up in the attempt to think through animation.
Given the extent to which visual media technologies permeate discourses of social and political representation today, it is perhaps not surprising that Guy Debord’s 1967 treatise *The Society of the Spectacle* has enjoyed something of a renaissance in contemporary film theory and political philosophy. In a range of very different works—one that includes Jonathan Beller’s *Cinematic Mode of Production*, Giorgio Agamben’s *The Coming Community*, Paolo Virno’s *Grammar of the Multitude*, Jean-Luc Nancy’s *Being Singular Plural*, and Alain Badiou’s recent writings on the financial crisis, to name just a few—Debord’s concept of spectacle has served as a trope for the commodification of social relations that a culture of images either implicitly or explicitly effects. And yet, to read these works together is to recognize very quickly that the concept of spectacle itself, as Debord first defined it and as it has been taken up by contemporary thought, actually occludes the very question that it would give it philosophical import for a consideration of visual media culture, sociopolitical discourse, or more to the point, the particular nature of the relation between the two: What, exactly, is spectacular about spectacle? Indeed, by reducing the work of the image to the industrial register of technology, and thus to a metaphysic of capitalist alienation, the existing discourse of spectacle effectively occludes any way of thinking about the ontological force of the image itself—or rather, how and on what terms the graphic aesthetic dimension of the image helps produce social existence. As a work of film theory, Beller’s matter-of-fact definition of the image offers the most glaring expression of this elision. Nearly paraphrasing Debord’s own brief comment on the subject, he writes, “the image is simply a cryptic synonym for [capitalist] relations of production.”(4)

In “What Is Spectacle,” I begin from the premise that the most urgent political and aesthetic task for both film theory and political philosophy is to develop a more philosophically rigorous way of thinking about what it means to live in a “society of the spectacle.” Drawing from Ernesto Laclau’s rhetorical conception of the political and Georges Bataille’s writing on the spectacle of monstrosity, in particular, I turn to a close reading of aesthetically “spectacular” images to consider how we might rethink society and spectacle as discursive productions that are necessarily entwined at the level of aesthetics as well as technology—and precisely where the graphic dimension of these visual and linguistic productions of society overlap and blur together. In the process, I attempt to recast some of Jean-Luc Nancy’s comments on the ground of the image and the problem of representation, and to raise a new set of questions for both media theory and political philosophy.
Audio-Visual Memories: The Affective Mnemotechnics of Chris Marker’s La Jetée
Marcel Swiboda, University of Leeds

In the wake of the Bergsonian turn that has substantially influenced philosophical approaches to the medium of film in recent years – often though not always by way of Gilles Deleuze’s readings of the cinematic time- and movement-images – the theme of memory has become an increasingly prevalent refrain in philosophical (neo-)materialist approaches to cinema, film and audiovisual media more broadly. Where the work of philosophers such as Bergson and Deleuze has become something of a theoretical mainstay in thinking the relationship between philosophy and film, the contributions to be made to a thinking of film offered up by other philosophical figures working within a broadly ‘materialist’ tradition have in some cases yet to be thoroughly explored. Consider as a case in point the work of Nietzsche, whose thinking regarding the materiality of the body, corporeal and technological inscription as elaborated in his Genealogy of Morals clearly has much to offer an investigation of the materiality of film, in particular in instances where memory comprises a major component of the cinematic event. This case can readily be comprehended when one considers – amongst other examples – the ways in which mnemonic, corporeal, technological or prosthetic modes of inscription operate in films such as Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2000), or more recently in Ari Folman’s Waltz With Bashir (2007).

This paper will tap into various currents deriving from the recent scholarship in Deleuzian and Bergsonian approaches to memory in film, but not in order to merely reprise the key concepts and ideas associated with these thinkers, so much as to tap a deeper philosophical materialist vein exploring the ‘mnemotechnics’ of film, both at the level of cinematic representation and the ways in which the medium of film itself can be conceived as an apparatus of audio-visual mnemonic inscription and embodiment. The primary case-based focus for this examination will be Chris Marker’s 1962 film La Jetée – a film that epitomises the memory-cinema of French filmmakers during this period and remains one of the most enduring (and enduringly complex) filmic explorations of the subject. The ways in which this film constructs different kinds of ‘memory-image’ (by way of perceptual, affective, cultural and collective forms of memory) will provide the analytical and conceptual focus of this paper. The main theoretical materials to be brought to this task will be drawn from Nietzsche, Bergson and Deleuze, and also Bernard Stiegler, whose work on technics, ‘tertiary memory’ and ‘image-consciousness’ provides an exceptional in-road into the philosophical analysis of memory’s functioning within and as part of the medium of film.
Dream Screen Redux: The Phallic Placenta as a Signifying Absence in Freudian Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic Film Theory
Melinda Szaloky

In this paper I will take my cue from Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*, in which the authors have sketched out the outlines of a Kantian transcendental investigation, called schizoanalysis, in order to cleanse the prevalent image of the unconscious from the mythico-metaphysical trappings of the Oedipal paradigm. I will suggest a possible feminist appropriation of Deleuze and Guattari's de-oedipalizing schizoanalysis by a rereading of the phallic model of signification in *placental-umbilical* terms. The intricate logic of the biological functioning of the placenta will allow us to reevaluate not only the concept of the phallic mother, but also the significance of both the fetish and the partial or missing object (object of desire, *objet petit a*), as well as Freud's conception of the uncanny as a death-bringing *Doppelgänger*. Equally, the placenta – rather than the maternal breast – will emerge as a feasible prototype for the blank background or “dream screen” for Freud's pleasure-driven primary projection, which the cinematic apparatus and viewing experience can arguably make accessible. The parallel between Freud's primary process (or first fiction) and the placenta is supported by the word's etymology, which confirms an intimate tie between the placenta and the pleasure principle.

These realizations beg the question why Freudian psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic film theory have neglected to consider the foundational role of the placenta in the development of the ego based on castration and its disavowal. I will suggest that this neglect may have something to do with the remarkable analogy between the placental-umbilical dynamic of the enceinte and birthing womb and Kant’s transcendental subjectivity, founded on an unfathomable “mother wit” (*Mutterwitz*), and manifest in aesthetic reflection.

Indeed, the intriguing conceptual connections between (1) the Kantian bimodal aesthetic reflection and “disinterested” pleasure, (2) Freud’s phantasmatic primary process and (deathly) pleasure principle, and (3) the regressive-immersive yet at the same time self-aware cinema-viewing experience of the cine-fetishist certainly deserve further elaboration. Equally, more thought needs to be given to the implications of reevaluating the phallic economy of signification in placental-umbilical terms. Introducing the ephemeral maternofoetal organ of the placenta into psychoanalytic film theory as the prototypical fetish, phallus, dream screen, uncanny *Doppelänger*, virtual or lost maternal object and object of desire (*objet petit a*) may offer a way out of the theoretical stalemate encountered by feminist theories keyed to the patriarchal phallic system of reference proffered by Freud, and Lacan. Considering the placenta, moreover, as having the same functionality as Kant’s transcendental subject – that of a *focus imaginarius*, a virtual memory organ furnishing both the idea of plenitude and of lack, and making possible symbolic signification as a synthetic a priori – may add an unexpected physiological dimension to Kant’s transcendental idealism, as well as a novel twist to conceiving aesthetic practice and experience.
A Long Journey to Self-Redemption in *The Memory Keeper’s Daughter* and *Atonement*
Claudia Tai

No sooner are we conscious of having made serious mistakes and their following disastrous consequences than we are conscious of being led by our conscience to either evade from the ineradicable guilt by self-denial or amend the mistakes with effort by self-overcoming as a solitary fighter in a long-term battle of the self. Self-redemption is the most valuable reward only for those who eventually have their mistakes amended and guilt removed. Compared with the two films, *The Memory Keeper’s Daughter* and *Atonement*, this paper aims at proposing that humankind can be redeemed through self-overcoming and self-experimentation, as Nietzsche claims with his perspectivism. In *The Memory Keeper’s Daughter*, Dr David Henry chose to abandon his baby girl with Down’s syndrome in order to create a family of perfection and erase his shadowy memory which he was sad and impotent to help his weak sister and exhausted mother. In contrast, he was haunted and suffered by this wrong decision in his entire life of misery. After his death, his withered self was not only redeemed by the forgiveness of his family, but also bloomed again through the reunion of his family. Likewise, the writer Briony Tallis in *Atonement* spent her entire life lamenting her false accusation against her sister’s boyfriend and its fatal result to him and her sister. But Briony’s inventing a story of them with a happy ending not only helps her amend the mistake but also makes their love immortal. In *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, Nietzsche argues, “self-overcoming, with harsh and dreadful inventions: a means of having and demanding respect for oneself” (2003: 131). By way of self-overcoming and self-experimentation, Dr Henry in *The Memory Keeper’s Daughter* and Briony in *Atonement* reveal their determination to finish their harsh journeys and reach the destination of self-redemption in the end.
The time of the shot: Rhythm and gaze in Jean-Luc Godard’s Éloge de l’Amour and Werner Herzog’s Fata Morgana
Michael Tawa

Beginning with a close reading of two sequences – one from Jean-Luc Godard’s Éloge de l’Amour (2001), the other from Werner Herzog’s Fata Morgana (1970) - I propose to study two different strategies of montage in relation to time. Godard’s cut to black and Herzog’s extended gaze produce two kinds of temporality concerning the subjects being filmed, but they also produce alterations in the rhythm, articulation and fabric of the films. Such manipulations of time deliver radical fractures in the temporal setup, allowing cinema to touch on conditions of crisis in the representational regime of the image.

In the first example, the sequence does not stay with the face, or linger beyond the moment of the scene. The shot cuts to black a fracture of a second before its expected end, just as the actor’s eyes are being averted, just as they look down or away. This looking away is not to anything at the margins of or beyond the frame. In fact, the gaze looks beyond the setup itself, away from cinema and its artifice, into the inner character and subjectivity of the person. And yet this inner gaze is directed outward, outside both the film’s frame of reference and the subjective body. By cutting to black just as the gaze becomes peripatetic, Godard amplifies its transgressive potential. The character is left at the borderline of a troubled acquiescence, from where there can be no rescue, and the cinematic moment is abandoned at the instant of its fullest potential eloquence.

In the second sequence, the shot lingers well past the expected limits of a scene. The camera stays with the face to the point of exposing the subject to an excess of the gaze. By remaining with the face and filming around the moment of an ending, in anticipation of a cut that never comes, Herzog shows fragility at the core of time and being. The moment filmed is in fact the moment of the potential collapse of artifice, of the frame and the setup. Framing itself collapses since the camera, still running, has ceased to run for anything in particular. The moment opens a zone of uncertainty and ambiguity for both character and observer. What was deliverable within the setup and its agency is no longer possible, since the moment has eclipsed the opportunity presented. What is now made possible is something other, wholly fugitive, illicit and in excess of the frame. This is not the out-of-frame, which would still be part of the setup. Rather it is something in excess of cinema itself - a moment that delivers the sighted to a sense of its objectification by the gaze, to a sense of the aporia in which it finds itself. No longer part of a narrative and at the same time unable to escape the frame, the sighted becomes trapped between interminable capture and the impossibility of release.

The paper will explore the strategic and conceptual implications of such temporal manipulations in relation to key texts on rhythm by Pierre Sauvanet, on potentiality by Giorgio Agamben and on boredom and enframing by Martin Heidegger.
From the “psychoplasmic” offspring in *The Brood* (1979) to the tattooed encodings in *Eastern Promises* (2007), time and again, David Cronenberg presents a compelling vision of embodiment, which challenges traditional accounts of personal identity and obliges us to ask how human beings persist through different times, places, and bodily states while retaining their sameness. Traditionally, the response to this question has emphasised the importance of cognitive memory in securing the continuity of consciousness. But what has been underplayed in this debate is the question of how the body can both reinforce and disrupt the grounds for our personal identity. Accordingly, by turning the notoriously “body conscious” work of Cronenberg, especially his seminal *The Fly* (1986), I intend to pursue the relation between identity and embodiment in the following way.

First, by augmenting John Locke’s account of personal identity with a specific appeal to the body, I will explore how Cronenberg’s treatment of embodiment as a site of independent experience challenges the idea we have that cognitive memory is the guarantor of personal identity. As is viscerally evident in both *Videodrome* (1983) and *The Fly*, Cronenberg’s treatment of the “New Flesh” posits an account of the body that undermines the Cartesian and Lockean account of personal identity as being centred on the mind. In its place, I will argue that Cronenberg shows us how the body, through being primary, establishes a personality independently of the mind.

Second, through focusing explicitly on the phenomenology of body memory, I will explore how we, as embodied subjects, relate to our bodies in a Cronenberghian world. Approaching this relation between memory and embodiment via the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, I will argue that memory is at the heart of Cronenberg’s vision of body horror. While it is generally assumed that memory secures our sense of selfhood, in films such as *Spider* (1992) and *The Fly*, different and conflicting versions of the past materialises itself through the flesh of the body, alerting us, in Julia Kristeva’s words, to “A ‘something’ that I do not recognize as a thing.” By pursing this anonymous materiality at the core of identity, I will conclude by suggesting that far from generating unity, Cronenberg’s vision of embodiment and identity is diseased (often literally) by a memory that cannot be assimilated by cognition. The result of this failure to assimilate body memory, is that memory itself occupies the role of the monster within.
Greg Tuck

Tsukamoto Shinya, is a filmmaker clearly fascinated by the capacities and limitations of the body. However, what marks his work out from a phenomenological perspective is whether, in terms of its augmentation (*Tetsuo*), its capacity to endure pain (*Tokyo Fist*) or its erotic longing (*A Snake of June*), Tsukamoto’s bodies are always in deeply entwined and mutual determining relations with other bodies, relationship which are themselves conditioned by their specific situation. So while the biological body is never denied it is also never enough, but must find expression through wider cultural and historical forms of ‘lived’ intersubjective embodiment. As such his films seem to make manifest one of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s most provocative ideas: the chiasmic structure of the ‘flesh’.

Developed in his unfinished work *The Visible and the Invisible*, the Flesh was meant not as a crude appeal to our determination by empirical (meat), moral (sins of), or structural (whether social or linguistic) forces, but a profoundly dialectical notion concerning the absolute bond between self, others and world. Merleau-Ponty wanted to reject the ontological antinomy between the empirical and the rational, our determination by either matter or ideas, in favour of a more synthetic description of our incarnate historical being. The notion of the Flesh critiques the Cartesian proclivity towards antithesis that can be discerned in theories of ontology reliant on modes of determination (whether through discourse or matter) in favour of a dynamic reversibility between embodied subjects who are both enabled by and emerge from this flesh-of-the-world. It is not however an obliterating homogenisation but allows for a space of non-coincidence and difference which upholds the positive status of alterity in light of this bond. In *Vital*, Tsukamoto engages with the most challenging notion of alterity and seemingly irreversible condition of the Flesh, death.

The narrative concerns Hiroshi, a young medical student who awakes with amnesia, unaware that the road accident has taken the life of his girlfriend, Ryoko. A chance encounter with an anatomy textbook rekindles his memories of his previous devotion to his studies and he returns to University. A fellow student Ikumi, feels drawn to him but realises she has to compete with a presence that even Hiroshi cannot name. When the body that Hiroshi is charged to dissect turns out to be Ryoko’s the scene is set for a extraordinary materialisation of his mourning as Hiroshi becomes fixated on finding what he has lost. As he delves deeper into his own feelings and her body he begins to ‘meet’ Ryoko in a strange dream space that he insists are neither memories nor dreams. Here, Ryoko is very much alive, an extraordinary dancer full of vital energy. It is this engagement with a vital, embodied Ryoko that enables Hiroshi to both discover and understand his lost love and open up the possibility for new engagements with the living. It is how the film materialises these ‘feelings’, how it articulates the empirical with the emotional, reverses the visual and the tactile, articulates dead bodies with live flesh, not least through the dialectical relationship it displays between the two modes in which embodiment is explored, dance and dissection, that will be the focus of this paper.
Out of the Past: Noir Temporality and Symbolic Structure
Ben Tyrer

This paper contends that, given the thoroughgoing criticism of Lacan and despite the current turn towards philosophy in film studies, psychoanalytic theory must not be abandoned. To this end, I propose a new reading of the constitution of the critical category of film noir in terms of Lacan’s point de capon (“quilting point”) and his theorisation of the retroactive construction of meaning. This does not entail a regression to the investigations of film, language and psychoanalysis articulated in the 1970s (Metz, Screen); rather it is a return to the site of this encounter to plot a new trajectory for psychoanalytic enquiry into the cinema. While the intersection of psychoanalysis and noir is of course well-trodden ground, the major interventions in the field (Kaplan, Krutnik) have been oriented towards questions of gender and representation, leaving largely unexplored the possibility of noir’s relation to Lacan’s theory of signification, as presented in his seminar on The Psychoses and his écrits ‘The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious’ and ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire’. It is a truism of film criticism that noir is a retroactive category. However, this function is insufficiently understood in noir historiography (Naremore, et al.), which tends only to give passing consideration to the theoretical implications of this widely acknowledged characterisation. Following Cohen-Séat’s (1958) distinction, this paper explores both the cinematic and the filmic, investigating a wealth of writing on noir as well as various film noir tropes that support this conception of noir as constituted ex post facto. The history of the production and reception of noir, as well some noir films themselves, in fact indicate a philosophy of language, predicated on the retroactive production of meaning, which is irresistibly suggestive of Lacanian structure. Reading noir with Lacan, it is possible to say that this retroactive “noir temporality” is the temporality of the Symbolic order. As such, this paper will explore the way in which the signifier “noir” functions as a point de capon in the study of film, first enabling the analysis of a certain type of Hollywood film from the 1940s and 1950s (Borde and Chaumeton) and now standing in metonymically for an entire cinematic discourse, and the way in which individual films noirs – Double Indemnity (1944) and D.O.A. (1950) – are thoroughly concerned with the retroactive production of knowledge through narrative structure.
W
Dara Waldron

Critical reaction to Michael Haneke's Caché has tended to centre on an intersection of themes and formal issues: from surveillance to the time-image; the real and imaginary to the historical; the violated to the retrenching violator. Underpinning these approaches is a recurrent interest in Haneke's unravelling of knotted configurations of self and other, similarity and alterity, against a politic narrative which marries to the public arena of intellectual life the private space of the bourgeois home. Such criticism revolves around a discussion of investigative concerns primarily rooted in historical negation; the cinematic apparatus used to renegotiate the parameters of social memory, life and thought. However, this paper argues that readings like this tend to amplify one of the directors philosophical concerns - the historical event and its traces in the present - at the expense of the other; the projecting of historical trauma onto an Other as a displacement of a private onto a public trauma. In the first case, the 'hidden' indicated by the title coalesces around a hidden perpetrator considered 'offscreen' in the Bazinian sense, and therefore a public Other Georges, the film's protagonist, must seek to confront and possibly destroy. In the second what is inevitably hidden to the viewer when accepting this projection as the true origin of the crime is the perpetrator of the crime itself; argued in this paper to be the private trauma centred around Pierrot, Georges's son. The point of this is that by concealing the perpetrator through his very onscreen presence critical reaction which emphasises the first point misses the second. It is argued then by placing emphasis on the second Haneke's strategy consists of strategically unveiling the perpetrator at the beginning of the film and then developing a narrative of suspense around the various trails of investigative rumour stipulated by there being another. By doing this Haneke borrows elemental tropes from Edgar Allen Poe's The Purloined Letter. For Poe, the moral of the purloined letter is that the hidden is able to rest less because of the degrees of innuendo and deceit that lead to its concealment than the credo that it will be missed when located at the very apex of the gaze. In a similar vein, Haneke revels in a play of concealment and revelation which draws on this operation to subtly endear critical aplomp. It is therefore argued that Caché operates both as a tale of memory and the returning repressed, self and the violating other but primarily the traumatic crack in a Self envisaged by the private family. That is, one whose gaze, by displacing internal traumas onto a public external other anticipates the films own critical reception referred to in this paper.
Glare and Erosion: Disorder in Narrative and the Uncertainty of the Image
Liz Watkins

Drawing from the work of Mary Ann Doane (2002) the paradox between contingency and rationalisation infuses the emergence of narrative form eliciting the affectivity of cinema as engaging a fascination and fear of disorder and uncertainty. This paper is situated amidst an analysis of colour aesthetics which engages with the cinematic archive as a photographic material in which colour resolution is variably sensitive to light, liquids and deterioration. A focus on the residual effects of the photographic opens a space in which to examine the significance of characteristics such as transparency, saturation for film theories of subjectivity, perception and desire. An address of photographic effects such as glare and instances where the screen is enveloped by colour in *Walkabout* (Nicolas Roeg, 1971) and *Picnic at Hanging Rock* (Peter Weir, 1975) addresses colour as a nexus of instabilities and unresolved processes which participates in the positioning of the spectator in relation to the screen as fantasy object. Both films foreground the process of image erosion within the layered temporalities integral to narratives which are drawn about a sense of disorientation; the young women who go missing during the St Valentine’s Day picnic, the two children driven to leave the violence of their father in the expanse of a sparse landscape. Sequences where the screen is encompassed by just one colour turn away from the story and return to cinema (Mulvey, 2006), and trace emotional or physical excess to operate as a matrix of the psychic, somatic and visible (M. Zee-Jotti), drawing the film material in to the midst of perception. This paper addresses such instances as an image of colour and film material. It is in this sense that a philosophical and phenomenological address of the physical characteristics of the film (Laura U Marks; Sobchack) finds that glare paradoxically remarks the spatial temporal co-ordinates of the camera and traces the photographic index, closing down the depth of field in move that is evocative of close-up in moment suggestive of disorientation within the film’s narrative form. This paper traces the minutiae and feint aspects of the visual and aural registers, drawn into the midst of the perceptual field so that within a familiar architecture fabricated from colour contrasts and shapes, the interplay of tenebrous colour and glare indicate the limits of the film stock and colour resolution to obfuscate the image. It is in this sense that this paper turns to Sobchack’s writing on Merleau-Ponty’s sense of embodied consciousness and the cinematic to address an *image of colour* to reconsider the temporal and spatial significance of the fragility of the film for theories of spectatorship.
Nietzsche, Wagner, Riefenstahl, von Baky, Chaplin: Aesthetics, Politics, and Play in Postmodern Culture

Daniel White,

The ‘masterpiece’ of Nazi cinema, Münchhausen, was produced in Berlin during 1943 under the auspices of Goebbels, as the German army met disaster on the Russian front. Crafting the picture out of the twin genres of the Bergfilm (“mountain film,” e.g., The Blue Light) and the propaganda film (e.g., Triumph of the Will), Münchhausen’s director Josef von Baky created a synthesis of Nazi politics and culture in a veritable Gesamtkunstwerk (“total art work” as in Wagner’s Ring Cycle), reflecting the values of Gesamtkrieg (“total war” or, in Gōbels’ phraseology, echoing Ludendorff and Clausewitz, Der totale Krieg). Oddly and even daringly, as Eric Rentschler argues in The Ministry of Illusion, von Baky merges technological finesse, elaborate stage mechanics, dramatic flourish, and erudite humor in a self-representation of German fascism at its apogee. This was a film “extravaganza,” a perfect “anesthetization of politics” (Ästhetisierung der Politik) in Walter Benjamin’s terms, which the Nazis hoped would compete with The Wizard of Oz (1939). Goebbels lavished support on the picture as the product of Nazi media culture in its finest hour, even if the film’s popular function was to create delightful and confident distraction from Germany’s emerging cataclysm.

The seeds out of which Münchhausen grew were also planted by Wagner’s innovations in German opera and Nietzsche’s alternatively playful and bitter critique of his countrymen’s bombast evident both in Wagner’s artistry and its encircling political milieu, the 19th century Reich. Inspired by Wagner’s fusion of myth, music, poetry, and drama in a new language of public display, yet repelled by his egotistical and racist self-promotion, Nietzsche at first hailed and subsequently denounced Wagner’s works, almost like the acrobat envisioned by his character Zarathustra, walking a philosophic tightrope in what Benjamin called the “play space” (Spielraum) between his own dichotomous critical responses. Leni Riefenstahl, in her acting and directing career, embraced both the German romanticism of Wagner in her Bergfilme and the political ascendancy of German imperial might personified by Hitler in her propaganda films. But, as Susan Sontag suggests in “Fascinating Fascism,” Riefenstahl succumbed to Wagner’s egotism in her inability to rise even to the sophistication of von Baky’s filmic sense of humor. In fact, the comic reparte of Münchhausen was not really funny so much as a series of comedic forays designed, like Elizabeth Nietzsche’s edition of her brother’s “book” Will to Power, to please the Führer. (Peter Viereck called Hitler “an aesthete with brass knuckles,” Metapolitics, p. xxi). It took a change of cultural perspective and political orientation, in the films of Charlie Chaplin, to make that humor sting. In The Great Dictator (1940), for instance, he lampooned Riefenstahl’s mythic hero (Hitler) as a clown with big guns and even bigger aspirations. In this vein Chaplin matched Nietzsche’s philosophic rejection of German culture in “What the Germans Lack” (Twilight of the Idols, sec. 8). As Ian Ward comments, “If Byron was the hero of the past, Charlie Chaplin was to be the Nietzschean hero to come” (Introduction to Critical Legal Theory, p. 157).

By discussing selected scenes from the aforementioned films, I propose to sketch the philosophy of critical play as it emerged in Nietzsche’s texts, especially in his reactions to Wagner’s operas and Germany’s Reich, particularly as his insights found their expressions in the imperially sanctioned humor of von Baky and (and I don’t claim any direct Nietzschean influence here) the oppositional humor of Chaplin. Indeed, Chaplin himself could have become a hero of the Allied capitalist West were it not for his astute recognition, e.g., in Modern Times (1936), that the emerging American and Western European media culture was itself becoming tyrannical—full of “confident and delightful distractions” like the flowers in the Land of the Lotus Eaters (Homer, Odyssey IX)—just as Horkheimer and Adorno claimed in “The Culture Industry” and Marcuse lamented in One Dimensional Man. My hope is to provide a Nietzschean critical perspective both on fascism and its opposition—on the tightrope between which Frankfurt School Critical Theory emerged like Zarathustra—to point toward a postmodern philosophy of liberation in which culture truly becomes humane play.
Realism and Narrating in Depth  
Cato Wittusen

In this paper, I will focus on deep narration and discuss it with an eye to Bazin’s conception of realism in cinema. I take the concept of temporal frequency, where a plot element is viewed several times, as an important element in deep narrating. I will discuss the function of this narrative technique in relation to questions about realism and the notion of closure of reality within film. Interestingly, the technique can be used in various ways: by screening the exact same plot portion several times or by showing the same act from different perspectives, for example.

Bazin was famously concerned with realism, with regard to both storytelling aspects and cinematography. He spoke about the aesthetic value of realism in terms of motion pictures respecting the continuum of reality, i.e. the unity of image in space and time. He suggested that shooting in depth is a technique that brings the spectator closer to the screened reality. For Bazin, an important function of realism (and the “aesthetic of reality”) is that it makes the spectator participate more actively in the story.

In discussing the phenomenon of frequency and deep narration, I will engage the Danish TV series Performances (2006), directed by Per Fly. The use of temporal frequency, however, is anything but new. The so-called double monologue in Ingmar Bergman’s Persona and Susan Alexander’s first night Opera performance in Orson Welles’ Citizen Kane are well-known examples of this phenomenon that will be briefly addressed in my paper. However, in contrast to these famous examples, the technique constitutes a much more fundamental principle in Performances, where it shapes the overall viewing experience in interesting ways. Performances features 6 episodes and the plot takes place during the rehearsal period for a Shakespearean play. It revolves around the stage play’s director, Marko, and 5 other characters with which he has fairly complicated relationships (his partner, daughter, ex-wife, best friend, and an actor in the play). Thematically, the series is, among other things, about love and friendship, the value of art, lack of communication, etc.

Each episode is narrated from the vantage point of one of the six characters. We are presented with important events in that character’s life during the rehearsal time. The range of story information is, therefore, relatively restricted. The narration, however, is fairly objective. As we watch the episodes and the story terrain gets more and more detailed, we frequently forget that we are presented with a flashback. We are gradually involved in a form of investigation of these peoples’ various relationships with the director. Importantly, we get to see many of the events several times. Thus, the narration becomes, little by little, less restricted. The narrative form of the drama, which explores the effect of temporal frequency, exercises a strong effect on us. It engages and challenges our relationship with the characters.

The narrative style sensitizes the viewer with regard to the depicted events. The meaning and the fullness of many of the story’s events are subject to change as we watch the six episodes. We are forced to rethink what we have seen and learned about particular events and the persons involved. The process may make us see the meaning of our own words and actions in a new light. In the thick of human interaction, we are not able to fully oversee the whole swirl of meaning determining contexts that facilitate others’ understanding of our words and actions.
Basket Case (short film)
Martin Wyllie

'Basket Case' is an attempt to make 'subjective' psychopathological experience 'objective'. The film shows my own struggle with mental illness by making accessible to others some of the phenomenological aspects of psychopathology which are often difficult to captured in ordinary language.
Y
Cinematic Immersion and Aesthetic Experience
Daniel Yacavone

Whether it is defined in relation to perceptual, imaginative, or affective processes (or some combination of these), becoming immersed in an art work and its world is an important aspect of aesthetic experience. Cinema is often singled out by critics and theorists as a medium and an art form particularly suited to creating, or allowing for, such immersion. But what is the best way to conceive of the immersive dimensions of films as works of art?

In this paper I will assume that how we choose to characterise a viewer’s immersion into a film and its created world largely depends upon two factors. Firstly, ‘where’ we figuratively situate the viewer vis-à-vis the film’s world, both initially, and as that world unfolds in and through time (given cinema’s complex temporality); and secondly, how we define the nature of the viewer’s subjective contribution to that world (e.g. its perceptual or imaginative, voluntary or involuntary, status) and its relation to the appreciation and understanding of a cinematic work.

With this in mind, I will briefly discuss two models of aesthetic experience in which immersion plays a prominent part, and which also have a relevance to influential paradigms in contemporary film studies, including phenomenological ones. The first, formulated by the late British philosopher R.K Elliott, hinges on a distinction between experiencing a work of art “from without” and experiencing it “from within” (“Aesthetic Theory and the Experience of Art,” 1967), the latter entailing a freer imaginative interaction with the work, allowing for a deeper experience of its expressive qualities. The second is to be found in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophy of art (as elucidated in Truth and Method and other writings), with its inter-related concepts of ‘play’, ‘structure’, and ‘world’, and its focus on the art work as a trans-subjective event of truth. I will consider the relative merits of these models in relation to the immersive experience of narrative films, with reference to examples drawn from modern and contemporary art cinema, including Michelangelo Antonioni’s Blow-Up and Béla Tarr’s Sátántangó. Although Elliott’s main contention that engaging with art works not only involves the distanced and “disinterested” perceptual scrutiny of ‘aesthetic objects’, but also having aesthetic experiences that are fully felt and “lived,” has a direct bearing on cinema, I will argue that it is Gadamer’s conception of the artistic event that is best able to encapsulate the full nature of cinematic immersion, with regards to a film as both an object and an experience.

Moreover, Gadamer’s account is compatible with an important self-reflexive component to cinematic immersion, often overlooked or denied in contemporary approaches to these issues, whereby the continual recognition and awareness of the artistically constructed nature of the worlds of films as they unfold (as well as the cinematic, artistic, and historical realities from which they emerge) is simultaneous with this immersion, and, in some instances, may even allow for it. On this model the alterity and autonomy of the cinematic work of art, and of its experience, is preserved, while the viewer, as an individual subjectivity, is granted an interested and active perceptual, imaginative, and cognitive engagement with films and their worlds.